I have been wanting to respond to this thread of conversation and only now have the time
to do.  I was shocked that well educated people would present a view that the past is the
study of error and therefore worthless.  There are arguments against such a view.  I have
not read all of the responses, but here are my thoughts
  
Many years ago, I thought of a term which might fit the position described.  I will call
it "reconstructive presentism."  This would be the view that the past inevitably has led
to the current dominant theory or position and therefore all useful knowledge is
encapsulated in the present version of a theory.  Conversely, there is nothing useful to
learn from the past.  Reasons against this position in economics might be some of the
following:
  
1.  Statements about knowledge, in order to be considered as some form of knowledge, need
to be contextualized.  Context requires an awareness of alternatives both in the present
and in the past.
  
2.  Any conception of error would require a conceptual framework from which to make
judgments about knowledge and error.  But one would also like to evaluate that conceptual
framework with meta standards and with relevant historical context about its coherence and
relative success.  Why should anyone accept the conceptual framework being advanced as the
single point of view from which to judge all knowledge and error?
        More specifically, my response to the economists at Harvard would be something
like this?  How do you know that the theoretical-conceptual framework from which you
dismiss the past is not itself in error?  One cannot answer such a question without
looking at the past and at alternative schools of thought in contemporary economics.
  
3.  The argument advanced by the Harvard people seems to be a tautology.  Our theoretical-
conceptual framework does not make errors, therefore we our not interested in error.
  
4.  Mainstream economics is increasingly pluralistic as Dave Colander has argued.  Many of
the research programs within economics would no doubt define error differently.
  
5.  The appeal to mathematics is not much help.  When economists heavily imported advanced
mathematics into economics in the 1930s to give better foundations for economic theory,
mathematical theorists were finding that math had no firm foundations.  Thus one could ask
how can a theoretical-conceptual framework without anything like firm epistemological
foundations not lead to error?  Thus error is certainly in the future of economics.  If
error is going to happen in the future, then the only way to study it is by looking at the
past.
  
6.  Studies of the history and philosophy of science since Kuhn and Popper have suggested
that error and a conception of error is crucial to scientific advancement.  This is true
for the natural and physical sciences not just economics or other social sciences.
  
7.  If we live in a universe of evolutionary complexity, then asymmetric knowledge or
information is pervasive.  Whatever we think we know would need to be contextualized and
tested in specific circumstances.  What we think of as knowledge and error would have to
determined by active processes of professional investigation.  In many circumstances the
line between knowledge and error could be shifting continuously.
  
8.  Only an omniscient being could really know the difference between knowledge and error
given our understanding of the various sciences that has evolved over the past few
decades.  Has the economics department at Harvard moved over to the Divinity School?
Actually theologians are very concerned about error.  Shouldn't economists be even more
concerned about error since there is a great deal more data available to economists than
to theologians about their differing domains of inquiry?
  
These are just the beginnings of arguments that could be made about the need to study
error.  I will be out of the office for a few days and unable to respond immediately.
  
Jim Wible