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From:
[log in to unmask] (John C. Medaille)
Date:
Thu Dec 21 13:26:49 2006
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Alan G Isaac wrote:  
>The difference has been clear and unclear to many people.  
>In my opinion, it was settled by Joseph Butler  
>(Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature.  Charlottesville, VA:  
>Ibis Publishing, 1987(1726).)  
>  
>In his refutation of psychological egoism, he noted that the  
>distinction between my self-interested desires and my other  
>desires does not disappear just because they are both *my*  
>desires.  You have not faced two related questions:  
>what is the nature of this satisfaction (i.e.,  
>self-interested or not), and why might the man get  
>satisfaction from making such a gift?  
  
  
Hurray for citing Butler, who is far more   
important in the history of this controversy than   
is generally recognized. But he gets to the real   
issue. The "homo oeconomicus" is arrived at by   
creating a false dichotomy: either altruism OR   
self-interest. And since a pure altruism is easy   
to knock down, that leaves only self-interest.   
But this is not the case; there is no necessary   
conflict between self-interest and concern for   
others (although there can be many actual   
conflicts). Indeed, a pure altruism is neither   
possible nor desirable, but a pure self-interest   
would simply be pathological. To give another   
example, a man's "love-utility" is not increased   
quantitatively by having a harem, but   
qualitatively by learning to love one woman more   
intensely. But this intensity is not of the sort   
that can be subject to mathematics.  
  
That consideration gives us the nature of the   
satisfaction, it is qualitative rather than   
quantitative. Here is where utilitarian   
philosophies and economics go wrong, because they   
confuse quantity and quality. Quantity is only a   
means to an end, an end that is always   
qualitative. A person seeks a raise (quantity)   
only because it represents an improvement in the   
quality of life; it is a means, not an end. When   
pure quantities are sought for their own sake, it   
becomes, as Aristotle noted, a example of   
"unnatural exchange," an exchange that has no natural use or point.  
  
John C. Medaille  
  

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