------------ EH.NET BOOK REVIEW --------------
Published by EH.NET (February 2008)
Donald Markwell, _John Maynard Keynes and International Relations:
Economic Paths to War and Peace_. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2006. xv + 320 pp. $85 (hardcover), ISBN: 0-19-829236-8.
Reviewed for EH.Net by Michael S. Lawlor, Department of Economics,
Wake Forest University.
This book will be of interest to economists in general, and to Keynes
specialists in particular. It focuses on the topic of the
international relations views expressed by Keynes over his long
career, from his involvement in the First World War as a Treasury
official and as Lloyd George's economic advisor at the Paris Peace
Conference; through his interwar position as a prominent analyst of
international monetary problems; to the part he played in the British
Treasury during the Second World War. There he was very influential
on the policies of how Britain would pay for the war, the form that
the post-war international payment systems would take under the
Bretton Woods system, and the negotiation of the terms of the
American post-war loan to Britain in 1946, shortly before his death.
The fact that this book solely focuses on this limited facet of
Keynes's multi-dimensional career, that Markwell is a political
scientist and therefore uses much non-economic material, consisting
mostly of primary internal memoranda from the Treasury office and
other governmental units, and that he frames his arguments in terms
of the secondary scholarship on international relations in political
science -- both of which are unfamiliar territory for most economists
-- adds to the freshness and usefulness of this study. It should also
be added -- and I don't think Markwell would disagree -- that some of
the debates and contexts for Keynes's activities in this regard have
already been well discussed in both Robert Skidelsky's (2000) and
Donald Moggridge's (1992) biographies of Keynes. These books provide
a thorough background and context for the many issues, events and
personalities surrounding Keynes's involvement in international
relations. I would suggest one of these volumes for further reading
to those who find this to be an area of interest. Markwell's book
goes beyond them, and is a useful companion to them, in its bringing
together the various strands of Keynes's ideas, writings and
activities with respect to international relations in one place. This
treatment adds focus to the material in a way that Keynes's
biographers, necessarily more focused on the grand sweep of his
career, were not able to do.
More broadly, this book is instructive to this reviewer for the
opportunity it offers to ponder the importance of context for the
application of some of the fundamental tenets of economic theory.
Ironically, perhaps this is precisely because of Markwell's lack of
focus on economics and due to his use of the aforementioned wealth of
policy evidence on Keynes's extensive involvement in government and
international affairs. Markwell's analysis requires the economic
reader to follow Keynes into the task of applying economic theory to
knotty problems of international politics and thereby to think hard
about the validity of the abstract nature of economic principles in
various real geopolitical scenarios of great import (like the two
World Wars), to consider what role economic factors may play in the
development of hostilities between nations, and to consider seriously
the compatibility of microeconomic truths with macroeconomic truths
when their application is not just a hypothetical example, but a real
live political circumstance.
To first take up the issue of the contextual nature of the
application of economics to political situations consider the
situation that Keynes, and all western economists and political
analysts, faced in the period from the end of the First World War,
through the slump and depression of the thirties. What concerned them
most was the question of how to re-create the era of rising
prosperity and smoothly functioning world trade that had
characterized Europe and America in the period before 1914. From the
end of the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference on, Keynes
was one of the first and most prominent (but by no means the only)
international figures who felt that this goal required a lasting
peace that would allow Germany to regain its rightful place, for
reasons of geography and size, as the economic engine of Europe.
This was Keynes's message in the book that first made him
internationally famous, _The Economic Consequences of the Peace_.
This book, as Markwell shows, grew from Keynes's fears that restoring
prosperity to Europe was wholly lost sight of in the blind rush to
revengefully heap reparations and crippling terms of defeat upon a
prostrate Germany. Keynes's sometimes over-the-top criticism of the
principals at the conference -- with Lloyd George, George Clemenceau
and Woodrow Wilson coming particularly under extensive personal
attack, some thought bordering on ridicule -- stemmed from the fact
that Keynes believed that their actions, as opposed to their
hypocritical words, would lead to an unstable peace.
Thus, at some risk to his own influence and career, Keynes quit his
role in the negotiation of the Paris peace treaty and returned to
England to hastily write his reaction to that experience in the form
of _The Economic Consequences_. It was a book that both criticized
the leaders of England and France for cowardice, in being unwilling
to challenge the popular clamor for revenge upon Germany, and that
laid bare the flaws of the peace terms that the French and British
political leaders had, Keynes thought, bamboozled President Wilson
into signing. These plans, he felt, were counterproductive of a
lasting peace and unrealizable to boot, because Germany could never
meet its reparations obligations so long as its internal economy was
crippled by the terms forced upon it by the treaty.
