Pat Gunning wrote:
>And I don't buy the argument that because
>economics is a social or a human science, it
>necessarily is value laden. The data about human
>beings can be treated just as objectively as the
>data of physics, although a different method must be used.
Underlying Prof. Gunning's response is the
"fact-value" distinction. Some wag somewhere has
said that �scientific� economists suffer from
physics envy. And indeed, many economists lay
claim to a �positive� or �value-free� view of
economic relations based purely on precise
measurement and complex mathematics, just like
physics. But astrology is also based on precise
measurement and bewildering mathematics; its
status as a science�and its relation to
reality�is not thereby established. Economists
may bristle at the comparison, but it is clear
that math and measurement are insufficient to
establish a science. In the first place,
mathematics is not an empirical science; it is a
set of formal and idealized relationships and
indifferent to any particular reality other than
its own axioms. There is nothing in economics
that is driven by a mathematical logic: time,
money, culture and uncertainty prevent this.[1]
The homo economicus, the �pure� economic
creature, simply does not exist, and were we to
meet such a creature, we would regard him as grotesque.
In the second place, measurement itself depends
on theory and all theories require value
judgments. For example, in measuring unemployment, the economist must�
"�first start by making the decision that it
needs theoretical explanation and second [he]
must define what unemployment is, both of which
are blatantly value-laden (and political)
activities. Furthermore, the choice of what
methods to use to investigate this phenomenon
also involves value judgments, as does selection
of the critical criteria about what will be
accepted as the �final term� in the analysis, the
bases of what arguments will or will not be
accepted. However, values and value judgments
enter into theory construction on the ground
floor by giving the theorist the �vision� of the
reality s(he) is attempting to explain. This
�vision� is pre-analytical in the sense that it
exists before theoretical activity takes place.[Charles M. A. Clark]"
Neoclassical economics are therefore, like every
thing else human, value-laden; it cannot be a
question of a false dichotomy between �values�
and �facts.� Rather, it is a question of
examining the values by which the facts are explained or even perceived.
The fact-value distinction lies at the heart of
modernism, and is best expressed by "Hume's
Fork": [1] �If we take in our hand any volume; of
divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let
us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning
concerning quantity or number? No. Does it
contain any experimental reasoning concerning
matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then
to the flames: for it can contain nothing but
sophistry and illusion.� (David Hume, Enquiry
Concerning Human Understanding) The major problem
with this is that the major fact about humans is
that everything they do is value-laden. Anyone
who claims is have a "value-free" judgement is
merely hiding their own values behind a
scientistic smokescreen; they are hiding them
certainly from their audience and, worse, from
themselves. As D. McCloskey put it:
"Modernism promises knowledge free from doubt,
metaphysics, morals, and personal conviction;
what it delivers merely renames as Scientific
Method the scientist�s and especially the
economic scientist�s metaphysics, morals, and
personal convictions. It cannot, and should not,
deliver what it promises. Scientific knowledge is
no different from other personal knowledge.
Trying to make it different, instead of simply
better, is the death of science."
At the end of the day, economics is about a class
of social relations, and such relations are never value free.
John C. Medaille
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