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------------ EH.NET BOOK REVIEW --------------
Published by EH.NET (February 2008)

Donald Markwell, _John Maynard Keynes and International Relations: 
Economic Paths to War and Peace_. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006. xv + 320 pp. $85 (hardcover), ISBN: 0-19-829236-8.

Reviewed for EH.Net by Michael S. Lawlor, Department of Economics, 
Wake Forest University.


This book will be of interest to economists in general, and to Keynes 
specialists in particular. It focuses on the topic of the 
international relations views expressed by Keynes over his long 
career, from his involvement in the First World War as a Treasury 
official and as Lloyd George's economic advisor at the Paris Peace 
Conference; through his interwar position as a prominent analyst of 
international monetary problems; to the part he played in the British 
Treasury during the Second World War. There he was very influential 
on the policies of how Britain would pay for the war, the form that 
the post-war international payment systems would take under the 
Bretton Woods system, and the negotiation of the terms of the 
American post-war loan to Britain in 1946, shortly before his death.

The fact that this book solely focuses on this limited facet of 
Keynes's multi-dimensional career, that Markwell is a political 
scientist and therefore uses much non-economic material, consisting 
mostly of primary internal memoranda from the Treasury office and 
other governmental units, and that he frames his arguments in terms 
of the secondary scholarship on international relations in political 
science -- both of which are unfamiliar territory for most economists 
-- adds to the freshness and usefulness of this study. It should also 
be added -- and I don't think Markwell would disagree -- that some of 
the debates and contexts for Keynes's activities in this regard have 
already been well discussed in both Robert Skidelsky's (2000) and 
Donald Moggridge's (1992) biographies of Keynes. These books provide 
a thorough background and context for the many issues, events and 
personalities surrounding Keynes's involvement in international 
relations. I would suggest one of these volumes for further reading 
to those who find this to be an area of interest. Markwell's book 
goes beyond them, and is a useful companion to them, in its bringing 
together the various strands of Keynes's ideas, writings and 
activities with respect to international relations in one place. This 
treatment adds focus to the material in a way that Keynes's 
biographers, necessarily more focused on the grand sweep of his 
career, were not able to do.

More broadly, this book is instructive to this reviewer for the 
opportunity it offers to ponder the importance of context for the 
application of some of the fundamental tenets of economic theory. 
Ironically, perhaps this is precisely because of Markwell's lack of 
focus on economics and due to his use of the aforementioned wealth of 
policy evidence on Keynes's extensive involvement in government and 
international affairs. Markwell's analysis requires the economic 
reader to follow Keynes into the task of applying economic theory to 
knotty problems of international politics and thereby to think hard 
about the validity of the abstract nature of economic principles in 
various real geopolitical scenarios of great import (like the two 
World Wars), to consider what role economic factors may play in the 
development of hostilities between nations, and to consider seriously 
the compatibility of microeconomic truths with macroeconomic truths 
when their application is not just a hypothetical example, but a real 
live political circumstance.

To first take up the issue of the contextual nature of the 
application of economics to political situations consider the 
situation that Keynes, and all western economists and political 
analysts, faced in the period from the end of the First World War, 
through the slump and depression of the thirties. What concerned them 
most was the question of how to re-create the era of rising 
prosperity and smoothly functioning world trade that had 
characterized Europe and America in the period before 1914. From the 
end of the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference on, Keynes 
was one of the first and most prominent (but by no means the only) 
international figures who felt that this goal required a lasting 
peace that would allow Germany to regain its rightful place, for 
reasons of geography and size, as the economic engine of Europe.

This was Keynes's message in the book that first made him 
internationally famous, _The Economic Consequences of the Peace_. 
This book, as Markwell shows, grew from Keynes's fears that restoring 
prosperity to Europe was wholly lost sight of in the blind rush to 
revengefully heap reparations and crippling terms of defeat upon a 
prostrate Germany. Keynes's sometimes over-the-top criticism of the 
principals at the conference -- with Lloyd George, George Clemenceau 
and Woodrow Wilson coming particularly under extensive personal 
attack, some thought bordering on ridicule -- stemmed from the fact 
that Keynes believed that their actions, as opposed to their 
hypocritical words, would lead to an unstable peace.

