Doug Mackenzie wrote:  
> > John C. Medaille wrote-  
>  
> > We (you, me, Mises) all seem to agree that  
> > meaning derives only from a social context; the  
> > question is whether MI can account for that  
> > context, and indeed whether it simply begins at  
> > the wrong end. But we might even use a better  
> > description of meaning. The statement "all  
> > meanings are individual meanings" is at best  
> > partial and at worst simply wrong. Would it not  
> > be more accurate, at a merely descriptive level,  
> > to say that "all meanings are individual  
> > expressions of socially derived meanings."  
>  
>  
>Socially derived though the interaction of  
>individuals? Who else? Of course people learn from  
>each other and each individual is part of a social  
>context, along with other individuals. I see nothing  
>wrong with MI at this point. YOu have not made any  
>problem clear, not anything that Mises (1922) and  
>Hayek (1937) did not deal with.  
  
  
But he doesn't deal with it; he merely asserts   
that his method can, but he doesn't attempt to   
account for the fact that individual attitudes   
are already socially formed before anyone acts.   
The social plays no  part in his axioms of   
action. What you have in the relationship between   
the individual and society is a chicken-and-egg   
problem, and such problems are never solved by   
asserting either chicken OR egg; they can only be   
resolved by finding a way to assert BOTH chicken   
AND egg. By asserting the chicken (the   
individual), Mises assumes that the egg (a social   
product) will take care of itself. It won't.   
Mises pays lip service to the social, but his   
solution is in no way different from those who don't, from pure individualists.  
  
What is most baffling in all this is how   
unproblematic Misians consider their theory to   
be. In this discussion (and in HA) I have had   
pushed at me the notion that praxeology belongs   
to neither the speculative nor the practical   
reason (and I agree), an epistemology divorced   
from philosophy, actions divorced from   
psychology, a social theory rooted in pure   
individualism, an idealism which handles   
prudential issues under imaginary constructs,   
among other problematics. Now, all of these   
things may be true, but then are not   
unproblematic. But Misians never seem to   
recognize the problematic nature of their   
formulations and questions seem to irritate them;   
indeed, Mises claims that Praxeology has the same   
epistemological status as do logic and   
mathematics, stating that it is "unconditionally   
valid for all beings endowed with the logical   
structure of the human mind. (57)" Now, the best   
thing you can say for someone who thinks he has   
"discovered" something as intuitively obvious as   
logic or mathematics, but which no one ever   
noticed, is that he is in the grip of an   
enthusiasm; the worst you can say is that he has fallen prey to arrogance.  
  
  
  I think we all  
>agree that the standard textbook NC approach fails,  
>and you seem to admit that Mises tried to do things  
>differently.  
  
I don't admit this; that is my point. The   
differences are trivial, though hotly debated.   
See Mason Gaffney's post. Are there real policy   
prescriptions that are different in a fundamental way?  
  
>Please explain exactly how exactly  
>Misesean economics fails.  
  
Isn't the prior question, "show a case in which   
Misesean economics has succeeded"?  
  
  
John C. Medaille