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The thoughtful responses by Anthony Brewer and Patrick Gunning to
my discussion of Whig history carry the conversation further and
require some kind of reply. Let me begin with Tony's comments
because they incorporate some of the issues Patrick raises also,
and then turn to the RELATIVISM that Patrick labels me with.
I agree with Tony that my definition of Whig history differs
somewhat from Butterfield's original conception. However, my
emphasis on the "inevitability" of a particular group's victory
in a Whiggish account is equivalent to the focus of Tony's
reformulation of Butterfield -- Whig history is the production of
a story that ratifies (if not glorifies) the present by
emphasizing a particular set of principles regarding the nature
of "progress." What is essential to recognize is that behind any
Whig history is the *present's* principles of justification for
knowledge--the historian's evaluation of the past is guided by
the rules of justification used among the historian's
contemporaries.
This leads immediately to my response to Tony's remark: "We are
surely concerned with the history of ideas and structures rather
than groups. Hence Ross's 'losers' and 'winners' aren't relevant.
To the extent that there is a current consensus, we are all
(apparent) 'winners.'" Surely what is important for those who
want to write histories of ideas is the *evaluation* of those
ideas, and when historians choose to evaluate ideas by the
principles of justification for which there is a current
consensus, they are aligning themselves with the "group" (call it
a "scientific community" if you want) which is, as Tony himself
says, apparently the "winners." Whig history will surely follow.
(BTW, I take the efforts to show why person or group "X" should
be incorporated into the canon of *our* history as a branch of
Whig history).
The announcement of the death of Whig history of economics is
therefore also the announcement that, among other things,
historians of economics today are choosing to evaluate ideas in
the context of the principles of justification contemporaneous
with the ideas being studied. Or to be more precise, many
historians of economics today are interested in how the ideas of
past economists were accommodated to the contemporary principles
of justification, and how they simultaneously resisted those
principles (and hence de-/re-constructed those principles).
Because the process of accommodation and resistance within
economics has to be set in, and is in fact an integral part of,
society's ongoing re-evaluation of those principles, non-Whig
history of economics does not distinguish between internal and
external factors. What matters is the answer to the question: how
did that process of accommodation and resistance work in this
particular instance?
Tony closes with the questions "Can we tell the story of the
history of science in terms of the growth of knowledge? Can we do
so for economics?" and responds with an account of the history of
science which suggests that we arrived at a "better criterion for
judging theories." It would be hard for me to disagree with Tony
regarding the judgement that the new criteria were "better"
because every institutional aspect of my discursive context
depends upon the preferential status our society gives to
science. Yet I must say that discussions with medieval historians
of science suggest to me that the story of the "growth" of
scientific knowledge is not one from error (Church/
Aristotelianism) into truth (Newtonian science), but rather an
interlocking set of processes of accommodation and resistance to
church traditions, empirical evidence, philosophical traditions,
new technologies, political movements, social norms (e.g., whom do
you trust?), etc. Furthermore, and this is a point I will return
to in a moment, we learn a lot more about the processes of
accommodation and resistance within our own intellectual
traditions by studying medieval history of science as an
interlocking set of processes of accommodation and resistance than
we do showing why the Church was "wrong" and Newton "right"
(according to principles of justification which will always
ratify Newton's claims as "advancements in knowledge" because
they follow from or undergird his theory).
Now we come to the heart of my differences with Patrick, and can
address the dreaded sin of relativism. Patrick says: "In [Ross's]
view, the historian should be free to choose which standards or
modes of argumentative logic he/she will use. Whig history, in
his view, takes away that freedom." Unfortunately, I DISAGREE WITH THE
PERSPECTIVE PATRICK ASSIGNS TO ME: historians are not
"free to choose" but rather are bound by the standards or modes
of reasoning present in the discursive context in which the
material they are studying is situated. The relevant questions
are: what standards of rationality/modes of reasoning were
dominant within the discursive context of the material I am
studying (or if I am studying the reception of particular ideas,
what were the standards/modes in the receiving interpretive
community)? What were the key traditions, social norms,
technologies, etc. that undergirded those standards/modes? In
what ways was the material I am studying accommodated to those
standards/modes? In what ways were those standards/modes
resisted? etc. Notice that the historical study is one of
arguments and counter-arguments, of interpretation and
institutions/social conventions, and of the re-/de-con/struction
of discursive contexts/interpretive communities.
Historians also have the responsibility to find ways to
communicate the historical material to their own contemporaries.
What elements of my contemporary discursive context can I use as
an entry point for introducing my readers to the alien context of
my historical material? Are there elements of resistance
/accommodation today that will make the historical material more
accessible?
My description of the twofold set of constraints faced by the
historian implies that philosophical discussion of the categories
rational/irrational, logical/illogical, absolute/relative are not
ones the historian is particular comfortable with. In the process
of historical study, we find that we can come to understand those
whose standards of argumentation were different than our own, and
we also recognize how their standards were shaped by the
contingencies of their discursive context. Our historical studies
suggest that, despite the contingencies of their experience,
humans can understand those in other times/places (I once gave a
lecture entitled -- "I began with the desire to speak with the
dead" -- to which one of my friends replied, "I hope not:
purgatory will be long enough"). They also suggest that much of
what we describe as necessary/logical/ etc. in our own discursive
context may be contingent. Quentin Skinner remarked in his famous
essay "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas" that we
learn from the history of thought that most of what we consider
necessary is really contingent, and that aspects of what may
appear to us as contingent are really universal. Our calling as
historians requires us to remain open to being surprised by
the universal and the contingent alike.
I'm sure none of this will satisfy Patrick, but I'm happy to keep
the conversation going. In the meantime, I'm off dancing for
awhile -- after all, every human interest (including the desire
to be understood) experiences diminishing returns!
Ross
Ross B. Emmett Editor, HES and CIRLA-L
Augustana University College
Camrose, Alberta CANADA T4V 2R3
voice: (403) 679-1517 fax: (403) 679-1129
e-mail: [log in to unmask] or [log in to unmask]
URL: http://www.augustana.ab.ca/~emmer
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