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H-NET BOOK REVIEW
Published by [log in to unmask] (June, 1998)
I. Bernard Cohen. _Science and the Founding Fathers: Science in
the Political Thought of Jefferson, Franklin, Adams, and Madison_.
Corrected edition. New York: W. W. Norton, 1995, 1997. 368 pp.
Illustrations, bibliographical references, and index. $25.00
(cloth), ISBN 0-393-03501-8; $15.95 (paper), ISBN 0-393-31510-X.
Reviewed for H-Law by Shalom Doron
<[log in to unmask]>, Brooklyn College/CUNY and R. B.
Bernstein <[log in to unmask]>, New York Law School and Brooklyn
College/CUNY
Exploring the Age of Experiments in Government
In the past half century, historians and other scholars who study
the origins of the Constitution and the political achievements of
the revolutionary generation have spawned a rich interdisciplinary
literature. These scholars have shown the influence on those
achievements of just about every realm of thought--political,
religious, cultural, ethnographic--except one. By and large,
historians, political scientists, and constitutional and legal
scholars either have overlooked the influences of science on
Americans' political thought and action in this era, or they have
contented themselves with superficial and hasty references betraying
their own lack of knowledge of such matters as Newtonian physics.[1]
For this reason, _Science and the Founding Fathers_ is a
groundbreaking work on the creation of the American Republic. I.
Bernard Cohen, now the Victor S. Thomas Professor Emeritus of the
History of Science at Harvard University, helped launch the history
of science as an academic discipline; the first recipient of an
American university's Ph.D. degree in the field, he has done
pioneering work on such subjects as Newton's _Principia_ and
Benjamin Franklin's science.[2] In the book under review, Cohen
investigates the role of science in the "age of experiments in
government," seeking to correct what he sees as a gross oversight
by scholars of American political, legal, and constitutional
history. Written in simple, engaging prose, _Science and the
Founding Fathers_ deserves praise as a book that explains, for those
with little or no scientific background, complex scientific ideas
and their connections to the political thought of the Founding
Fathers.
Cohen argues "that scientific issues were related to the political
thought and also the political action of our Founding Fathers" (p.
13). The revolutionary generation was heavily influenced by the
Enlightenment, with its great emphasis on science; they based much
of their political theory on scientific ideas and defended their
theories by analogies from the physical, mechanical, and biological
sciences.
In his first chapter, "Science and American History," Cohen examines
the impact of the Enlightenment, also known as the "Age of Reason,"
on Americans of the revolutionary generation. He shows that many of
the Founding Fathers--including Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin,
John Adams, and James Madison, the main subjects of this
study--repeatedly used scientific ideals, concepts, and analogies to
formulate and support ideas about government. These scientific
concepts and analogies drew primarily, though by no means
exclusively, on the "twin luminaries" of the Enlightenment, the
philosopher John Locke and the scientist Isaac Newton. Says Cohen,
"There can be no doubt that the Founding Fathers displayed a
knowledge of scientific concepts and principles which establishes
their credentials as citizens of the Age of Reason" (p. 60).
Chapter Two, "Science and the Political Thought of Thomas Jefferson:
The Declaration of Independence," begins by exploring Jefferson's
relationship with science in general and with Newtonian physics in
particular. Jefferson's education in science was extensive, and he
manifested his interest in the promotion of science through the
active roles he played to expand scientific knowledge, both as
president of the American Philosophical Society (an honor he valued
more highly than his election in the same year as vice president of
the United States) and as president of the United States. The most
important example of his promotion of scientific knowledge was his
devising of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, which would explore the
territory to the west of what was in 1803 the United States (and
which the United States ultimately acquired through the Louisiana
Purchase). In preparation for the expedition, President Jefferson
had his choice as its leader, Captain Meriwether Lewis, trained by
leading American scientists in botany, anatomy, zoology, astronomy,
and Indian history. Furthermore, in a remarkable confidential
letter that was in effect the expedition's charter, Jefferson
instructed Lewis to gather extensive scientific data about the
country he would be passing through and its flora, fauna, and
inhabitants.[3]
In the 1780s, Jefferson--ever the patriot--used his scientific
training and methodology to counter "the widely held 'scientific'
theory that plants and animals, and even human beings, of the New
World were inferior to those of the Old" (p. 73). French
naturalists, led by the Comte de Buffon, argued that all life
"degenerated" in America. Jefferson responded in his only
full-length book, _Notes on the State of Virginia_, with an analysis
of extensive specimens (which he had collected and preserved as
evidence) proving that plant and animal life was as large and
healthy in America as in Europe, if not more so--thus proving that
America was the equal, and perhaps even the superior, of Europe.[4]
Cohen then discusses how "Jefferson's most renowned political
statement, the Declaration of Independence, exhibits signs of his
commitment to the Newtonian Philosophy" (p. 68). Cohen finds
Newtonian echoes in the preamble of the Declaration of Independence,
where "Jefferson defines the 'separate and equal station' as one to
which the people are entitled by 'the Laws of Nature'" (p. 110). In
using the plural "Laws," rather than the singular "Law," Cohen
argues, Jefferson was referring not to the common law, but to the
scientific "Laws of Nature," a reference to Newton's laws of motion.