Thus, at some risk to his own influence and career, Keynes quit his 
role in the negotiation of the Paris peace treaty and returned to 
England to hastily write his reaction to that experience in the form 
of _The Economic Consequences_. It was a book that both criticized 
the leaders of England and France for cowardice, in being unwilling 
to challenge the popular clamor for revenge upon Germany, and that 
laid bare the flaws of the peace terms that the French and British 
political leaders had, Keynes thought, bamboozled President Wilson 
into signing. These plans, he felt, were counterproductive of a 
lasting peace and unrealizable to boot, because Germany could never 
meet its reparations obligations so long as its internal economy was 
crippled by the terms forced upon it by the treaty.

All this is well known to Keynes scholars and to students of the 
World War One period. What Markwell adds is context and detail to 
Keynes important role in the struggle to win both the war and the 
peace. What can be learned by all economists from his experience is 
that the dire nature of the post-war European economies, particularly 
those of the losing Axis powers, could not _automatically_ be 
reversed unless attention was paid both to their immediate needs in 
the form of relief aid of one kind or another and also to their more 
long-term need to foster investment and trading institutions that 
would ensure the growth and permanence of economic prosperity. In 
asking how this would be achieved, Markwell classifies the nature of 
Keynes's arguments at this crucial historical juncture as a species 
of a "liberal-idealist" one.

	At the end of 1918, Keynes had a clear view of some of the 
	elements of the post-war order he wished to see. His 
	liberal-idealist faith in free trade, on which he had been 
	brought up, was unshaken. He had urged the abandonment of 
	inter-Allied debt and Britain's forgoing her share of 
	reparations, which he hoped would go to assist the new 
states. 	He had urged a moderate approach to reparations; and 
clearly 	wished the defeated powers to be treated so that they 
would not 	need assistance to avoid starvation, unemployment, 
anarchy, or 	perhaps Bolshevism. The fundamental views which 
underlay his 	action at the peace conference, and which were to be 
expounded 	in _The Economic Consequences_, were already formed 
and were 	shared by many others (p. 53).

Thus Keynes began his career, as many economists have before and 
since his time, as a solid proponent of free trade as the primary 
means to bring about international peace. This brings us to the 
second issue raised above: to what extent, and how, are economic 
factors causative of acrimony and war between nations? Any modern 
economist could profit by considering this question in light of 
Markwell's book. Here, Markwell writes, Keynes's view matured over 
the course of his career. The standard argument pits free trade 
against imperialism. Free trade, it is thought in the standard 
liberal argument, may have peaceful benefits as an unintended 
consequence, if it make customers out of potential enemies. Moreover, 
since mutually beneficial gains for any two countries can be shown 
(and this is one of the principle lessons of a liberal economics) to 
lead to rising prosperity for both trading partners, there is a 
potential for any two countries to both benefit from trade. Trade, so 
this argument goes, would make traders reluctant to upset trading by 
aggression and war, and so free trade may tend to reduce 
international aggression and war.

On the other side, the argument of imperialism starts from the 
premise that it is beneficial for a country to run a favorable 
balance of trade, and an expanding export market, in that this tends 
to keep manufacturers and producers of tradable goods and services at 
home in a prosperous and expanding state. By this argument developed 
_countries_ (note not firms directly, but perhaps state action 
spurred by firms) will seek means to maximize export opportunities in 
particular and may also vie to receive exclusive preferences for 
their goods and services in these markets, as well as trying to 
ensure scarce inputs to the production process, such as raw materials 
and/or natural resources that are in short supply at home. How is 
this accomplished? By the argument of imperialism, it is accomplished 
by military and diplomatic maneuvers that allow powerful states to 
dominate weaker states and to assemble official or semi-official 
trading _empires_.