All this is well known to Keynes scholars and to students of the
World War One period. What Markwell adds is context and detail to
Keynes important role in the struggle to win both the war and the
peace. What can be learned by all economists from his experience is
that the dire nature of the post-war European economies, particularly
those of the losing Axis powers, could not _automatically_ be
reversed unless attention was paid both to their immediate needs in
the form of relief aid of one kind or another and also to their more
long-term need to foster investment and trading institutions that
would ensure the growth and permanence of economic prosperity. In
asking how this would be achieved, Markwell classifies the nature of
Keynes's arguments at this crucial historical juncture as a species
of a "liberal-idealist" one.
At the end of 1918, Keynes had a clear view of some of the
elements of the post-war order he wished to see. His
liberal-idealist faith in free trade, on which he had been
brought up, was unshaken. He had urged the abandonment of
inter-Allied debt and Britain's forgoing her share of
reparations, which he hoped would go to assist the new
states. He had urged a moderate approach to reparations; and
clearly wished the defeated powers to be treated so that they
would not need assistance to avoid starvation, unemployment,
anarchy, or perhaps Bolshevism. The fundamental views which
underlay his action at the peace conference, and which were to be
expounded in _The Economic Consequences_, were already formed
and were shared by many others (p. 53).
Thus Keynes began his career, as many economists have before and
since his time, as a solid proponent of free trade as the primary
means to bring about international peace. This brings us to the
second issue raised above: to what extent, and how, are economic
factors causative of acrimony and war between nations? Any modern
economist could profit by considering this question in light of
Markwell's book. Here, Markwell writes, Keynes's view matured over
the course of his career. The standard argument pits free trade
against imperialism. Free trade, it is thought in the standard
liberal argument, may have peaceful benefits as an unintended
consequence, if it make customers out of potential enemies. Moreover,
since mutually beneficial gains for any two countries can be shown
(and this is one of the principle lessons of a liberal economics) to
lead to rising prosperity for both trading partners, there is a
potential for any two countries to both benefit from trade. Trade, so
this argument goes, would make traders reluctant to upset trading by
aggression and war, and so free trade may tend to reduce
international aggression and war.
On the other side, the argument of imperialism starts from the
premise that it is beneficial for a country to run a favorable
balance of trade, and an expanding export market, in that this tends
to keep manufacturers and producers of tradable goods and services at
home in a prosperous and expanding state. By this argument developed
_countries_ (note not firms directly, but perhaps state action
spurred by firms) will seek means to maximize export opportunities in
particular and may also vie to receive exclusive preferences for
their goods and services in these markets, as well as trying to
ensure scarce inputs to the production process, such as raw materials
and/or natural resources that are in short supply at home. How is
this accomplished? By the argument of imperialism, it is accomplished
by military and diplomatic maneuvers that allow powerful states to
dominate weaker states and to assemble official or semi-official
trading _empires_.
The economic analysts of the liberal tradition in England -- Smith,
Ricardo, Burke, Mill, and Marshall -- can be identified as the major
proponents of the former idea. Dissenters from this tradition both in
England and on the continent -- like Hobson, Lenin and Luxembourg --
can be identified with various twists on the latter idea in Keynes's
time. Markwell makes it clear that Keynes early in his career came
down exclusively on the side of the liberal conception of free trade
-- hence his categorizing of Keynes's earliest arguments into those
of a "liberal-idealist" camp. He recognized and believed in the
potential of free trade to promote peace and harmony among nations,
and he thought that by reestablishing Germany's power to participate
in trade with it neighbors, a lasting peace could be established in
Europe after World War One.
It must be said, though, that the history of Europe and the world in
the nineteenth century and leading up to the war in 1914, offered
evidence supportive to both sides of this debate. On the one hand
Britain, France, Germany and in fact most of Europe, had all grown
prosperous in this period by trading with other nations, particularly
was this so in the case of Britain, a small island economy with vast
global trading interests. But each had also sought to carve out for
itself some exclusive markets for its exports, and some exclusive
sources of raw material for it own producers, through the conquest of
overseas empires. This vying for power internationally had become so
commonplace among European governments that part of this activity
became known in England by the playful title of the "The Great Game."
