At the risk of posting something ugly or stupid, I will point out that Irving Fisher was a Neoclassical and a Eugenicist. Eugenics is often associated with Nazism, though this certainly does not imply that Fisher was a Nazi. Also, Hayek argued (in the Road to Serfdom) that all forms of collectivism, including the Market Socialism, are ultimately incompatible with liberty and will lead to some form of servitude or fascism. Hayek did not think that Lerner or Lange were fascists, just that their program bad unintended consequences in the long run.  

Pat pointed out that Marxists are polylogists (to use Mises' term) by class, as opposed to racial polylogists like Hitler. This does not imply a "common classification" as you put it. One can advance a critique that applies to both Marxism and Fascism without making all Marxists out to be Hitlerean.

DWM Ph.D.

> As a Marxist classified with "racists, religious zealots,
> nationalists," I wonder what the response would be if I
> classified neo-classical economists with Fascists.  People would
> rightly respond that such a suggestion would be something between ugly and
> stupid.
> 
> On Wed, Jun 8, 2011 at 9:56 AM, Pat Gunning <[log in to unmask]>
> wrote:
> > Turpin's book, as reported by Donald Fry is an
> excellent example of what
> > Ludwig von Mises called POLYLOGISM.
> >
> > Polylogism is the "theory that the logical structure
> of the human mind
> > differs according to certain divisions of mankind and
> that as a result the
> > ideas and logic of men also differ in accordance with
> the specified
> > classification of men. Marxian polylogism asserts
> there are differences
> > according to social classes. Others claim there are
> differences according to
> > race, religion, nationality, etc." (Percy Greaves)
> > http://mises.org/easier/P.asp#33
> >
> > In the past, this theory was proposed by Marxists,
> racists, religious
> > zealots, nationalists, and so on. Now it is presented
> by a professor of
> > communication, who presumably recognizes that
> different people speak
> > different languages but denies that they have a common
> deep structure.
> > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deep_structure
> >
> > Mises believed that the main motive for polylogism was
> to attack the use of
> > economics in evaluating economic policy. He writes
> that a "consistent
> > supporter of polylogism would have to maintain that
> ideas are correct
> > because their author is a member of the right class,
> nation, or race."
> > See section 2 of
> > http://www.econlib.org/library/Mises/HmA/msHmA3.html
> >
> > Apparently, Turpin believes that he has the "right"
> attitude about
> > distribution, which trumps the traditional economic
> theory of the classical
> > and early neoclassical economists. The moral view he
> presents is based on a
> > "conflict, survivalist view" of an economy. This view
> sees an economy as an
> > interaction that determines who gets what, and not an
> interaction that
> > determines how individuals come to produce the
> mountains of consumer goods
> > that can be observed in the department stores,
> supermarkets and shipping
> > depots. Who could reasonably deny that Smith held the
> latter view of an
> > economy and that this is mainly what future
> generations learned from Smith's
> > writings?
> >
> >
> > On 6/7/2011 6:05 PM, Humberto Barreto wrote:
> >>
> >> ------ EH.NET <http://eh.net/> BOOK REVIEW ------
> >> Title: The Moral Rhetoric of Political Economy:
> Justice and Modern
> >> Economic
> >> Thought
> >>
> >> Published by EH.NET <http://eh.net/> (June 2011)
> >>
> >> Paul Turpin, /The Moral Rhetoric of Political
> Economy: Justice and Modern
> >> Economic Thought/. New York: Routledge, 2011. xv +
> 163 pp. $115
> >> (hardcover),
> >> ISBN: 978-0-415-77392-8.
> >>
> >> Reviewed for EH.Net by Donald E. Frey, Department
> of Economics, Wake
> >> Forest
> >> University.
> >>
> >> Paul Turpin’s thesis is that Adam Smith’s
> theory of a self-regulating
> >> economy was only plausible if it rested on the
> values and customs of the
> >> commercial society of his time and place.
> Smith’s ideal economy could
> >> operate without the regulating role for church and
> state only because the
> >> constraints of the “social decorum” of his
> society took their place.
> >> However, reliance on social decorum creates a
> paradox for the theory of
> >> “natural liberty” because “at the very
> moment it dismisses dogma
> >> [church] and ancient custom [the feudal state]
> with one hand, it
> >> reintroduces
> >> a dogmatic decorum with the other. ... People are
> free to be themselves as
> >> long as they correspond to the right decorum [of
> the commercial society]”
> >> (p.10).  Thus, the system of natural liberty
> imposes its own conformity.