The economic analysts of the liberal tradition in England -- Smith, 
Ricardo, Burke, Mill, and Marshall -- can be identified as the major 
proponents of the former idea. Dissenters from this tradition both in 
England and on the continent -- like Hobson, Lenin and Luxembourg -- 
can be identified with various twists on the latter idea in Keynes's 
time. Markwell makes it clear that Keynes early in his career came 
down exclusively on the side of the liberal conception of free trade 
-- hence his categorizing of Keynes's earliest arguments into those 
of a "liberal-idealist" camp. He recognized and believed in the 
potential of free trade to promote peace and harmony among nations, 
and he thought that by reestablishing Germany's power to participate 
in trade with it neighbors, a lasting peace could be established in 
Europe after World War One.

It must be said, though, that the history of Europe and the world in 
the nineteenth century and leading up to the war in 1914, offered 
evidence supportive to both sides of this debate. On the one hand 
Britain, France, Germany and in fact most of Europe, had all grown 
prosperous in this period by trading with other nations, particularly 
was this so in the case of Britain, a small island economy with vast 
global trading interests. But each had also sought to carve out for 
itself some exclusive markets for its exports, and some exclusive 
sources of raw material for it own producers, through the conquest of 
overseas empires. This vying for power internationally had become so 
commonplace among European governments that part of this activity 
became known in England by the playful title of the "The Great Game."

But imperialism and empire were not topics that engaged Keynes, 
either by upbringing or by temperament. In order to reassert the 
classical liberal argument he had been brought up on in this context 
he, like many of his fellow British liberals, made a crucial 
distinction between empires and exclusive trading blocks. "Empires," 
according to Keynes (in 1903), need not lead to exclusive trading 
blocks. An empire that was founded and run on proper political 
principles, as he thought was the case of the British Empire, could 
lead to a loose confederation of states for which association with 
Britain was "to provide facilities for the growth under freedom and 
justice without molestation from abroad of these young nations ... 
[W]hen a country becomes part of the Empire it is free to pursue it 
own destiny, in its own way. Because our ideal is democratic" (p. 19).

This somewhat condescending (to the colonial countries) and benign 
view of empires was in sharp contrast to both the imperialism 
theorist's view of empires, as well as to those of other English 
political and ideological leaders (of the so called "Round Table") 
who, after World War One, wanted to work for the imperial unity and 
exclusivity of trade relations between the various members of the 
British Empire. Keynes criticized the notion that empires necessarily 
_would_ form into exclusive trading blocks that excluded all others, 
and that empires _should_ lead to this state of affairs. He 
excoriated the latter in particular, exemplified for Keynes by the 
"German dream of Mittel-Europa." It was a conception of empire based 
on "exclusivity" and the attempt to "monopolize" for the home country 
producers' markets for their exports and sources of food and raw 
materials. This, he lamented, led to new frontiers "between greedy, 
jealous, immature, and economically incomplete, nationalist states" 
(p. 20). Worse, competing for such imperial preferences by 
nation-states, such as the British Round Table thinkers advocated, 
could lead to conflict and war.

Thus, the question that formed the international relations context in 
which Keynes wrote during and immediately after the First World War, 
was whether war could only stem from a perverse international policy 
in pursuing the potential gains from free trade (what Markwell calls 
the liberal-idealist position) or whether war was a natural outcome 
that could be expected from an inevitable imperialist-capitalism by 
which states would naturally vie for national power by assembling 
competitive exclusionary trading blocks (what Markwell identifies as 
the "realist" view).. Keynes, at this stage, as we have seen, favored 
the first argument -- that free trade only caused war when it was 
perversely pursued along the lines of imperial, exclusive terms. If 
trade and empires could be based on openness of markets and 
democracy, such as British experience in the pre-war period showed to 
Keynes was possible, then empires could be a beneficial source of 
cosmopolitanism and peace.