But imperialism and empire were not topics that engaged Keynes,
either by upbringing or by temperament. In order to reassert the
classical liberal argument he had been brought up on in this context
he, like many of his fellow British liberals, made a crucial
distinction between empires and exclusive trading blocks. "Empires,"
according to Keynes (in 1903), need not lead to exclusive trading
blocks. An empire that was founded and run on proper political
principles, as he thought was the case of the British Empire, could
lead to a loose confederation of states for which association with
Britain was "to provide facilities for the growth under freedom and
justice without molestation from abroad of these young nations ...
[W]hen a country becomes part of the Empire it is free to pursue it
own destiny, in its own way. Because our ideal is democratic" (p. 19).
This somewhat condescending (to the colonial countries) and benign
view of empires was in sharp contrast to both the imperialism
theorist's view of empires, as well as to those of other English
political and ideological leaders (of the so called "Round Table")
who, after World War One, wanted to work for the imperial unity and
exclusivity of trade relations between the various members of the
British Empire. Keynes criticized the notion that empires necessarily
_would_ form into exclusive trading blocks that excluded all others,
and that empires _should_ lead to this state of affairs. He
excoriated the latter in particular, exemplified for Keynes by the
"German dream of Mittel-Europa." It was a conception of empire based
on "exclusivity" and the attempt to "monopolize" for the home country
producers' markets for their exports and sources of food and raw
materials. This, he lamented, led to new frontiers "between greedy,
jealous, immature, and economically incomplete, nationalist states"
(p. 20). Worse, competing for such imperial preferences by
nation-states, such as the British Round Table thinkers advocated,
could lead to conflict and war.
Thus, the question that formed the international relations context in
which Keynes wrote during and immediately after the First World War,
was whether war could only stem from a perverse international policy
in pursuing the potential gains from free trade (what Markwell calls
the liberal-idealist position) or whether war was a natural outcome
that could be expected from an inevitable imperialist-capitalism by
which states would naturally vie for national power by assembling
competitive exclusionary trading blocks (what Markwell identifies as
the "realist" view).. Keynes, at this stage, as we have seen, favored
the first argument -- that free trade only caused war when it was
perversely pursued along the lines of imperial, exclusive terms. If
trade and empires could be based on openness of markets and
democracy, such as British experience in the pre-war period showed to
Keynes was possible, then empires could be a beneficial source of
cosmopolitanism and peace.
So what did Keynes at this early stage in his development think were
the economic causes of war? Wars could result, said the younger,
classical liberal Keynes, from "impoverishment, population pressure,
penetration by foreign capital and the 'competitive struggle for
markets'" (p. 3). Note this fits our conclusion in the previous
paragraph, by carefully excluding free-trade from those causes, so
long as it is not pursued in exclusionary terms. So the interesting
questions for economists today -- trained to believe unreflectively
and in the abstract in the eternal verity of the potential for mutual
gains from trade -- to take from this study of Keynes are as follows:
Are there some possible circumstances under which this gain will not
_automatically_ arise in the context of actual situations of
international relations? Does economic theory itself suggest
conditions in which we may want to abandon a dogmatic attachment to
what seems like a species of economic Truth? It turns out that the
historical analog to these questions in the present case is "how did
Keynes's view of the role of economics in international relations
evolve over his career?"
One way to answer these questions is by following Markwell in
identifying three further stages in Keynes's evolution in this regard
-- identified as his "early liberal institutional, protectionist and
mature liberal institutionalist" (p. 3) positions. All three stages
could be thought of as instances where Keynes did not so much abandon
the above-listed catalogue of the potential economic causes of war,
but rather thought of extensions to the first cause -- economic
"impoverishment." His extensions were of two varieties. First in the
1920's, and again in the 1930's, Keynes suggested extensions from the
_contextual_ perspective of then current national and international
events. Later in the 1930's, and from the _theoretical_ perspective
of his _General Theory_, he suggested further, more economically
fundamental extensions to this factor. Put another way, as he matured
in terms of both experience and theoretical framework, he added to
this list of the potential economic causes of war the crucial factors
of monetary disorder, trade imbalances and unemployment. Even later,
with special reference to Hitler and Germany, he added that there is
no proper economic cause that extended to a nation's possible
reaction to "impoverishment" by embracing what he called a "brigand."
