I have a question, Peter. Judging from your terminology, you believe 
that a political theorist is only interested in what I would call 
"unconstrained majority-rule democracy." Do you really mean this? Let me 
explain.

I use the term "constrained democracy" to refer to majority rule 
decision-making that is subject to constraints. Here are two examples. 
The US, as established by the founders, is a constrained democracy 
because it specifies a set of rights that cannot be taken away by 
majority rule. In case of conflict, the document that describes the 
institutions and procedures of the democracy specifies that a Supreme 
Court ruling is final. Local government democracy in Wisconsin is also a 
constrained democracy because the State law constrains the rights of 
local governments and, therefore, of the citizens who elect local 
governments. In case of conflict, the Wisconsin constitution, I presume 
specifies that the high court of Wisconsin would rule on the 
constitutionality of the state constraint, unless it also violates the 
federal constitution.

Now that the definition is clear, I consider the point at issue in 
Wisconsin. As I understand it, it concerns two rights that the state 
government uses to constrain the local governments. The first is that a 
local government that faces a duly elected union cannot making separate 
pay agreements with workers who do not wish to pay union dues or to be 
part of the union, even if those workers do not wish to be part of the 
union. In short, the local government cannot hire employees who 
(ultimately) decline to pay union dues or at a pay-benefit schedule that 
differs from that which is sanctioned by the union bosses. The second is 
that a local government that faces a duly elected union cannot make 
negotiations with a union that exclude benefits (health care, pensions, 
etc.). In other words, they cannot unilaterally take benefit 
negotiations off the table. These state government-specified rights were 
established by majority rule at the state level. Thus, the democracy of 
the local governments is constrained.

The governor and many, if not all, Republicans aim to change the law. 
They want to take away these constraints.

Are not political theorists also interested in constrained democracy? 
And is it not necessary to use a model of constrained democracy to 
comprehend the Wisconsin situation?

Two minor points about your post. First, I think that the question of 
whether "we allow the market or politics to dominate" is loaded. 
Dominate what? Usually, the dichotomy is drawn between market outcomes 
and the outcomes of either socialism or of some sort of market 
intervention. Socialism is the complete absence of markets. Thus, the 
dichotomy is between markets and socialism. Arguments favoring 
intervention specify either a particular intervention, a set of 
interventions, or a procedure for making interventions. So far as I can 
know, no economist would know how to deal directly with the question of 
whether politics (democracy) or markets should dominate. I certainly don't.

Second, I was reporting on Commons's definition of collective 
bargaining, not my own. My point was that his definition is not relevant 
to the Wisconsin situation.