So what did Keynes at this early stage in his development think were 
the economic causes of war? Wars could result, said the younger, 
classical liberal Keynes, from "impoverishment, population pressure, 
penetration by foreign capital and the 'competitive struggle for 
markets'" (p. 3). Note this fits our conclusion in the previous 
paragraph, by carefully excluding free-trade from those causes, so 
long as it is not pursued in exclusionary terms. So the interesting 
questions for economists today -- trained to believe unreflectively 
and in the abstract in the eternal verity of the potential for mutual 
gains from trade -- to take from this study of Keynes are as follows: 
Are there some possible circumstances under which this gain will not 
_automatically_ arise in the context of actual situations of 
international relations? Does economic theory itself suggest 
conditions in which we may want to abandon a dogmatic attachment to 
what seems like a species of economic Truth? It turns out that the 
historical analog to these questions in the present case is "how did 
Keynes's view of the role of economics in international relations 
evolve over his career?"

One way to answer these questions is by following Markwell in 
identifying three further stages in Keynes's evolution in this regard 
-- identified as his "early liberal institutional, protectionist and 
mature liberal institutionalist" (p. 3) positions. All three stages 
could be thought of as instances where Keynes did not so much abandon 
the above-listed catalogue of the potential economic causes of war, 
but rather thought of extensions to the first cause -- economic 
"impoverishment." His extensions were of two varieties. First in the 
1920's, and again in the 1930's, Keynes suggested extensions from the 
_contextual_ perspective of then current national and international 
events. Later in the 1930's, and from the _theoretical_ perspective 
of his _General Theory_, he suggested further, more economically 
fundamental extensions to this factor. Put another way, as he matured 
in terms of both experience and theoretical framework, he added to 
this list of the potential economic causes of war the crucial factors 
of monetary disorder, trade imbalances and unemployment. Even later, 
with special reference to Hitler and Germany, he added that there is 
no proper economic cause that extended to a nation's possible 
reaction to "impoverishment" by embracing what he called a "brigand." 
That is to say, economics had no explanation or remedy for a nation 
that was led by "a madman or a gambler" that was willing to risk war 
for personal power (p. 198). (Markwell convincingly shows on pp. 
197-203 that Keynes was never pro-German or an appeaser, as he has 
sometimes been accused.)

Let us take the first stage of the evolution of Keynes's views to 
begin. As Britain suffered through the slump of the twenties and as 
most of the West similarly suffered though the worse experience of 
the Great Depression in the thirties, Keynes came to blame these 
continued difficulties in restoring prosperity on the lack of 
existence a of well-functioning international monetary order. In 
particular, he was convinced that the gold standard had become a 
shackle on Britain, and on western expansion in general, because it 
forced weakened economies, such as he identified Britain as being 
since the First World War, to run a high-interest-rate policy for 
international reasons (to protect its gold reserves) that was wholly 
inconsistent with a needed internal low-interest-rate policy to 
restore employment and prosperity. This again deviated from the 
belief that free trade would _automatically_ restore prosperity in 
any political context. In this case, and barring international 
agreement on an alternative system that bitter experience had taught 
him was not likely, it would be better for Britain to unilaterally 
either peg its pound below its pre-war parity rate -- and by such a 
devaluation encourage the output of its exporters - or, as eventually 
transpired in 1931, to abandon the gold standard altogether.

Even as this was his best counsel on short-term policy, Markwell 
shows Keynes was continuously preoccupied in this period, roughly 
1922-1932, with finding a solution to the question of what possible 
type of international arrangement could be agreed upon by many 
nations and managed with some high degree of efficiency that would 
not rely upon what Keynes considered the immiserating and 
trade-inhibiting policies of the gold standard [1].

