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WHIG HISTORY OF ECONOMICS IS DEAD
Now What?
James P. Henderson
Valparaiso University
Let me pick up a thread that runs through the two previous
editorials, those by Roy Weintraub and Phil Mirowski:
WHIG HISTORY OF ECONOMICS IS DEAD.
R.I.P.
Now what?
Much of the work done in the history of economics during the
second half of the twentieth century fits the description offered
by Andrew Pickering in his "Distinguished Guest Lecture," at the
1995 meeting of the H.E.S. The history of economics "is the genre
known as history of ideas. In its canonical form this tries to
understand scientific ideas as evolving under their own inner
logic. . ." (Pickering, forthcoming). The history of economics
has tended towards internal history, concentrating on the
economics ideas and relegating the life and times of the
economist and the contemporary institutions to the background.
Yet economics is fundamentally social, so the social construction
of economic knowledge must be a central concern. Paraphrasing
Wade Hands - economics is practiced in a social context, the
products of economic activity are the results of a social
process, and economic knowledge is socially constructed (Hands,
p. 75). Moreover, there is a tendency is to ignore "time" while
constructing the history of economics. By ignoring time, I mean
we see the ideas of economists in their final form instead of
trying to understand how those ideas were developed over time.
Admitting that "Whig history of economics is dead," and
recognizing that "economic knowledge is socially constructed,"
frees us to try other approaches. We might turn our attention to
developments in other disciplines where "much mileage has
recently been got by sociologising and contextualising the
picture" (Pickering, forthcoming). Here is how these two
approaches are described:
The sociology of scientific knowledge approach has sought to
display the social interests that sustain the particular
bodies of knowledge that one finds associated with
particular groups; and, less theoretically, the
historiographic avant garde would probably agree that the
best history of ideas is contextualist, relating specific
ideas to their historical, cultural, social, etc, contexts
(*Ibid*.).
Both of these approaches emphasize the view that economics is a
knowledge-producing enterprise. This shifts the focus to the
process of constructing the economic knowledge--the economists
and their interests and concerns and objectives, the institutions
where the knowledge was constructed, how the knowledge so
constructed emerged over time.
The demise of the Whig view of history makes our
intellectual lives as historians of economics much more
complicated. According to the historian of science, David
Knight, in his article "Background and Foreground: Getting Things
in Context," this approach requires "hard work among the archives
of some institution or scientist, eminent or obscure . . . [and
rejects the] wide-angle lenses in favour of close-ups." For
Knight it is "a real journey from one world to another; the
eagle's to the mole's" (Knight, p. 7). To focus on context
requires that we find out what concerned intellectuals at a given
time, how were they educated, what was their intellectual life
like and how did they interact with society.
Having read the masterworks of the economist, what now? One
can start by exploring what Bernard Cohen calls "information
networks." Economists operate in a scientific community, a group
of like-minded economists or others simply interested in
economics. Cohen's description of the Scientific Revolution
which "produced a new kind of knowledge and a new method of
obtaining it, [and] produced new institutions for the
advancement, recording and dissemination" of that knowledge,
applies equally to the creation of economics (Cohen, 1985, p.
81). Such information networks are both formal and informal.
Informal information networks include correspondence and face-to-
face visits, but a "formal information network" requires
specialist journals and reports, which are customarily sponsored
by learned societies and academies.
In British economics, the *Economic Journal* and the British
Economics Association (later Royal Economics Society) were the
realization of such cultural practices and institutions. But
prior to 1890 when they were founded, economists had four other
national learned societies which welcomed them and their ideas:
the Political Economy Club of London (organized in April, 1821),
Section F (the Statistical and Economics Section) of the British
Association for the Advancement of Science (admitted at the third
meeting in 1833), the London (later Royal) Statistical Society
(founded by the organizers of Section F, it held its first public
meeting in March, 1834), and the National Association for the
Promotion of Social Science, known as the Social Science
Association (organized in the summer of 1857 by Lord Brougham, it
held its first Congress in October of that year). In addition to
these national organizations, economists could present their
ideas at local learned societies, for example, Jevons's papers at
the Manchester Statistical Society. There is a wealth of
material in the Reports, Transactions, and Journals of such
organizations that remains largely unexploited by historians of
economics.
That economic masterwork that we know and love, is the
result of a process of investigation and discovery that occurred
over time. What was the writer's original objective? Why did
the writer select that issue? Why did she take that particular
issue so seriously? That economist was not locked away in a
garret, completely isolated from social, economic, and
intellectual events. Correspondence, early manuscripts, papers
presented at learned societies are a rich source of material
revealing how the economist's ideas developed over time. Those
ideas were tried out on others, presented in a setting where the
economist believed that her ideas were welcome and were they
would get a fair hearing and where the criticism would be
constructive. These change the course of the development of
those ideas.
