------------ EH.NET BOOK REVIEW --------------
Published by EH.NET (February 2007)
Donald R. Stabile, _Economics, Competition and Academia: An
Intellectual History of Sophism versus Virtue_. Cheltenham, UK:
Edward Elgar, 2007. vii + 148 pp. $90 (hardcover), ISBN:
978-1-84720-236-9.
Reviewed for EH.NET by Donald E. Frey, Department of Economics, Wake
Forest University.
In this book, Donald Stabile gives the highlights of a two
millennia-long debate between market-driven models of higher
education and market-sheltered models. Tracing the debate back to the
Greeks, Stabile equates the market-oriented approach with the
Sophists, who taught the practical subjects students were willing to
pay for, and who measured success by their own incomes. The
market-sheltered approach, Stabile argues, was promoted by Plato and
Aristotle, whose wealth exempted them from reliance on students' fees
and who sought to teach what made for virtue. Stabile suggests that
the "virtue" school relied on endowments of one sort or another to
insulate education from market pressures toward more utilitarian
subjects. Stabile uses the term "endowment" in a somewhat elastic
manner, including, for example, personal wealth in the case of Plato
and, in the present era, state support as an equivalent of endowment.
Stabile is an historian of economic ideas and he concentrates on
thinkers (including groups, such as the authors of the 1828 Yale
Report) who articulated or defended particular models of education.
Using the poles of "sophism" (market-driven and utilitarian
education) and "virtue" (market-sheltered and non-utilitarian
education), Stabile analyzes where various thinkers and educational
institutions have been located on the spectrum between the two. The
analysis is richer than merely considering how higher education is
financed (tuition fees versus endowment earnings); it includes issues
of motivating students and faculty, the nature of curriculum,
divisions between the responsibilities of faculty and administrators,
and how education relates to its culture.
Curriculum is central to the sophism-virtue debate, as Stabile sees
it. The sophist curriculum would be pragmatic, with much student
choice, in order to appeal to tuition-paying students. In modern
terms, there would be many electives, and this would pose the problem
of assuring sufficient demand to justify offering those electives.
Conversely, what he calls a virtue-oriented curriculum would offer a
core of required courses deemed by faculty to be essential for moral
development. This was the model of colonial and early
nineteenth-century denominational colleges, which could offer fewer
courses and keep faculties small. As Stabile indicates, very few
American universities in the post-1800 era have been pure polar
models of sophism or virtue. Most have relied upon multiple sources
of funding, including tuition and fees, endowment returns, state
support, and current donations. And, many university curricula
combine elements of sophism and virtue.
Though Stabile starts with the Greeks, and gives consideration to
pre-Enlightenment thinkers and universities, his main efforts are
concentrated on the period after Adam Smith. Following Smith,
Stabile's focus is predominantly on the American scene, although he
does pay attention to Jeremy Bentham, J.S. Mill, and Alfred Marshall.
The American educational theorists considered were not all
economists, but include figures such as Benjamin Rush, Francis
Wayland, Charles Eliot, and Abraham Flexner.
Stabile argues that education reflected trends in the culture, and
gives special focus to the culture of the rising corporate
capitalism. Charles Eliot, president of Harvard for four decades
prior to 1909, revised its curriculum in directions that fit the
ethos of capitalism, keeping an eye on what the market demanded.
Eliot ultimately approved a graduate business school to serve the
need of business for trained leadership. This strategy implied that
the university would grow, just as business had, by serving the needs
of business and adopting the methods of business. On the other hand,
in some areas, Eliot pushed back against the capitalist ethos. He
made sure his businessmen-trustees did not meddle in curriculum
matters, nor think of faculty as they would think of employees. And
he was emphatic that the profit motive should not drive the
university. By Stabile's categories, Eliot exhibited tendencies
associated with sophism in some sectors yet resisted such tendencies
in other arenas.