> >>
> >> Using traditional terminology, Turpin argues that
> the decorum of this
> >> society
> >> was that of “commutative” justice -- the
> values that allow commerce to
> >> function, such as high regard for property rights,
> contracts, voluntary
> >> trading, competitive efficiency, etc.  But the
> tilt in that direction
> >> largely banished issues of “distributive
> justice” from the public sphere.
> >> When distributive issues occasionally intruded
> into the public arena, they
> >> were narrowly defined by the market mentality:
> distributive justice was
> >> reduced to the question of the rightness of the
> distribution of economic
> >> rewards received by people. And what is right is
> whatever results from the
> >> workings of a competitive market -- an answer that
> reverts to commutative
> >> categories.
> >>
> >> Broader distributive issues exist, Turpin insists:
> namely, what is one’s
> >> place in society and one’s relationship to that
> society? Smith left this
> >> to
> >> be decided in the private arena by the decorum of
> the existing society,
> >> and
> >> largely kept these questions out of the public
> arena. Turpin points out
> >> that
> >> such private-sector decorum worked at various
> times to subordinate, not
> >> liberate, groups of people (consider the role of
> women) -- an outcome
> >> hardly
> >> consistent with a system of natural liberty. This
> reviewer thinks Turpin
> >> could have gone even further: the thought-patterns
> taught by commerce may
> >> invade the “private” realm and turn even
> personal relationships into
> >> forms of economic transactions or calculations (a
> process written about in
> >> Robert Bellah’s /Habits of the Heart/).
> >>
> >> Turpin defines distributive justice in terms of
> human relationships, which
> >> includes full membership in society for all:
> “having a recognized place in
> >> society is something people need to develop their
> own identities. ...
> >> [and]
> >> /people as-they-are are recognized as belonging/,
> as being members” (p.
> >> 106, emphasis added). That is, one’s security as
> a member of society does
> >> not need to be proportional to one’s economic
> productivity (or merely
> >> one’s high income), an affirmation that flies in
> the face of much of the
> >> practice of modern commercial cultures.  Smith
> considered some provision
> >> for
> >> the poor in /The Wealth of Nations/, as befit the
> “decorum” of his time.
> >> But for the “liberal” society, which followed
> him, removal of
> >> non-competitive hindrances to earning one’s
> income became almost the only
> >> public obligation to distributive justice. Turpin
> says that such a society
> >> would still leave people with existential
> insecurity, “the frightening
> >> prospect of not-belonging, of being abandoned (p.
> 121).
> >>
> >> Turpin is a professor of communication, and
> supports his thesis by a close
> >> look at Smith’s rhetoric. / The Wealth of
> Nations/ rhetorically appeals to
> >> the reader’s sympathetic response to familiar
> commercial behaviors, which
> >> Smith praises as virtues. In /Wealth/, Smith also
> encourages his reader’s
> >> lack of sympathy for monopolists, whose motives
> are portrayed as wicked.
> >> That
> >> is, Smith’s rhetoric is that of moral blame and
> praise. Turpin argues that
> >> this resolves the famous “Das Adam Smith
> problem.”  The “sympathy”
> >> of /The Theory of Moral Sentiments/ has not
> disappeared from /The Wealth
> >> of
> >> Nations/ after all. While sympathy for others
> might not motivate economic
> >> actors, Smith appeals to the sympathetic response
> of his audience: “The
> >> sympathy of the reader for the judgments of
> Smith’s implied reader creates
> >> a formidable orientation toward competition,
> legitimating both formal and
> >> informal institutions” (p. 40).
> >>
> >> Although much changed between Smith’s and Milton
> Friedman’s times,
> >> Friedman’s popular writing ignored that
> intervening history that had given
> >> people good reason to turn against laissez-faire.
> In /Capitalism and
> >> Freedom/, “Friedman sums up nearly one hundred
> years of the heart of the
> >> modern era with no analysis at all about why or
> how welfare replaced
> >> freedom
> >> as a dominant concern” (p. 68).  Turpin
> describes Friedman’s strategy as
> >> being very similar to that of Smith: namely to
> advocate for individual
> >> freedom as the social norm, while actually
> promoting a particular social
> >> decorum that is necessary for it to work. “The
> dissonance between these
> >> two
> >> social orders, the ideal and the actual, is what
> finally emerges as a
> >> problem” (p. 75). As with Smith, Friedman’s
> “discussion of justice is
> >> actually about commutative justice, not
> distributive justice” (p. 74).