So the second-stage of the development of Keynes's views on 
international relations was that he came to feel strongly that a 
return to the pre-1914 prosperity in Europe required the adoption by 
international agreement of an alternative to the former gold standard 
that would attract wide participation. This could only happen, he 
thought, if there were strong international leadership (which he long 
looked for from the U.S., as far back as the end of the First World 
War, but did not actually witness until World War Two). Moreover, 
Markwell clearly shows that in all of his many writings and 
participation in conferences devoted to this topic, Keynes was very 
fluid and pragmatic about the form that such a system should take. He 
was willing to compromise his own vision of a U.S./British-led system 
of managed (flexible) fixed exchange rates and the form that a 
managed stock of international liquidity reserves and payment media 
would take, if it would encourage wider agreement. (He stressed that 
the search for unanimity was an evil to be avoided.)

This fluidity as to details was to serve him well when he was 
negotiating with America during the Second World War over Lend-Lease 
and especially the post-war monetary system in that the Americans had 
firmly held demands and alternative plans of their own, which when 
added to Britain's weak financial position, meant that Keynes was 
forced to negotiate from a distinctly weak position. Thus, the 
1923-30 period was the stage of Keynes's developing international 
relations views that Markwell calls "early liberal institutionalist." 
Free trade could be beneficial, he was saying, but only if a properly 
functioning international monetary institution was adopted.

Briefly, we proceed on to the third stage of Keynes's views on the 
economic element in international relations. Here the question 
becomes more starkly the universal nature of the coincidence of free 
trade and peaceful international relations. This stage arose out of 
Keynes's participation on the Macmillan Committee on Trade and 
Finance (1929-31), the Economic Advisory Council set up by Ramsey 
McDonald, and particularly its Committee of Economists (created in 
July 1930, and to which also belonged William Beveridge, A. C. Pigou 
and Lionel Robbins) and in the pages of the political affairs journal 
that he headed at the time, the _New Statesman_. All of this activity 
arose from the need to respond to the international crisis that arose 
from the Great Depression and its particular impact on Britain.

In this and the fourth stage of Keynes's grappling with international 
relations questions, Markwell emphasizes continuity in Keynes's 
evolving views. The economist in me wants to call the first issue one 
of political context and, therefore not economically fundamental. But 
Markwell makes a good case that the last two stages of Keynes's 
thought in this regard should be seen as merging into, and 
reinforcing, one another. The fourth phase he identifies is the 
period after 1933, sometime between 1934 and 1936, depending on when 
one judges Keynes to have been in control of the central propositions 
of his _General Theory_.

To go back, we should start with describing the third stage of 
Keynes's views that Markwell describes as his "protectionist" phase. 
This occurred when, in the early years of the Great Depression, 
1929-33, and to quite a bit of controversy, Keynes advocated 
protectionist measures for Britain, especially higher tariff 
barriers, as a way of combating the British unemployment of that 
period. He contextualized this recommendation by arguing that this 
unemployment had unfortunately occurred within a world system where 
the gold standard made the pursuit of free trade for "creditor" 
countries (such as Britain was since 1914) a road to even higher 
domestic unemployment than it was already experiencing. This was 
because, in order to maintain its balance of payments, it was forced 
to run a high-interest rate policy and deflation to protect its 
reserves. In this circumstance, and again barring a better 
international monetary system that seemed so impossible to him at 
that dark stage in history, Keynes gave a limited endorsement to 
British protectionist policy in the then-current economic emergency 
and for the short term. One detects almost a reluctance on his part 
to do so. And, indeed, his about-face was controversial enough on the 
Economists Committee that Robbins found it necessary to both author a 
dissenting minority report, attack Keynes's position in the press and 
later author, with Beveridge and other LSE economists, a book 
defending free trade even in this context (Beveridge et al. 1931).[2] 
Consider Markwell's comment on Keynes in this period: "Keynes's 
renunciation of free trade came, hesitantly, and then boldly, in 
proposals, first, for emergency tariffs, and, secondly, for greater 
national self-sufficiency and economic isolation. Keynes moved from 
admitting that the classical connection between free trade and peace 
was an argument against a tariff, but one outweighed by the economic 
emergency; through saying that his proposed tariffs could also help 
international amity; to denying that free trade did in fact promote 
peace" (p. 153).

