Steven Horwitz wrote:  
>Let me also take the privilege of dealing with just one issue below John.  
>  
>John C.Medaille wrote: >> This is problematic to   
>say the least, and does not accord with the way   
>humans really are. If "meaning" is only the   
>"meaning of individuals," than language would be   
>impossible, since communication depends on   
>shared meanings; it would be miraculous if there   
>was enough overlap in individually determined   
>meanings to form a language. Mises has the   
>social structure derived from the way we think   
>about it, when in truth the way we think about   
>it is derived from the social structure. We get   
>our cues about what things mean from others;   
>this is simply a matter of fact, for you, for   
>me, for anybody. It is not that we don't then   
>internalize and modify those meanings, but the   
>starting place is not in the individual but in   
>the social milieu in which he finds himself. The   
>individual always finds himself already situated   
>in a social setting from which he derives   
>meaning, and this setting must be the starting   
>place for meaning. This is the issue that Hayek   
>was addressing, though incompletely. <<  
>Again, I think you have misread/misunderstood Mises.  
>I wrote:  
>"Because, he argues, only individuals can   
>attribute meaning to actions, any analysis of   
>action, including collective action, must begin   
>*but not end* with the meaning that individuals ascribe to them."  
>I don't think this idea is in contradiction with   
>the idea of shared meanings.  In fact, my   
>earlier post quoted Mises talking about how   
>individuals do not create "ideas and standards   
>of value" but that we borrow them from   
>others.  That all meanings are ultimately the   
>meanings of individuals doesn't mean that we   
>don't have shared ones by virtue of us being in   
>the same social setting.  In fact, Mises is very   
>explicit in *Nation, State, and Economy* about this issue:  
>"Community of language is at first the   
>consequence of an ethnic or social   
>community;  independently of its origin,   
>however, it itself now becomes a new bond that   
>creates definite social relations.  In learning   
>the language, the child absorbs a way of   
>thinking and of expressing his thoughts that is   
>pre-determined by the language, and so he   
>receives a stamp that he can scarcely remove   
>from his life.  The language opens up the way   
>for a person of exchanging thoughts with all those who use it;  
>he can influence them and receive influence from   
>them."  (p. 13 of the NYU Press edition)  
>This was written decades before *Human Action*.  
  
  
Steve, I don't think the issue is whether Mises   
acknowledges the social origin of meaning, but   
whether MI is sufficient to deal with this fact.   
We (you, me, Mises) all seem to agree that   
meaning derives only from a social context; the   
question is whether MI can account for that   
context, and indeed whether it simply begins at   
the wrong end. But we might even use a better   
description of meaning. The statement "all   
meanings are individual meanings" is at best   
partial and at worst simply wrong. Would it not   
be more accurate, at a merely descriptive level,   
to say that "all meanings are individual   
expressions of socially derived meanings." And   
does not such a description pose some   
insurmountable challenges for MI? Nowhere in HA,   
and nowhere in this discussion, have a seen a   
method for bridging the gap that everyone   
acknowledges, the gap between the individual and the social.  
  
And this gets to the heart of why I consider   
Misianism to be neoclassicism on steroids. NCE   
models human behavior from a standpoint of pure   
individualism; society is nothing more than the   
summation of individual choices made for personal   
benefit, and this remains true for Mises. But it   
is not in fact true. The most important aspects   
of our lives are not choices but gifts, and the   
choices we do make are socially constrained and   
at least partially determined. The NCE   
description is not only compatible with Mises,   
but is re-enforced by Mises, as far as I can   
tell. Thus, despite its philosophic pretensions,   
the MI view is simply a strong form of the utilitarian view.  
  
Now, it may be, as you have suggested, that I   
have simply misunderstood MI, and I am open to   
that possibility. However, it will be necessary   
to demonstrate the connection between MI and the   
social in a way that differs from the mere summation technique of NCE.  
  
  
>See above.  Mises would have agreed with   
>everything in your paragraph above, yet he was a   
>staunch methodological individualist.  Hence we   
>are left with at least three possible explanatory hypotheses:  
>1. Mises wasn't really serious about all that shared meaning stuff.  
>2. Mises misunderstood what methodological individualism meant.  
  
Or more likely, he posed a problem that he could not solve.  
  
  
John C. Medaille