Referring to human rights as "self evident," Jefferson means to
say, in Cohen's view, that they are "axioms," just as the "Laws of
Nature" were considered to be "axioms," but in the Newtonian sense,
not the Euclidian sense--that is, the truths of the Declaration "are
plainly self evident only in a particular way" (p. 133).
Cohen's third chapter, "Benjamin Franklin: A Scientist in the World
of Public Affairs," outlines Franklin's extensive scientific
credentials, including his work in the new science of electricity,
of which he was a principal founder. (Here Cohen draws on his work
on Franklin covering more than five decades, from his 1941 edition
of Franklin's _Experiments and Observations on Electricity_ to his
1990 collection of essays, _Benjamin Franklin's Science_.[5]) Cohen
first proves that Franklin's reputation as a scientist was an
important qualification for his appointment to diplomatic office,
first as colonial agent (that is, lobbyist for several American
colonies) to the parliament and king of Great Britain, and later,
with the coming of the American Revolution, as American minister
plenipotentiary to France. Cohen then discusses the examples of
scientific analogy that appear in Franklin's political thought and
arguments. Most notable of these is Franklin's argument in favor of
a unicameral legislature for the new nation, wherein he compared
John Adams's suggested two-house legislature to a specimen of
natural history, a two-headed snake which, if "one head should
choose to go on one side of the stem of a bush and the other head
should prefer the other side...neither of the heads would consent to
come back or give way to the other" (p. 155), and the snake--and by
analogy the nation--would die. This episode illustrates how Cohen's
perspective enriches our understandings of perennial subjects of
scholarly inquiry; though the controversy over unicameral versus
bicameral legislatures has long been a staple of historians'
understandings of the evolution of American constitutionalism,[6] no
previous scholar has noted the invocation of scientific analogies by
the key figures in that dispute.
Like Jefferson, Franklin used science to promote the importance of
America. In his 1751 pamphlet, "Observations Concerning the
Increase of Mankind," Franklin used the mathematical science of
demography to study the population explosion in America as compared
with Europe, "predicting that under the American conditions which
provided unchecked growth, the population would double every twenty
or twenty-five years" (p. 158); from these calculations, Franklin
concluded that "British America was destined to become the most
populous and the most important part of the British system" (p.
159).
Cohen's third chapter, "Science and Politics: Some Aspects of the
Thought and Career of John Adams," deals with science in Adams's
political thought, as seen through Adams's debate with John Taylor
of Caroline in the early 1800s over the principle of balance in
government. Though Adams was not as well-versed in science as
Jefferson or Franklin, his Harvard education (in particular, his
studies with Professor John Winthrop) gave him a background in both
physics and mathematics. By choosing "balance," most notably
"balance of power" and "balance of property," as the basis of his
political philosophy, Adams rejected Newton's dynamics, the study of
forces and accelerations, for the equilibrium of statics, "the
science of forces at rest" (p. 216). Adams attributed to the
seventeenth-century English political thinker James Harrington (who
predated Newton) this concept of political power balanced by its
proportion to ownership of land; Harrington believed "that the
physical sciences are of absolutely no use as sources of analogies
for political discourse" (p. 217). Cohen's crucial point is that
Adams's balance was _not_ Newtonian, for all that he seems to have
thought it was.
Responding to John Taylor's charge that the Constitution of the
United States might be "complicated with the idea of a balance" (p.
225), Adams responded with an image "of balanced machinery, of
wheels within wheels" (p. 226), which promotes equilibrium in the
system, which the people desire for its tendency to promote their
interests. Indeed, according to Adams, the people "have invented a
balance to all balances in their caucuses," where, Adams wrote,
"_elections are decided_" (p. 226). Adams _did_ cite Isaac
Newton's third law of motion--erroneously--to defend this system of
balance in the context of his argument for a bicameral legislature.
In response to Franklin's ridicule of the system as impractical,
Adams cited Newton's third law--"'that reaction must always be equal
and contrary to reaction,' or there can never be any _rest_" (p.