> >> Justice is merely “payment in accordance with
> product.” The fact that
> >> Friedman had a large modern following suggests
> that the values of our
> >> commercial culture have blinded many of us to what
> a minimalist,
> >> impoverished
> >> notion of justice this really is.
> >>
> >> Turpin is in good company in defining distributive
> justice much more
> >> broadly
> >> -- to include the affirmation of membership in,
> and participation in,
> >> one’s
> >> society or community. Arthur Okun’s well-known
> essay, “Equality and
> >> Efficiency: The Big Trade-Off,” spoke of the
> fundamental importance of
> >> affirming the full membership of people in their
> society; distributive
> >> justice went beyond income distribution, as
> important as it was. Okun
> >> argued
> >> explicitly that some things (e.g., voting rights,
> academic honors, or
> >> marks
> >> of athletic excellence) should be excluded from
> the market. Otherwise
> >> society
> >> would be no more than a “giant vending
> machine,” and recognition of
> >> one’s human standing no more than a commodity.
> There is a long tradition
> >> among humanist thinkers, religious thinkers, and
> others, that a good
> >> society
> >> is marked by concern for one’s identity, found
> in community.  For example,
> >> a 1986 pastoral letter of the American Catholic
> bishops was explicit about
> >> giving up some economic “efficiency” (i.e.,
> deviating from a key norm of
> >> the commercial society) to support the viability
> of existing communities
> >> and
> >> the sense of place they represented for their
> members. Well before Adam
> >> Smith, John Amos Comenius, the education reformer
> and Protestant bishop,
> >> envisioned a humane society that respected people,
> and their human dignity
> >> --
> >> starting with children.
> >>
> >> Turpin’s book approaches his economic subject
> from a multi-disciplinary
> >> perspective. His own field is communications
> (hence the title), but he is
> >> at
> >> home with the relevant economic and philosophical
> literature. Not
> >> surprisingly, Turpin prefers philosophy rooted in
> communications theory;
> >> but
> >> this is an apt choice. This philosophy views
> social-ethical norms as
> >> emerging
> >> from moral discourse among members of a community
> (he speaks of
> >> “discourse” communities).  Human
> relationships imply discourse, and
> >> moral norms are nothing, if not about human
> relationships.  If norms are
> >> dictated by the social decorum of a certain
> society (which always seems to
> >> have inherent biases favoring some groups), they
> are not aids to freedom,
> >> but
> >> straitjackets for at least some members of that
> society. The laissez-faire
> >> system of natural liberty is not so free.
> >>
> >> Turpin brings a fresh and important interpretation
> to the history of moral
> >> thought embedded in political economy. This book
> presents an impressive
> >> multi-disciplinary argument that is provocative,
> convincing, and
> >> consistent
> >> with what other observers have noted about the
> ills of a society modeled
> >> on
> >> an eighteenth-century ideal. Economists should
> consider Turpin’s idea that
> >> answers to problems of economic morality could
> emerge from human
> >> discourse.
> >> The alternative is to be mute about moral issues,
> thereby leaving the
> >> status
> >> quo to provide the answers.
> >>
> >> Donald E. Frey is the author of /America’s
> Economic Moralists: A History
> >> of
> >> Rival Ethics and Economics/ (State University of
> New York Press, 2009)
> >>
> >> Copyright (c) 2011 by EH.Net. All rights reserved.
> This work may be copied
> >> for non-profit educational uses if proper credit
> is given to the author
> >> and
> >> the list. For other permission, please contact the
> EH.Net Administrator
> >> ([log in to unmask]
> <mailto:[log in to unmask]>).
> Published by EH.Net
> >> (June 2011). All EH.Net reviews
> >> are archived at http://www.eh.net/BookReview.
> >>
> >> Geographic Location: General, International, or
> Comparative
> >> Subject: History of Economic Thought; Methodology
> >> Time: 18th Century, 19th Century, 20th Century:
> Pre WWII, 20th Century:
> >> WWII
> >> and post-WWII
> >
> > --
> > Pat Gunning
> > Professor of Economics
> > Melbourne, Florida
> > http://www.nomadpress.com/gunning/welcome.htm
> >
> 
> 
> 
> -- 
> Michael Perelman
> Economics Department
> California State University
> Chico, CA
> 95929
> 
> 530 898 5321
> fax 530 898 5901
> http://michaelperelman.wordpress.com
>