That is to say, economics had no explanation or remedy for a nation
that was led by "a madman or a gambler" that was willing to risk war
for personal power (p. 198). (Markwell convincingly shows on pp.
197-203 that Keynes was never pro-German or an appeaser, as he has
sometimes been accused.)
Let us take the first stage of the evolution of Keynes's views to
begin. As Britain suffered through the slump of the twenties and as
most of the West similarly suffered though the worse experience of
the Great Depression in the thirties, Keynes came to blame these
continued difficulties in restoring prosperity on the lack of
existence a of well-functioning international monetary order. In
particular, he was convinced that the gold standard had become a
shackle on Britain, and on western expansion in general, because it
forced weakened economies, such as he identified Britain as being
since the First World War, to run a high-interest-rate policy for
international reasons (to protect its gold reserves) that was wholly
inconsistent with a needed internal low-interest-rate policy to
restore employment and prosperity. This again deviated from the
belief that free trade would _automatically_ restore prosperity in
any political context. In this case, and barring international
agreement on an alternative system that bitter experience had taught
him was not likely, it would be better for Britain to unilaterally
either peg its pound below its pre-war parity rate -- and by such a
devaluation encourage the output of its exporters - or, as eventually
transpired in 1931, to abandon the gold standard altogether.
Even as this was his best counsel on short-term policy, Markwell
shows Keynes was continuously preoccupied in this period, roughly
1922-1932, with finding a solution to the question of what possible
type of international arrangement could be agreed upon by many
nations and managed with some high degree of efficiency that would
not rely upon what Keynes considered the immiserating and
trade-inhibiting policies of the gold standard [1].
So the second-stage of the development of Keynes's views on
international relations was that he came to feel strongly that a
return to the pre-1914 prosperity in Europe required the adoption by
international agreement of an alternative to the former gold standard
that would attract wide participation. This could only happen, he
thought, if there were strong international leadership (which he long
looked for from the U.S., as far back as the end of the First World
War, but did not actually witness until World War Two). Moreover,
Markwell clearly shows that in all of his many writings and
participation in conferences devoted to this topic, Keynes was very
fluid and pragmatic about the form that such a system should take. He
was willing to compromise his own vision of a U.S./British-led system
of managed (flexible) fixed exchange rates and the form that a
managed stock of international liquidity reserves and payment media
would take, if it would encourage wider agreement. (He stressed that
the search for unanimity was an evil to be avoided.)
This fluidity as to details was to serve him well when he was
negotiating with America during the Second World War over Lend-Lease
and especially the post-war monetary system in that the Americans had
firmly held demands and alternative plans of their own, which when
added to Britain's weak financial position, meant that Keynes was
forced to negotiate from a distinctly weak position. Thus, the
1923-30 period was the stage of Keynes's developing international
relations views that Markwell calls "early liberal institutionalist."
Free trade could be beneficial, he was saying, but only if a properly
functioning international monetary institution was adopted.
Briefly, we proceed on to the third stage of Keynes's views on the
economic element in international relations. Here the question
becomes more starkly the universal nature of the coincidence of free
trade and peaceful international relations. This stage arose out of
Keynes's participation on the Macmillan Committee on Trade and
Finance (1929-31), the Economic Advisory Council set up by Ramsey
McDonald, and particularly its Committee of Economists (created in
July 1930, and to which also belonged William Beveridge, A. C. Pigou
and Lionel Robbins) and in the pages of the political affairs journal
that he headed at the time, the _New Statesman_. All of this activity
arose from the need to respond to the international crisis that arose
from the Great Depression and its particular impact on Britain.
In this and the fourth stage of Keynes's grappling with international
relations questions, Markwell emphasizes continuity in Keynes's
evolving views. The economist in me wants to call the first issue one
of political context and, therefore not economically fundamental. But
Markwell makes a good case that the last two stages of Keynes's
thought in this regard should be seen as merging into, and
reinforcing, one another. The fourth phase he identifies is the
period after 1933, sometime between 1934 and 1936, depending on when
one judges Keynes to have been in control of the central propositions
of his _General Theory_.
To go back, we should start with describing the third stage of
Keynes's views that Markwell describes as his "protectionist" phase.
