Pat Gunning wrote:  
>John, after reading your post carefully, it   
>seems that you are inviting me to have a   
>discussion about the meaning of truth, about the   
>"most important elements in a man's life," and   
>about your novel conception of "gift." I do not   
>regard the HES list as the proper forum for such a discussion.  
  
  
The concept of gift is hardly novel. But I will   
not argue about a word, but only about the thing   
itself. Did you give something in exchange for   
your being? Did you trade something for the   
language and culture you received? What would you   
call something you received without exchange?   
Whatever you call it, I am willing to call it.   
But men have most commonly called it a "gift."  
  
  
>I will, however, make two comments on your interpretation of Mises.  
>  
>1. Regarding the "method of imaginary   
>constructions," there is no real puzzle unless   
>you are looking for something more profound than   
>Mises intends. I am sure that you will agree   
>that to define anything, we must imagine the   
>thing without one or more of the attributes that we employ in our definition.  
  
You are treating Imaginary Constructions merely   
as abstractions from reality. In an abstraction,   
we "drop out" those portions of the reality that   
we feel do not contribute to the analysis of some   
phenomenon. Such analysis is useful, because one   
can inspect what is left out and what remains,   
and hence make a judgment as to the relevance of   
the choice of what to leave in and what to leave   
out. But that is not how Mises defines an   
Imaginary Construction; for Mises, all of reality   
drops out in favor of "praxeological"   
assumptions, assumptions which need not be,   
indeed cannot be, tested by reality or any empirical method.  
  
"The use of imaginary constructions  
to which nothing corresponds in reality is an indispensable tool of  
thinking. (201)"  
  
"In designing such an imaginary  
construction the economist is not concerned with the question of whether or not  
it depicts the conditions of reality which he   
wants to analyze. Nor does he bother  
about the question of whether or not such a   
system as his imaginary construction  
posits could be conceived as really existent and in operation. Even imaginary  
constructions which are inconceivable, self-contradictory, or unrealizable can  
render useful, even indispensable services in the comprehension of reality,  
provided the economist knows how to use them properly. (236)"  
  
To do what Mises wants to do, there are   
established methods within philosophy and   
science: the reductio ad absurdum, the thought   
experiment, abstraction, analogy, and so forth.   
But all of these retain at least an analogic or   
metaphoric connection with all aspects of   
reality, and a real connection with at least one   
aspect of reality. Thus, for example, Einstein's   
riding a light wave is not something that can be   
done, but neither is it an imaginary   
construction, to which "nothing corresponds in   
reality." The light wave is real enough, and   
"riding it" can be imagined, if we discard human   
limitations. Mises may have had in mind something   
like a thought experiment, but in departing from   
the norms of such experiments he looses himself   
from the surly bonds of reason.  
  
  
>What we imagine is, to Mises, an imaginary   
>construction. This is all that Mises means by an   
>imaginary construction. It is also what he has   
>in mind when he says that economics and   
>praxeology cannot do without imaginary   
>constructions. He applies this general idea to   
>what he calls praxeological phenomena --   
>phenomena related to what he calls action.  
  
Action cannot be analyses deductively; human   
action can only be analyzed by looking at human   
actions. Mises attempts to deduce all his   
theories from what he calls "the logical   
structure of the human mind" as perceived by   
praxeology. But how can one perceive the   
structure of the human mind without inducing it   
from human actions? The whole thing turns out to   
be circular. The purely deductive method is   
simply pre-scientific; it posits dogmas in place of real observations.  
  
>The method of imaginary constructions is a means   
>of reaching an understanding of a specific case   
>of economic interaction by conceiving of the   
>interaction in the absence of some   
>characteristic that we use to define it. The   
>significance of the procedure lies with how one   
>comes to define economic interaction, an issue   
>that is too complex to get into here.  
>  
>2. Regarding your interpretation of Mises's use   
>of the terms "contractual" and "hegemonic" to   
>refer to "social relations" as a basis for   
>constructing a "theory of society" (your   
>language), you seem to be taking his terms out   
>of context. You apparently want his terms to   
>refer to what you have in mind when you use the   
>words "social relations" and "society." However,   
>you will see upon closer examination that he   
>uses these terms to refer to types of cooperation.  
  
Again, I won't argue about words, but only about   
the things themselves. I am quite willing to   
substitute the term "types of cooperation"   
between persons for the term "social relations."   
So then, the terms contractual and hegemonic do   
not exhaust the types of cooperation, as an   
examination of one's one cooperative relations will show.  
  
>So while his goal is to build a theory of   
>cooperation, your goal appears to be to build a   
>much broader or deeper theory. Do you think it   
>wise to fault a writer for writing about a   
>subject that is different from the one with   
>which you are concerned? (I think that Mises   
>does write elsewhere about the subject you seem   
>concerned with. I would elaborate on this but I   
>prefer that you first state independently,   
>without reference to Mises or anyone else, the   
>issues that you think one should deal with.)  
>  
>Permit me to end with a suggestion in the form   
>of a question. If you do not believe that you   
>are a Mises scholar, then don't you think it   
>inappropriate to include a criticism of Mises's   
>work in your writings about other subjects?  
  
I don't think critiques of a thinker are limited   
to devotees of that thinker; other forms of   
expertise may be brought to bear. However, there   
is one sense in which I agree with you. I believe   
that in reading any text, no matter how strange,   
one needs to read it with a "willing suspension   
of disbelief," rather in the way one watches a   
play, ignoring that the actors aren't who they   
pretend to be. Only then can one really grasp   
what an author has to say, and only then can one   
begin one's critique. I started out as a   
supporter of all the things that Mises would have   
us believe. And then I actually read Human   
Action. The willing suspension of disbelief   
became an overwhelming effort; there were just   
too many contradictions to what is known from   
psychology, sociology, anthropology and too many   
violations of philosophic and scientific   
methodology. The Imaginary Construction is merely one of them.  
  
  
John C. Medaille