Eliot is not the only figure in this book to produce ideas consistent
with both the "virtue" _and_ the "sophist" approaches. In Stabile's
telling of it, even the rise of the business school in American
higher education was not a pure case of the triumph of sophism, for
their funding was often provided from large endowments; and the
faculties aimed to impart virtue to students by creating business
codes of ethics and placing liberal arts courses in the business
curriculum. Indeed, Stabile's general conclusion is that "virtue has
retained its primary place in academia in spite of academia's being
surrounded by the culture of capitalism [i.e. sophism]" (p. 124).
Throughout the book, Stabile makes the case that even the thinkers
most committed to sophism respected boundaries (defined by their
notions of virtue) beyond which they would not push their ideas. In
the end, we find that influential thinkers and educational
institutions seem to have been pulled in both directions, ending with
characteristics of both sophism and virtue. Does this mean that
Stabile's sophism and virtue are not the best reference points
against which to survey higher education?
The reader departs from this book with a reasonable idea of what
sophism means. However, throughout the book, virtue remains
ill-defined. In fact, this reader came to suspect that -- at least as
Stabile tells the story -- "virtue" has little independent content of
its own, and simply plays the role of a foil -- that is,
"not-sophist." Part of the reason for this is that the norms of
virtue have changed: they were one thing to the ancient Greeks,
another in the Catholic middle ages, yet another in early Protestant
America, and finally another in secular twentieth-century
universities. Stabile is aware of this shifting of the meaning of
virtue, and the implied moral relativism, though he writes only
sparingly about it. Summarizing a proponent of business education,
Stabile makes the point: "Once academia had become secularized ...
what was the definition of virtue? ... Business faculty could lay the
same claim of virtue as did liberal arts faculty. With no intrinsic
standard of virtue such as Christianity held, all disciplines could
claim a privileged place" (p. 114). In short, virtue had been
rendered meaningless by secular moral relativism.
Stabile makes the brave claim that "the Christian ethos has persisted
despite the secularization of academia and the influence of
capitalism" (p. 123). Yet, he does not develop this claim. Indeed,
even in his discussion of earlier, presumably more Christian, eras,
Stabile is not very detailed in his discussion of what virtue would
mean in the curriculum of a Christian university or college.
Functionally, as used in this book, "virtue" seems to stand simply
for whatever tendencies in higher education cannot be reduced to
utilitarian motives (as noted, virtue seems to be a foil, an
anti-sophism with little content of its own). Even in the Christian
context, when Stabile gives virtue some content, its meaning is
simply anti-sophism: to avoid "unnatural" acquisitiveness.
A component of Stabile's failure to define virtue as understood by
different eras is his lack of distinction between Catholic education
and Protestant education that dominated the American colonies and
continued into the nineteenth century. For example, Stabile's
description of Puritan education boils down to the statement that
Puritans "were firm believers in education as a way for humans to
understand sin and avoid it" (p. 45). He does not mention the nature
of the Puritan intellectual culture described at length in many books
by Perry Miller in the mid 1900s, the Puritan commitment to empirical
science and their adoption of the scientifically oriented curriculum
of Peter Ramus, or their fascination with the pioneering educational
ideas of John Amos Comenius. In short, there are different
perspectives on even Christian "virtue" that Stabile fails to
consider, which would have enriched the book. Protestant theories of
education might even have allowed pragmatic subjects to be integrated
in a curriculum as a matter of theological principle instead of as a
matter of sophism.
This concern aside, I found this book well worth reading. Even if the
categories Stabile has chosen to summarize higher-education
strategies are not ideal, he raises an issue that has a long history
and remains important. Today, some of the most contentious debates in
faculty meetings of liberal arts colleges are waged over proposals to
reduce "core" requirements or to add a major that might appear "too
vocational." In dealing with the educational ideas of major
economists, Stabile is also particularly good at showing how their
general economic ideas had implications for higher education. And, in
fact, his short sketches of the economists' general ideas are useful
summaries for anyone.
Donald E. Frey has published in the economics of education and in the
history of economic thought. His current work is a history of
America's economic moralists.
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Published by EH.Net (February 2008). All EH.Net reviews are archived
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