Given the brilliance of the discussion of Sidgwick and Coase, I am
hesitant to ask a question that probably should have been answered
for me in Econ 10, back in 1962-63, except James Tobin was priming
the pump and I went on to become a political theorist.
I have a question about Coase, that has been intensified by the
discussion -- especially the noise around the airport example. My
impression is that Coase, whom I have not read for about two decades,
is absolutely brilliant in terms of giving a free market,
individualistic, static explanation of how, in any circumstances
where the costs of negotiation are low (zero?), the two parties will
come up with the optimal solution for each of the parties. That is
fine, but has always struck me as very individualistic, with no
attention to what I would think of as social interests. Cannot, for
instance, there be a social decision (a governmental dictate) that
airplanes should be forced to try to reduce their noise, and
therefore the government should introduce a bias into the
negotiations, or a regulation that insists that noise be reduced
(rather than individuals be moved -- and traditional communities be
upset). The society / the government might think, for instance, that
restrictions on noise might lead to technological innovation about
noise control that would produce benefits throughout the society, or
that penalizing noise (rather than everyone on Long Island who lives
under the JFK air lanes) is a socially more acceptable result. Or,
to go to the example I remember from Coase, why not make the
railroads reduce their sparks -- perhaps also by giving them a
corridor that farmers need to stay out of.
The main reason I mention this issues is that, when I first ran
across Coase, it seemed to me that environmental issues were
completely ignored by his article -- or, rather, they were left to
the negotiations of the individual parties, neither of whom need care
about the environment. So I wanted the terms of the negotiations to
be biased in favor of the environment.
I realize that I may have phrased the above in a relatively (!)
ignorant way (especially I may be missing a dynamic where airlines
and railroads may be encouraged to reduce their pollution because it
may lessen how much they have to pay .... -- but don't lots of other
people (who haven't yet been attacked by railroads or airlines)
benefit if railroads and airlines are 'encouraged' to reduce
pollution ....)
(I also do not remember at all how Coase brings into question issues
of causality in his last few pages, but that may be just as well ....)
If the above is just a hopelessly ignorant question, I apologize. It
is a serious question to the extent that I remember convincing
myself, twenty-five years ago, that Coase's narrow argument was
brilliant but not helpful for environmental issues (or, perhaps,
other 'social' concerns), unless the government added back
regulations or a bias into the negotiations.
Peter G. Stillman
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