> Steven H. wrote:  
>> I'm not even going to bother to refute the   
>> "self-interest maximizing" part because Mises   
>> never invoked the language of "maximization" and   
>> his notion of "self-interest" was so broad as to   
>> be nearly empty.  It certainly was not narrow   
>> "self-interest" in the way we often talk about it now.   
  
  
John C.Medaille wrote:   
> Then how do you reconcile that with this   
> statement from Mises (and many just like it):   
  
>     "The man who gives alms to hungry children does it,   
>     either because he values his own satisfaction expected   
>     from this gift higher than any other satisfaction he   
>     could buy by spending this amount of money, or because   
>     he hopes to be rewarded in the beyond.  (735)"   
  
> The concept in this statement hardly seems   
> "empty" at all; clearly, he believes that even in   
> charity the benefit derived must exceed the   
> dollars expended. Is that an "empty" concept? And   
> is this really different from "narrow   
> self-interest" as "we often talk about it now"?   
> The difference is not clear to me.   
  
  
This is a very old question.  
  
The difference has been clear and unclear to many people.  
In my opinion, it was settled by Joseph Butler  
(Fifteen Sermons upon Human Nature.  Charlottesville, VA:   
Ibis Publishing, 1987(1726).)  
  
In his refutation of psychological egoism, he noted that the   
distinction between my self-interested desires and my other   
desires does not disappear just because they are both *my*   
desires.  You have not faced two related questions:  
what is the nature of this satisfaction (i.e.,   
self-interested or not), and why might the man get   
satisfaction from making such a gift?  
  
Cheers,  
Alan Isaac  
  
PS I discussed this and related questions in  
"Morality, Maximization, and Economic Behavior",  
Southern Economic Journal 63(3), January 1997.