Bateman, Bradley wrote:
>John Medaille's characterization of Moore's ethical position may fit
>textbook descriptions in some limited sense, but it is badly mistaken.

Well, Okay. My characterizations fit "in some 
limited sense." At least we have some limited 
agreement. But as far as being "badly mistaken," I am not convinced.

>When Moore says that the good is indefinable, he is arguing that it is a
>Platonic essence that would be intuited identically by any reasonable
>person.

We might be tempted to ignore the suspicion that 
"Reasonable person" here might merely mean 
middle-class Englishman, but it would be a 
mistake to do so. Whether you call it intuition 
or emotion, you must end up making it a 
psychological reality rather then something in 
the real world. After all, to make it real would 
be the "naturalistic fallacy." There is no doubt 
that Moore wanted the good to be something 
objective; but he made it impossible for it to be 
so. Whatever else may be the case, it is the case 
that if the good is something that can neither be 
proved nor disproved, then no rational discussion 
can take place. You end up with an appearance 
rather than the reality of a reasonable position, 
but have discounted reason, then the appeal to 
"reasonable persons" has a hallow ring, does it not?

What Moore wanted to do and what he did might be 
divergent things. It wouldn't be the first time 
that intention did not match performance.

John C. Medaille