This occurred when, in the early years of the Great Depression,
1929-33, and to quite a bit of controversy, Keynes advocated
protectionist measures for Britain, especially higher tariff
barriers, as a way of combating the British unemployment of that
period. He contextualized this recommendation by arguing that this
unemployment had unfortunately occurred within a world system where
the gold standard made the pursuit of free trade for "creditor"
countries (such as Britain was since 1914) a road to even higher
domestic unemployment than it was already experiencing. This was
because, in order to maintain its balance of payments, it was forced
to run a high-interest rate policy and deflation to protect its
reserves. In this circumstance, and again barring a better
international monetary system that seemed so impossible to him at
that dark stage in history, Keynes gave a limited endorsement to
British protectionist policy in the then-current economic emergency
and for the short term. One detects almost a reluctance on his part
to do so. And, indeed, his about-face was controversial enough on the
Economists Committee that Robbins found it necessary to both author a
dissenting minority report, attack Keynes's position in the press and
later author, with Beveridge and other LSE economists, a book
defending free trade even in this context (Beveridge et al. 1931).[2]
Consider Markwell's comment on Keynes in this period: "Keynes's
renunciation of free trade came, hesitantly, and then boldly, in
proposals, first, for emergency tariffs, and, secondly, for greater
national self-sufficiency and economic isolation. Keynes moved from
admitting that the classical connection between free trade and peace
was an argument against a tariff, but one outweighed by the economic
emergency; through saying that his proposed tariffs could also help
international amity; to denying that free trade did in fact promote
peace" (p. 153).
His argument in the context of such an economic emergency as the
Great Depression seems to have been analogous to the old saw that
"the patient cannot stand the cure." He thought that Britain was in
such a crisis with regard to unemployment, that her money wages were
too rigid for deflation to work its classic role in bring down costs,
that the gold standard had so limited the range within which domestic
economic policy had to maneuver, and that so many other countries
were reacting to this crises by erecting tariff barriers of their own
(effectively exporting their unemployment problems to Britain), that
he had become "reluctantly convinced" (p.154) that protectionism was
the best temporary policy Britain could pursue in this circumstance.
Economists, and particularly specialists in macroeconomics and in
Keynes's thought, might immediately wonder if the drafting of the
_General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money_ did not have a
profound effect on Keynes's ideas on this question. Less historically
minded economists might also wonder if, and how, the perspective of
macroeconomics might alter one's view of the _universal_ argument for
the benefits from trade. Again the history of Keynes's own
international relations positions offers examples of him facing
exactly this question. Consequently, the fourth and last stage that
Markwell identifies in Keynes's evolving views on international
relations -- what he calls the "mature liberal institutionalist"
phase -- was based on just this issue. Again depending on when one
judges the proposition of the _General Theory_ to have been drafted,
in some period during the middle part of the 1930s, Keynes developed
a more fundamental _economic theory_ framework in which to argue the
point about protectionism that we have seen him making on pragmatic
_policy_ grounds in the early years of the Great Depression. In the
_General Theory_ and after, Keynes insisted that the question of the
economic causes of war and the advisability of protectionist,
anti-trade measures depended on how close the economy was to full
employment -- and this extended to his advice to the government
during the Second World War, when he judged the economy to have met
this condition. Short of this internal goal, Keynes said that
countries were unlikely to reap the potential benefits from free
trade described by classic liberal economics. This was because the
temptation was too strong for any one country to erect tariff
barriers around itself to boost the demand for domestic producers. It
was Keynes's view that the policies of many nations since 1929
offered examples of this. Since competitive attempts to export
domestic unemployment to another country eventually ended in lowering
employment in them all, protectionist policies became a second best
solution in this context. Better that each county should act in
isolation from international forces to raise domestic employment to
its full potential, by lowering interest rates and bolstering demand
for domestic industry in any way possible. According to Keynes, "if
our central controls succeed in establishing an aggregate volume of
output corresponding to full employment as nearly as practicable, the
classical theory comes into it own again from this point onwards" (p.
186).
Here we can quote Markwell to the effect that Keynes hereby modified
his position on the economic causes of war in a fundamental way:
In short, Keynes's argument was both that laissez-faire did not have
the tendency to peace claimed for it, and that a reformed capitalism
along the lines he advocated would much improve the prospects for
peace. Keynes said that 'the new system might be more favourable to
peace than the old has been.' It is not clear
whether by this Keynes meant simply that past causes of war would be
absent, or that with these gone _and_ free trade, some of the
mechanisms classical liberals claimed were the means by which free
trade actively promoted peace would work again. Such mechanisms
included the creation by trade of vested interests in peace, and the
promotion of moral solidarity between nations trading with each other
(p. 184).