His argument in the context of such an economic emergency as the 
Great Depression seems to have been analogous to the old saw that 
"the patient cannot stand the cure." He thought that Britain was in 
such a crisis with regard to unemployment, that her money wages were 
too rigid for deflation to work its classic role in bring down costs, 
that the gold standard had so limited the range within which domestic 
economic policy had to maneuver, and that so many other countries 
were reacting to this crises by erecting tariff barriers of their own 
(effectively exporting their unemployment problems to Britain), that 
he had become "reluctantly convinced" (p.154) that protectionism was 
the best temporary policy Britain could pursue in this circumstance.

Economists, and particularly specialists in macroeconomics and in 
Keynes's thought, might immediately wonder if the drafting of the 
_General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money_ did not have a 
profound effect on Keynes's ideas on this question. Less historically 
minded economists might also wonder if, and how, the perspective of 
macroeconomics might alter one's view of the _universal_ argument for 
the benefits from trade. Again the history of Keynes's own 
international relations positions offers examples of him facing 
exactly this question. Consequently, the fourth and last stage that 
Markwell identifies in Keynes's evolving views on international 
relations -- what he calls the "mature liberal institutionalist" 
phase -- was based on just this issue. Again depending on when one 
judges the proposition of the _General Theory_ to have been drafted, 
in some period during the middle part of the 1930s, Keynes developed 
a more fundamental _economic theory_ framework in which to argue the 
point about protectionism that we have seen him making on pragmatic 
_policy_ grounds in the early years of the Great Depression. In the 
_General Theory_ and after, Keynes insisted that the question of the 
economic causes of war and the advisability of protectionist, 
anti-trade measures depended on how close the economy was to full 
employment -- and this extended to his advice to the government 
during the Second World War, when he judged the economy to have met 
this condition. Short of this internal goal, Keynes said that 
countries were unlikely to reap the potential benefits from free 
trade described by classic liberal economics. This was because the 
temptation was too strong for any one country to erect tariff 
barriers around itself to boost the demand for domestic producers. It 
was Keynes's view that the policies of many nations since 1929 
offered examples of this. Since competitive attempts to export 
domestic unemployment to another country eventually ended in lowering 
employment in them all, protectionist policies became a second best 
solution in this context. Better that each county should act in 
isolation from international forces to raise domestic employment to 
its full potential, by lowering interest rates and bolstering demand 
for domestic industry in any way possible. According to Keynes, "if 
our central controls succeed in establishing an aggregate volume of 
output corresponding to full employment as nearly as practicable, the 
classical theory comes into it own again from this point onwards" (p. 
186).

Here we can quote Markwell to the effect that Keynes hereby modified 
his position on the economic causes of war in a fundamental way:

In short, Keynes's argument was both that laissez-faire did not have 
the tendency to peace claimed for it, and that a reformed capitalism 
along the lines he advocated would much improve the prospects for 
peace. Keynes said that 'the new system might be more favourable to 
peace than the old has been.' It is not clear
whether by this Keynes meant simply that past causes of war would be 
absent, or that with these gone _and_ free trade, some of the 
mechanisms classical liberals claimed were the means by which free 
trade actively promoted peace would work again. Such mechanisms 
included the creation by trade of vested interests in peace, and the 
promotion of moral solidarity between nations trading with each other 
(p. 184).

Here is the final issue that modern economists might profit from 
pondering as a result of reading this book. Keynes was saying in the 
1930s that countries had first to ensure full employment before they 
could anticipate the mutual economic gains and the possible peace 
dividends that trade holds out. If the economic system of a 
free-market economy does not _automatically_ tend toward full 
employment, but needs to be managed to attain this goal consistently 
through time (and surely this is the basic lesson of macroeconomics 
even to this day), then it is a mistake to think and preach that free 
trade is some sort of divinely given cure for all economic ills, in 
all contexts, domestic and foreign.