229). Adams, Cohen notes, had forgotten the meaning of Newton's
third law, which applies to the forces that bodies exert on each
other, not equal and opposite forces acting on the same body, which
produces Adams's image of equilibrium or "rest." Adams's political
theory, while scientific, was not Newtonian, though Adams still
sought to "hang his hat" on that esteemed sage of the Enlightenment.
In his fifth and final chapter, "Science and the Constitution,"
Cohen studies science as it influenced the political thought of
James Madison and other members of the Federal Convention of 1787,
as it emerges in the text of the Constitution, and as it was used by
Madison to defend the Constitution in his essays in _The
Federalist_. This chapter also serves as an epilogue to pull
together all the diffuse parts of the book and represent them as a
cohesive whole, arguing a single thesis.
Cohen begins this chapter with the single direct reference to
science in the Constitution--namely, the power granted to Congress
under Article I, section 8, clause 8: "To promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the Exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries." Cohen analyzes the various versions of the provision
recommended in and considered by the Convention, as well as some
practical applications, such as the invention of the steamboat.
Cohen continues with a discussion of whether the Constitution is a
Newtonian document, citing Woodrow Wilson and others, who contend
that it is Newtonian (and, in Wilson's case, Darwinian as well),
both in its structure and its background. Cohen sets out to
disprove those claims, and achieves his goal. In sum, he agrees
with the late political scientist and historian Clinton Rossiter
that, even though it goes too far to say that the Constitution is a
Newtonian document, Newtonian physics and the science of the
Enlightenment in general "quickened the advance toward free
government" (p. 255) in three ways--by conquering superstition; by
its kinship with democracy, leading promoters of science to promote
"free government" as well; and by its system of "immutable natural
laws," which gave "sanction to the doctrine of natural law" (p.
256). Moreover, as Cohen notes, the Constitution's framers did make
extensive use of scientific metaphors and analogies in the debates
over the Constitution, both in the Convention and during the
ratification controversy.
For example, _The Federalist_, the handiwork of Alexander Hamilton,
John Jay, and James Madison, was the primary book of arguments for
the proponents of the Constitution during the ratification
controversy. Cohen shows that its authors often used scientific
metaphors, even though science was not their primary concern. "What
is significant, therefore," Cohen notes, "is not that science
provided metaphors in a prominent way for the authors of _The
Federalist_, but rather the fact that there are any such metaphors
at all" (p. 272). Scientific references in _The Federalist_
indicate that science pervaded the thought of its authors, and of
the Revolutionary generation as a whole, so completely that they
referred to it unconsciously in their political debates.
Cohen's overarching thesis is that science influenced the political
theories and debates of the Revolutionary generation, by providing
them with ideals to achieve and models to imitate, as well as
analogies to support and illustrate their arguments in debate.
Cohen makes his thesis more complex by implying, in his last
chapter, that the influence of science is not always deliberate.
That is, the Founders did not necessarily incorporate scientific
language into their arguments intentionally; rather, it had become
second nature to them.
We have two serious criticisms of this book, neither of which
reduces its importance as a groundbreaking work in the field of
early American history. The first is structural, or perhaps,
editorial: this book is too diffuse. In attempting to open up a
completely new approach to the study of the formation of the
American Republic, Cohen has tried, and predictably failed, to
address every important aspect of the scientific influence in the
politics of the period. Attempting to do too much is always a
danger when one goes "where no one has gone before." Furthermore,
Cohen's method of burying discussions of key issues in "Supplements"
rather than in integrating them into his main text, and of failing
to provide clear cross-references to those Supplements at points
when they would illuminate his discussion, often leaves the reader
at sea.
Our second, more serious criticism is that Cohen insists that every
scientific reference that he, an expert on science and its history,
finds in the writings of the Revolutionary generation, must be
intentional and must therefore imply or contain every meaning that
he finds within it. Cohen's thesis would become richer and more
accurate if he expanded it to say that even the political theory of
the Revolutionary generation sometimes draws on science quite by
accident, because science permeated their thinking, and therefore
such references do not necessarily mean or imply all that Cohen
claims they do. (Cohen's acknowledgment, previously mentioned, that
scientific references were second-nature to the Revolutionary
generation to the extent of being unconscious or inadvertent should
have been more central to his argument.)
When, for example, Jefferson referred to "the Laws of Nature" and
"self evident" truths in the Declaration of Independence, he did not
necessarily intend to imply the more specific Newtonian references
that Cohen attributes to him. Thus, Jefferson's inadvertent
resonances with Newtonian thought are analogous, so to speak, to
James Madison's use of scientific analogies in _The Federalist_.