On 2/21/2011 9:07 AM, Peter G. Stillman wrote:
> So -- and speaking as a political theorist, primarily, -- I think 
> these different languages are interesting .  Pat's language 
> prioritizes exchange -- but I would think that one of the issues would 
> be (this is *my* language) where do we allow the market to dominate, 
> and where politics (or democracy).  Similarly, Pat thinks in terms of 
> 'restrictions on bosses' or 'a freer hand'; he seems not to consider 
> that the issue can be the scope of the democratic setting of terms of 
> the workplace.  (Note that my language allows, where Pat's tries to 
> restrict, the scope of what can be bargained about. Why Pat thinks 
> that arguments about health care insurance payments are any more than 
> wages or anything else a "fight for collective bargaining," than a 
> "fight for the wealth and income of Wisconsin taxpayers.")
>
> Peter Stillman
>
>> Hi, Ric:
>>
>> I have some questions and a comment.
>>
>> Why do you suggest that collective bargaining is an institution? 
>> Isn't it more accurate to call it a special legal right granted by 
>> the State to a representative of the MAJORITY of employees of a 
>> particular organization? By virtue of his being elected by the 
>> majority, the union boss receives the legal right to prevent the free 
>> exchange of work for pay between those who do not wish to be 
>> represented by the elected union officials and the employer.
>>
>> Moreover, why do you call this "collective action through a 
>> democratic process?" Suppose that a majority of firms in an industry 
>> agreed through a cartel to raise price. And suppose that the law 
>> permitted the cartel boss to dictate industry price even to 
>> competitors who sought to undercut the cartel price. Would this also 
>> be an example of collective action through the democratic process?
>>
>> One might justify allowing a union boss this special privilege on the 
>> grounds that employers had previously succeeded in restricting free 
>> exchange. I am not discussing what is right or wrong here. I am only 
>> suggesting that you might wish to use other terms.
>>
>> Commons viewed the trade agreement that results from collective 
>> bargaining as between unions and industry. One side wants higher pay 
>> and restrictions on bosses; the other wants lower pay and a freer 
>> hand. That is not the issue in dispute in Wisconsin, as I understand 
>> it. My understanding is that the legislature, on the basis of a 
>> recommendation from the governor, aims to alter the rules regarding 
>> the kinds of bargains that are allowable between a union and the 
>> representatives of local governments. The local government officials 
>> have not tried to restrict employees from expressing grievances 
>> individually or collectively. On the contrary, the State of Wisconsin 
>> has a variety of protections for individuals worker against arbitrary 
>> treatment by supervisors. Rather than a "fight for collective 
>> bargaining," it would seem better to call it a "fight for the wealth 
>> and income of Wisconsin taxpayers." A more appropriate reference than 
>> Commons might be Mancur Olson.
>>
>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Logic_of_Collective_Action
>>
>> http://books.google.com/books?id=W0fGAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA605&lpg=PA605&dq=%22John+R.+Commons%22+%22collective+bargaining%22&source=bl&ots=-g0rIhtd65&sig=7OL5UGltywRUhtDYTgbo4KA6jF4&hl=en&ei=ZtVhTbnUK4G2tgf8mtC8DA&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=7&ved=0CEEQ6AEwBg#v=onepage&q=%22John%20R.%20Commons%22%20%22collective%20bargaining%22&f=false 
>>
>>
>>
>> Best wishes,
>>
>>
>> On 2/19/2011 3:23 PM, Ric Holt wrote:
>>> It is a little ironic that the fight for collective bargaining today is
>>> taking place in Madison, Wisconsin where John R. Commons taught for
>>> years. Street  (1966) observes that Ayres agreed with Veblen on the
>>> negative effect of ceremonial activities and institutions, calling them
>>> a "persistent drag." But a very different view of social institutions
>>> emerges from the work of John R. Commons, who saw collective action
>>> through the democratic process as reshaping institutions to improve
>>> society and individual freedom.
>>>
>>> Commons was the source of many landmark social innovations
>>> (institutions) that helped to soften the clash of social interests in a
>>> modern capitalist economy and improve the standard of living of the
>>> average worker and citizen. Variations of his workers compensation
>>> program, devised for Wisconsin, were rapidly adopted by other states
>>> (Street 1973) and the unemployment insurance and pensions systems 
>>> became
>>> models for the New Deal.  This was all based on his view that
>>> "collective action within a responsive democratic framework of
>>> legislation and judicial interpretation can transform existing legal
>>> arrangements into more effective instruments to promote development."
>>> (Street 1974).
>>>
>>> As some of you know I'm starting to work on a book that focuses on Post
>>> Keynesian economics and Social Justice. One issue I'm exploring is
>>> whether there are conditions needed for true freedom and what are they.
>>> Let us take a case where you have a worker in Bahrain where his
>>> situation is to work long hours in a terrible and unsafe environment or
>>> starve. Some would say that he has liberty and freedom since he has a
>>> "choice." No one is coercing him to work at this place.  But freedom
>>> should mean much more than just having the freedom to make a choice, 
>>> but
>>> having "meaningful" choices in one's life that will truly make one's
>>> life better off and happier. Since the choice the worker has is not a
>>> "meaningful" choice, similar to "take your life or your money" then
>>> in many ways he is a "victim" and his choice and freedom is being
>>> coerced.
>>>
>>> Liberty, then, is not just dependent on being able to make choices, but
>>> something much more, which is being able to make meaningful choices in
>>> one's life. In this case the choice of working or starving is not being
>>> imposed by a particular individual, but by the type of social
>>> arrangements that exist. If we change those social arrangements which
>>> might include the right to bargain, provide unemployment compensation
>>> where being unemployed is not equal to starving, or educational
>>> opportunities to learn new skills for other job opportunities, then
>>> these change in social arrangements has significantly increase the
>>> liberty and freedom of this individual in a meaningful way. So
>>> following, in many ways, the ideas of Commons the type of social
>>> innovations that we put into place can dramatically increase our
>>> individual freedom and lead to less conflict and more harmony in 
>>> society
>>> which will increase overall social welfare. Economic development has
>>> both quantitative and qualitative changes that can increase liberty or
>>> restrict it.
>>>
>>> Ric Holt
>>> Southern Oregon University
>>>
>>
>> -- 
>> Pat Gunning
>> Professor of Economics
>> Melbourne, Florida
>> http://www.nomadpress.com/gunning/welcome.htm
>
>

-- 
Pat Gunning
Professor of Economics
Melbourne, Florida
http://www.nomadpress.com/gunning/welcome.htm