I'd like to respond to a couple points in this discussion that 
have been made in the last week.  Please bear with me. 
 
- On November 29, Robin Neill wrote: 
 
>Now I have learned that McCloskey is just one more 
>methodologist.  McCloskey is a false start. 
 
It seems to me that we are all "just one more methodologist" 
in so far as we think about or critique our practice.  No one 
methodologist holds THE answers.  McCloskey may only 
provide a limited or one-sided way to pursue this, but insofar 
as it is an attempt to honestly reflect on our practice (i.e. 
look at our warts and all), I can't agree that is a false start.   
Also, if one is interested in pragmatism, to denigrate rhetoric 
because McCloskey is seen as a "false start" misses the 
point.  Rhetoric as an epistemic practice was recognized by 
the early pragmatists as early as Emerson.   
 
 
- On November 29, Michael Gibbons wrote: 
 
>let's just lump everything different into one category, easier 
>to dismiss without detail critical examination. 
 
Mea culpa.  I got sucked into the discussion and also used 
the term "post-modern deconstruction" as if it denoted the 
entire spectrum of "post-modern" thought.  As Michael 
points out, we are talking about a host of intellection 
positions and various "isms":  post-modernism, structuralism, 
deconstructionism and post-structuralism, to name perhaps 
the four principle strains.  Granted, to tray and "define" 
these strains is like dealing with superfluities anymore, but I 
believe it is possible, and necessary, to identify some core 
ideas that can be seen as underlying assumptions for each.   
There are both significant and subtle differences among 
them.  A decent guide that I would recommend is Allen 
Megill's Prophets of Extremity.   
 
Ironically, much of what they take issue with are problems 
associated with the psychology and anthropology of 100 
years ago that Ron Stanfield mentions.  In so far as one 
agrees with me, many of the new "isms" share an aversion 
to the continued taint of Enlightenment thought, primarily an 
epistemological foundation that guarantees certainty and a 
transparent theory of language.  I still find these two issues 
very troubling in economics--no matter what school of 
thought. 
 
As for what these "isms" mean for economics, I don't know. 
But that's the point, isn't it?  Hell, we could easily say Kant 
had it figured out and go home and have a beer. 
 
Jonathon E. Mote 
1822 Chestnut #3F 
Philadelphia, PA  19103 
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