What intellectual tools were available to him? It is
important to remember that mathematics too has a history. So
does scientific methodology and philosophy and statistics, both
the gathering of data and its interpretation. How did he use the
analytical tools available to him? If the available analytical
tools were inadequate or inappropriate, how did he respond? Did
he create new tools? Adapt tools from other disciplines?
One of most enlightening exercises one can undertake when
trying to capture the essence of the context that engaged an
economist is to read the contemporary reviews of the new
masterpiece. We know it to be a masterpiece, but did the
author's contemporaries? Do not limit yourself to reviews in
specialist economics journals, for some of the most interesting
reactions appear in the popular journals of the day, *The
Quarterly Review*, *The Westminster Review*, *The Edinburgh
Review*, come to mind in the British case. Also look in the
journals of other disciplines. There are fascinating treatments
of Alfred Marshall's *Principles* in *International Journal of
Ethics*, *Mind*, and the *Economic Review*.
A contextual approach requires that we recognize that
economic knowledge is created in real time. Pickering focuses on
scientific culture, which he extends beyond the simple notion of
a field of knowledge, to include "culture" in the broader sense
of the "made things" of science--"skills and social relations,
machines and instruments, as well as scientific facts and
theories" (Pickering, 1995, p. 3). To that list, we add the
information network created for the advancement, recording and
dissemination of economic knowledge. Here's where things get
complicated, for context is not constant. Pickering offers us an
intriguing approach, one that Esther-Mirjam Sent employed so
successfully that she was awarded the "Joseph Dorfman Prize for
the Best Dissertation" by the H.E.S. in 1995. Pickering explores
"the mangle of practice"--the process of modeling as it develops
over time. Modeling is an open-ended process. "A given model
can be extended in an indefinite number of ways; nothing within
the model foreshadows which should be chosen." To comprehend the
practice of economics necessitates "understanding closure, . . .
understanding why some individual or group extends particular
models in particular ways." The key to understanding closure
appears to lie in the observation that models are not
extended in isolation. Modeling typically aims at producing
associations in which a plurality of projected elements hang
together in some way. And the important point here is that
the achievement of such associations is not guaranteed in
advance--particular modeling sequences readily lead to
mismatches in which the associations are not achieved.
The modeling sequence is an interactive process of "Resistance"
and "Accommodation." The development of the model gives rise to
resistances which impede the achievement of goals.
Encounters with resistance set in train a process of
accommodation, in which the openness of modeling is further
exploited in trial-and-error revisions and substitutions of
models, modeling sequences, and so on, aimed at proceeding
further toward the intended association. The process of
accommodation itself precipitates further resistances in and
to practice, so that practice in the end appears as a goal-
oriented dialectic of resistance and accommodation.
Successful accommodations overcome resistances in a series of
"Free Moves" and "Forced Moves." The free moves in the modeling
process are those active components of scientific practice where
the scientist confronts a resistance free to exercise choice and
discretion. The forced moves, the passive components of
practice, intertwine with the free ones and serve to elaborate
the scientist's choices in ways that are beyond her control.
Faced with resistances as consequences of the forced moves, she
is led to revise some of her free moves. Given the absence of
universal scientific standards, these free and forced moves can
be traced over time in an attempt to understand the alternatives
available to her, the choices she made, and the consequences of
those decisions (Pickering and Stephanides, 1992, pp. 140--141
and Pickering 1995, chapter 1).
These two related approaches--"sociologising and
contextualising"--if adopted to the writing the history of
economic offer promising possibilities for our discipline. But
first, we must take these approaches seriously and abandon Whig
history.
REFERENCES
Cohen, I. Bernard. 1985. *Revolution in Science*.
Hands, D. Wade. 1994. "The Sociology of Scientific Knowledge:
Some thoughts on the possibilities," *New Directions in
Economic Methodology*, Roger E. Backhouse, ed.
Knight, David. "Background and Foreground: Getting Things in
Context," *British Journal of the History of Science* 20
(1987), 3 -- 12.
Pickering, Andrew and Adam Stephanides. 1992. "Constructing
Quarternions: On the Analysis of Conceptual Practice,"
*Science as Practice and Culture*. Andrew Pickering, ed.
139--167.
Pickering, Andrew. forthcoming. "The History of Economics and
the History of Agency," *The State of the History of
Economics: Proceedings of the History of Economics Society*
_____. 1995. *The Mangle of Practice, Time, Agency & Science*.
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