Keynes, of course, should not be looked on as an infallible guide in 
pondering this issue. He was fallible in judgment even within the 
field of international relations that Markwell surveys here. For one, 
his self confidence about his cleverness in designing policy fixes 
often led to disastrous negotiations on his part with his official 
American counterparts during the Second World War. Harry Hopkins, the 
special advisor to U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, reportedly 
expressed this irritation in his comment that Keynes was "one of 
those fellows that just knows all the answers" (Chandavarkar, 2001).

Moreover he showed a complete lack of understanding of the American 
political process. Used to dealing exclusively with ministers and 
their Whitehall staff in the more centralized English system, he was 
dismayed by the power of individual Congressman. Also, not only was 
Keynes unnecessarily rude to these Congressman, who he often gave the 
impression that he considered them provincial and beneath him, but 
his haughty behavior was also unwise, in that those very Congressmen 
could hold up American aid for British needs. He similarly accused 
the White House and State Department of being too timid in its 
relations with Congress, not realizing that the American Constitution 
gave Congress control of appropriations, whatever the White House may 
have negotiated for with the British.

But Keynes's faults were more than outweighed by his many talents. 
Keynes's insight into how economies work, combined with his ability 
to understand and exert influence over the process of policy 
creation, is unlikely to be seen again in today's era of extreme 
specialization. As such, modern economists, whether they agree with 
his judgments or not, can learn valuable lessons in the political 
economy of policy application from following his career in 
international relations in the context of numerous actual 
international crises. Markwell does a fine job in showing, over 
numerous issues, how difficult and how much skill is required to 
apply economic reasoning in the realm of international relations. 
Markwell's greatest attraction for an economist is that he shows how 
Keynes pursued this activity with skill and subtlety in the context 
of many of the weightiest geopolitical issues to face the West in the 
twentieth century. It is one measure of Keynes's and others' ultimate 
success in this context that it is hard now to even imagine Germany 
and England at war. We, as economists, can learn a great deal from a 
recounting of his experiences in establishing this peaceful and 
prosperous state of affairs in Europe. Perhaps it might even make us 
a bit humble to contemplate that it may be in large part due to 
Keynes's own work both in economics and politics, to the wisdom of 
the architecture and implementation of the Marshall Plan, which was 
surely in the spirit of Keynes's ideas, and to the way in which 
economies have been managed since his time, that we have the luxury 
of not facing his unpalatable choice between free trade and full 
employment.

Notes:

1. Also note that Keynes therefore wanted to destroy what he 
considered a "barbarous relic" of the nineteenth century, the belief 
that the gold standard operated "automatically" to restore 
international imbalances and that this meant it would encourage 
trade. Alternatively, a major message of Keynes throughout this 
period was that the gold standard was not, in fact, operating 
automatically by the pre-war rules of the game in the period after 
World War One because the U.S. and the Federal Reserve System refused 
to let its own eventual control of the majority of the world's 
monetary gold cause U.S. prices to rise. Keynes thought this unfairly 
forced upon all other "creditor" nations the problems, noted above, 
of choosing to abandon international monetary arrangements, to 
competitively devalue its currency or to run a ruinous deflation. 2. 
It is instructive to modern economists that Robbins later, in his 
autobiography (Robbins, 1971), recanted his opposition to Keynes 
during those depression years.

References:

Chandavarkar, A. 2001. "A Fresh Look at Keynes: Robert Skidelsky's 
Trilogy." _Finance and Development_, Vol. 38, no. 4, December.

Moggridge, Donald. 1992. _Maynard Keynes: An Economist's Biography_, Routledge.

Robbins, Lionel C. 1971. _Autobiography of an Economist_, Macmillan.

Skidelsky, Robert. 2000. _John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Britain_, 
Macmillan.


Michael S. Lawlor is Professor of Economics, Wake Forest University, 
Winston-Salem, North Carolina. His most recent publication on Keynes 
is _The Economics of Keynes in Historical Context: An Intellectual 
History of the General Theory_ (2006).

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