I don't follow Harro's argument. I didn't mean to say that the roles are new--the issue I was addressing was whether economic science gets pulled into in. With Friedman it did, as it did with Samuelson, Tobin, and many others. My argument was that in the methodological pronouncements Classical economists drew a distinction between economic scientists and economic policy advisors, and put a strong emphasis on economists advising government on policy matters to make it clear that they were not speaking as economic scientists, but as statesmen--and people were free to advise away as statesmen. That distinction is now blurred, which blends economic science and economic policy much more than it needs to be.
Is the line blurred--absolutely, but that doesn't mean that we should not try and separate out the two as much as possible.
The change that has occurred in economics is that today, there is empirical work that also is relatively value free to base policy on (although a lot less than many suggest). Did some Classical economists violate these methodological prescriptions--yes they did, but that did not mean that that is what they saw as best practice.
In the 1930s, pro-activist economists--Lerner and Samuelson--started to violate that practice and draw government activist policy directly from theoretical models. In response pro-market economists started doing the same, and the result is ideology and economic science becomes hopelessly intertwined.
Here is what Senior had to say on the division:
(The economist's) premises consist of a very few general propositions, the result of observation, or consciousness, and scarcely requiring proof, or even formal statement, which almost every man, as soon as he hears them, admits as familiar to his thoughts, or at least as included in his previous knowledge: and his inferences are nearly as general, and, if he has reasoned correctly, as certain, as his premises.
But his conclusions, whatever be their generality and their truth, do not authorize him in adding a single syllable of advice. That privilege belongs to the writer or statesman who has considered all the causes which may promote or impede the general welfare of those whom he addresses, not to the theorist who has considered only one, though among the most important of those causes. The business of a Political Economist is neither to recommend nor to dissuade, but to state general principles, which it is fatal to neglect, but neither advisable, nor perhaps practicable, to use as the sole, or even the principle, guides in the actual conduct of affairs. (Nassau Senior, 1836: 2-3)
Here is how Robbins carried through the argument:
My suggestion here, as in the Introduction to my Political Economy: Past and Present, is that its (political economy) use should be revived as now covering that part of our sphere of interest which essentially involves judgments of value. Political Economy, thus conceived, is quite unashamedly concerned with the assumptions of policy and the results flowing from them. I may say that this is not (repeat not) a recent habit of mine. In the Preface to my Economic Planning and International Order, published in 1937, I describe it as "essentially an essay in what may be called Political economy as distinct from Economics in the stricter sense of the word. It depends upon the technical apparatus of analytical Economics; but it applies this apparatus to the examination of schemes for the realization of aims whose formulation lies outside Economics; and it does not abstain from appeal to the probabilities of political practice when such an appeal has seemed relevant.
It should be clear then that Political economy in this sense involves all the models of analysis and explicit or implicit judgments of value that are usually involved when economists discuss assessments of benefits and the reverse or recommendations for policy. (Robbins, 1981 Ely Lecture, 8)
Earlier he had this to say.
those who adopt this latter attitude (the view that his definition will preclude economists from being interested in policy) are concerned not so much with problems of definition as with problems of conduct or deportment. They think that the economist will sacrifice opportunities for usefulness if he abstains from excursions into social philosophy and (apparently) they think that if such excursions are not dignified by the title, economics science, he may feel precluded from making them. The warning may be necessary. But the psychology may be questioned. To me at least, it seems difficult to believe that recognition of the distinction between the two kinds of propositions will prevent any man of spirit from being interested in both. (Robbins, 1938, 345)
David Colander
CAJ Distinguished Professor of Economics
Department of Economics
Middlebury College
Middlebury, Vermont, 05753
(802-443-5302)
-----Original Message-----
From: Societies for the History of Economics [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Eric Schliesser
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Subject: Re: [SHOE] on 'statesmen' and economists wispering to princess
I agree with Harro, which is why in my own own work I often happily draw comparison between 17th-18th century debates and those of the 20th.
But I agree with Collander that there was a vision/image of economics prevalent around Marschall and Cambridge (J.N. Keynes) that insisted on some such split (of course, the younger Keynes was at Versailles, underscoring Harro's point), and that we can understand post WWII economic developments as removing that image.
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On May 13, 2011, at 18:20, Harro Maas <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
Eric Schliesser wrote: 'Second, we don't understand post WWII economics, if we fail to see that the blurring between economics and statesmanship was deliberate'
I am not sure the label 'statesman' captures the intended role of the economist so well. As Colander uses it, it seems to be about the 'art' not the 'science' of economics ('capturing non-economic issues), but in my view this distinction never made much sense. One of the roles that Al Roth, I think in a paper in JHET or JEM long time ago - I don't have it at hand, attributed to economists 'wispering to princess' (or counceling as Eric Schliesser wrote) nicely shows the line was always blurred: Mun or Quesnay, not to speak of the political radicals around Bentham, or, of course, Keynes or Samuelson, were as much wispering to princess as Mankiw, Vernon Smith, or Krugman. Burried in discussions about methodology is what the whispering should be about and what kind of whispering is most effective to get your way of seeing things through. So I don't think the roles are new so much, but they stand in for the different visions (opinions, ideologies) of how the
world should look like. Which brings us back to Friedman's/the Chicago boys shock doctrine for Chile.
Harro maas
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