Moreover, recall Cohen's insistence that Jefferson was the American
of his generation who was by far most conversant with Newtonian
physics. Had Jefferson intended to incorporate direct and specific
references to Newtonian physics in the Declaration, by Cohen's own
analysis Jefferson would have been writing over the heads of the
vast majority of his intended audience--including the other two
leading members of the committee assigned to draft the Declaration,
John Adams and Benjamin Franklin. (Cohen notes that, because
Franklin could not read Latin, he could not read Newton's original
Latin text of the _Principia_; there is no evidence that Franklin
owned or read the contemporary English translation of Newton's
leading work.)
By claiming that all these scientific implications or resonances
were in fact intended, and so understood by contemporary readers,
Cohen is guilty of the very crime that he accuses experts on legal
and political history of committing--that of claiming ultimate
authority, by virtue of his expertise as a historian of science, to
interpret American founding documents "in all cases whatsoever." As
we have noted, Cohen sells his thesis short by limiting it as he
does; a more complex reading of the evidence does not diminish his
achievement, but rather enhances it immensely. We look forward to
further work in this vein--by historians of politics, law, and
science--which will expand on what Cohen has begun, and thus enrich
our knowledge of the founding of the American republic and the
complex interactions among scientific ideas, technological
innovations, and constitutional arrangements in American history.
Acknowledgement: the reviewers wish to acknowledge the
contributions of Shamaila Afzal, Eric Bemben, Anthony Chu, Elsie
Gottesman, Christopher W. Hanke, Catherine Layden, Ahmed Mohassib,
Ysidro A. Mora, Moshe (Brad) Nemetski, Marya Riche, Josh Schenbart,
and Max S. Valcourt, students at Brooklyn College enrolled in
Professor Bernstein's spring 1998 History 43.9 course, "Science,
Technology, and the Constitution in American History," for their
discussions of this book and their contributions to our
understanding of its strengths and weaknesses. We also wish to
thank Daniel M. Lyons, Brooklyn College/CUNY '39, for endowing the
Daniel M. Lyons Visiting Professorship in American History at
Brooklyn College that made History 43.9 possible.
Notes
[1]. But see Michael Foley, _Law, Men and Machines: Modern
American Government and the Appeal of Newtonian Mechanics_ (London
and New York: Routledge, 1990), which discusses previous historians'
superficial and careless references to Newtonianism and the
Constitution.
[2]. For example, I. Bernard Cohen, _Introduction to Newton's
"Principia"_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 1971); I. Bernard Cohen, _The Newtonian Revolution_
(Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1980); I. Bernard
Cohen, _Revolution in Science_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, 1985); and I. Bernard Cohen,
_Interactions_ (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994).
[3]. Thomas Jefferson, "Instructions to Captain Lewis," 20 June
1803, reprinted in Merrill D. Peterson, ed., _Thomas Jefferson:
Writings_ (New York: Library of America, 1984), 1126-1132.
[4]. See generally Thomas Jefferson (William Peden, ed.), _Notes on
the State of Virginia_ (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North
Carolina Press for the Institute of Early American History and
Culture, 1955); Charles A. Miller, _Jefferson and Nature: An
Interpretation_ (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993);
Antonello Gerbi (Jeremy Moyle, ed. and trans.), _The Dispute of the
New World_ (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973);
Henry Steele Commager, _The Empire of Reason: How Europe Imagined
and America Realized the Enlightenment_ (New York: Anchor
Press/Doubleday, 1977); Henry Steele Commager and Elmo Giordanetti,
eds., _Was America a Mistake? An Eighteenth-Century Controversy_
(New York: Harper and Row, 1967); and Richard B. Bernstein with Kym
S. Rice, _Are We to Be a Nation? The Making of the Constitution_
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987), chapter Five.
[5]. I. Bernard Cohen, ed., _Benjamin Franklin's "Experiments": A
New Edition of Franklin's "Experiments and Observations on
Electricity"..._ (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1941); I. Bernard Cohen, _Franklin and Newton_ (Philadelphia:
American Philosophical Society, 1956); I. Bernard Cohen, _Benjamin
Franklin's Science_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard
University Press, 1990).
[6]. See generally Gordon S. Wood, _The Creation of the American
Republic, 1776-1787_ (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North
Carolina Press, 1969; rept., with new introduction, 1998); Donald
S. Lutz, _The Origins of American Constitutionalism_ (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1988); Willi Paul Adams (Rita and
Robert Kimber, trans.), _The First American Constitutions_ (Chapel
Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1980); Jackson
Turner Main, _The Upper House in Revolutionary America, 1763-1787_
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967); and Bernstein with
Rice, _Are We to Be a Nation?_, Chapters Two and Five.
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