Let me also take the privilege of dealing with just one issue below John.  
  
John C.Medaille wrote:   
 >> This is problematic to say the least, and does not accord with the   
way humans really are. If "meaning" is only the "meaning of   
individuals," than language would be impossible, since communication   
depends on shared meanings; it would be miraculous if there was enough   
overlap in individually determined meanings to form a language. Mises   
has the social structure derived from the way we think about it, when in   
truth the way we think about it is derived from the social structure. We   
get our cues about what things mean from others; this is simply a matter   
of fact, for you, for me, for anybody. It is not that we don't then   
internalize and modify those meanings, but the starting place is not in   
the individual but in the social milieu in which he finds himself. The   
individual always finds himself already situated in a social setting   
from which he derives meaning, and this setting must be the starting   
place for meaning. This is the issue that Hayek was addressing, though   
incompletely. <<  
   
Again, I think you have misread/misunderstood Mises.  
   
I wrote:  
   
"Because, he argues, only individuals can attribute meaning to actions,   
any analysis of action, including collective action, must begin *but not   
end* with the meaning that individuals ascribe to them."  
   
I don't think this idea is in contradiction with the idea of shared   
meanings.  In fact, my earlier post quoted Mises talking about how   
individuals do not create "ideas and standards of value" but that we   
borrow them from others.  That all meanings are ultimately the meanings   
of individuals doesn't mean that we don't have shared ones by virtue of   
us being in the same social setting.  In fact, Mises is very explicit in   
*Nation, State, and Economy* about this issue:  
   
"Community of language is at first the consequence of an ethnic or   
social community;  independently of its origin, however, it itself now   
becomes a new bond that creates definite social relations.  In learning   
the language, the child absorbs a way of thinking and of expressing his   
thoughts that is pre-determined by the language, and so he receives a   
stamp that he can scarcely remove from his life.  The language opens up   
the way for a person of exchanging thoughts with all those who use it;    
he can influence them and receive influence from them."  (p. 13 of the   
NYU Press edition)  
   
This was written decades before *Human Action*.  
  
 >> Indeed, this is the situation of man generally; each of as are   
called into being by a relationship between our parents, a relationship   
in which we have no part and no choice; we do not choose to have English   
as our mother tongue, America as our nation of origin, or Smith as our   
family name. Within this original community of the family, we learn all   
our meanings and all our norms; we may (and likely will) reject or   
modify those norms, but even the rejection will be in the context of the   
received meanings. We are always appealing to social norms because that   
is the only court of appeal. Now, I do not think that any of this can be   
controverted; nor do I think that it can be reconciled with   
"methodological individualism." <<  
  
See above.  Mises would have agreed with everything in your paragraph   
above, yet he was a staunch methodological individualist.  Hence we are   
left with at least three possible explanatory hypotheses:  
   
1. Mises wasn't really serious about all that shared meaning stuff.  
   
2. Mises misunderstood what methodological individualism meant.  
   
3. You misunderstand what methodological individualism means.  
  
Steve Horwitz