Here is the final issue that modern economists might profit from
pondering as a result of reading this book. Keynes was saying in the
1930s that countries had first to ensure full employment before they
could anticipate the mutual economic gains and the possible peace
dividends that trade holds out. If the economic system of a
free-market economy does not _automatically_ tend toward full
employment, but needs to be managed to attain this goal consistently
through time (and surely this is the basic lesson of macroeconomics
even to this day), then it is a mistake to think and preach that free
trade is some sort of divinely given cure for all economic ills, in
all contexts, domestic and foreign.
Keynes, of course, should not be looked on as an infallible guide in
pondering this issue. He was fallible in judgment even within the
field of international relations that Markwell surveys here. For one,
his self confidence about his cleverness in designing policy fixes
often led to disastrous negotiations on his part with his official
American counterparts during the Second World War. Harry Hopkins, the
special advisor to U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt, reportedly
expressed this irritation in his comment that Keynes was "one of
those fellows that just knows all the answers" (Chandavarkar, 2001).
Moreover he showed a complete lack of understanding of the American
political process. Used to dealing exclusively with ministers and
their Whitehall staff in the more centralized English system, he was
dismayed by the power of individual Congressman. Also, not only was
Keynes unnecessarily rude to these Congressman, who he often gave the
impression that he considered them provincial and beneath him, but
his haughty behavior was also unwise, in that those very Congressmen
could hold up American aid for British needs. He similarly accused
the White House and State Department of being too timid in its
relations with Congress, not realizing that the American Constitution
gave Congress control of appropriations, whatever the White House may
have negotiated for with the British.
But Keynes's faults were more than outweighed by his many talents.
Keynes's insight into how economies work, combined with his ability
to understand and exert influence over the process of policy
creation, is unlikely to be seen again in today's era of extreme
specialization. As such, modern economists, whether they agree with
his judgments or not, can learn valuable lessons in the political
economy of policy application from following his career in
international relations in the context of numerous actual
international crises. Markwell does a fine job in showing, over
numerous issues, how difficult and how much skill is required to
apply economic reasoning in the realm of international relations.
Markwell's greatest attraction for an economist is that he shows how
Keynes pursued this activity with skill and subtlety in the context
of many of the weightiest geopolitical issues to face the West in the
twentieth century. It is one measure of Keynes's and others' ultimate
success in this context that it is hard now to even imagine Germany
and England at war. We, as economists, can learn a great deal from a
recounting of his experiences in establishing this peaceful and
prosperous state of affairs in Europe. Perhaps it might even make us
a bit humble to contemplate that it may be in large part due to
Keynes's own work both in economics and politics, to the wisdom of
the architecture and implementation of the Marshall Plan, which was
surely in the spirit of Keynes's ideas, and to the way in which
economies have been managed since his time, that we have the luxury
of not facing his unpalatable choice between free trade and full
employment.
Notes:
1. Also note that Keynes therefore wanted to destroy what he
considered a "barbarous relic" of the nineteenth century, the belief
that the gold standard operated "automatically" to restore
international imbalances and that this meant it would encourage
trade. Alternatively, a major message of Keynes throughout this
period was that the gold standard was not, in fact, operating
automatically by the pre-war rules of the game in the period after
World War One because the U.S. and the Federal Reserve System refused
to let its own eventual control of the majority of the world's
monetary gold cause U.S. prices to rise. Keynes thought this unfairly
forced upon all other "creditor" nations the problems, noted above,
of choosing to abandon international monetary arrangements, to
competitively devalue its currency or to run a ruinous deflation. 2.
It is instructive to modern economists that Robbins later, in his
autobiography (Robbins, 1971), recanted his opposition to Keynes
during those depression years.
References:
Chandavarkar, A. 2001. "A Fresh Look at Keynes: Robert Skidelsky's
Trilogy." _Finance and Development_, Vol. 38, no. 4, December.
Moggridge, Donald. 1992. _Maynard Keynes: An Economist's Biography_, Routledge.
Robbins, Lionel C. 1971. _Autobiography of an Economist_, Macmillan.
Skidelsky, Robert. 2000. _John Maynard Keynes: Fighting for Britain_,
Macmillan.
Michael S. Lawlor is Professor of Economics, Wake Forest University,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina. His most recent publication on Keynes
is _The Economics of Keynes in Historical Context: An Intellectual
History of the General Theory_ (2006).
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