Dear All,
In response to Mason Gaffney (below):
I was concerned when I wrote about 'intellectual support-bargaining' on the
SHOE thread that it might be taken as something superficial. It is not
possible to explain fully in a single post.
Mason interprets my comments in accordance with the conventional and simple
understanding of information, which might be summarised as, "good people
tell the truth, while unprincipled people do not". The view that there are
no "good people", or that "good people" are extremely rare, is then
dismissed as 'cynical'.
But such dismissal does not constitute evidence against views expressed
about the pursuit of truth. In the present instance, the evidence at issue
was that recorded in previous SHOE posts regarding the origins of the LSE
and its political leanings. I proposed 'intellectual support-bargaining' as
a realistic explanation of that evidence. Those posting on the origins of
the LSE were clearly concerned that what actually happened was not
consistent with the common understanding of the way academic institutions
are set up and conducted.
The idea of 'intellectual support-bargaining' rests on a broader theory of
support-bargaining based on recognition of a compulsion in humans to seek
support. It thus has distinctive psychological background. It also rests on
the recognition that human minds deal only with information, and information
is always subject to manipulation for the advance of interests. Language
constitutes one of the principle means by which information is manipulated.
Language might even be seen as made for support-bargaining. Mason himself
refers to 'wordplay' as misleading. Mason uses the word 'cynic' for those
who express doubt about the existence of 'good people'. But that is merely
an instance of the use of language in 'intellectual support-bargaining'.
Labelling someone a 'cynic' drives support away from the opinions that
person holds. The word in itself implies disapproval. It protects the
interest in maintenance of existing theory. Mason uses the linguistic
techniques that he condemns. He provides evidence in support of the theory
he is trying to discredit.
The pursuit of truth, in so far as it is carried on in linguistic terms, has
to be conducted in an 'information interface' that is imbued with
distortions and even deceptions arising from the inputs of the 'unprincipled'
- those who pursue their own interests, either as individuals or in the
groups that form through support-bargaining. Truth could not, in any case,
be pursued independently of interest, since it is necessary to select first
the particular truth we are going to pursue - whether, for example, we want
the truth about the nature of deity, or whether we want the opening hours of
the local supermarket.
The best approximations to truth, as understood in the context of
intellectual support-bargaining, arise when interests are predominantly
interests in truth. This is not rare. To avoid accidents, it is useful to
know the truth about gravity. When we buy a car, we want to know the truth
about its specifications and condition. To avoid embarrassment, it is useful
to know the characters and dispositions of the people we deal with. Where
there is interest in truth, people support what is consistent with evidence.
The replicative and multi-source approach to evidence used in the natural
sciences applies also, in so far as it can be applied, in the social
sciences. Such an approach may be accepted as raising the probabilities of
identifying truth, but since our minds are confined to information, we can
never know anything beyond the information interface. What comes to be
regarded as truth is such by virtue of the support accruing to it.
I hope the above sheds a little more light on the theory of 'intellectual
support-bargaining'. It is to be taken as an indication of the fuller
arguments which have already been published. Support-bargaining creates
'money' and hence 'money-bargaining', so it should be a matter of interest
for historians of economic thought. Some, perhaps including Mason, may
recognise that there is reading to do. As far as the 'information interface'
is concerned, I hope to publish in detail on the subject next year.
Patrick Spread
Recent publication: www.routledge.com/9781138122918
Patrick Spread
Saikile, 29 Moorland Close,
Witney, OX28 6LN
United Kingdom
Tel: (+44) (0)1993 862 783
Mob: (+44) (0)787 1108 046
--------------------------------------------------
From: "Mason Gaffney" <[log in to unmask]>
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2017 11:56 PM
To: <[log in to unmask]>
Subject: Re: [SHOE] LSE series of reprints of scarce works on political
economy
> Patrick Spread reveals much truth about the worst in academic and other
> intellectual discourse, but in the process he goes, I believe, too far.
> Many thinkers and writers are moved by honest curiosity and quest for
> truth.
> They may be a small minority, but their findings and idealism vindicate
> the
> whole intellectual enterprise.
>
> The confirmed cynic twists idealism itself into a form of egotism. With
> that
> kind of wordplay we can quibble forever, but I think most people can see
> through it without my dwelling on the obvious.
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Societies for the History of Economics [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On
> Behalf Of Patrick Spread
> Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2017 1:21 AM
> To: [log in to unmask]
> Subject: Re: [SHOE] LSE series of reprints of scarce works on political
> economy
>
> Dear All,
>
> I follow with great interest the discussions regarding the origins of the
> LSE and its academic/political orientation. Rob Tye reveals below yet
> further complicated concerns over finance, academic achievement and
> ideological commitment.
>
> What is described can be understood as a process of 'intellectual
> support-bargaining'. The common assumption behind academic enquiry is that
> all are engaged in the pursuit of truth. But as your descriptions plainly
> show, many are concerned to advance political interests, advance careers
> or
> gain financial returns. So if the process is assessed in terms of 'the
> pursuit of truth' there are bound to be disappointments. 'Intellectual
> support-bargaining' provides a realistic account of theory-formation.
> People seek support for their interests by proposing theories conducive to
> advance of their interests. All theory is devoted to advance of interests
> of
> one kind or another. Those who get the greatest support will dominate the
> academic scene, will get the funding, will get the posts. 'Truth' ought to
> triumph on the evidence, but evidence tends to be selected to accord with
> interest. History shows that while we can do without 'truth', we cannot do
> without support.
>
> The idea of 'intellectual support-bargaining' is based not just on
> conscious
> contrivance to advance interests, but on psychological impulses to look
> after self. It is why the species has survived. It is also why humans have
> formed such odd theories and held them with such passionate commitment.
>
> Patrick Spread
>
>
>
> Recent publication: www.routledge.com/9781138122918
>
> Patrick Spread
> Saikile, 29 Moorland Close,
> Witney, OX28 6LN
> United Kingdom
> Tel: (+44) (0)1993 862 783
> Mob: (+44) (0)787 1108 046
>
> --------------------------------------------------
> From: "Rob Tye" <[log in to unmask]>
> Sent: Tuesday, June 20, 2017 9:48 AM
> To: <[log in to unmask]>
> Subject: Re: [SHOE] LSE series of reprints of scarce works on political
> economy
>
>> Dear Mason, and Erik
>>
>> With hindsight, I see the regrettable fundamental shift in general
>> attitudes over the course of the 20th century as away from a whiggish,
>> scientific and objective notion of truth championed by say Russell and
>> Wells (somewhat via
>> LSE) in 1900, to a more relativistic, historicist and merely social
>> notion of truth indicated by such as Foucault, Giddens or McCloskey in
>> 2000. I would argue that politically motivated funding of research
>> played a troubling and significant role in that shift. However, I
>> certainly agree with Sheamur and Dimand that we need to follow the
>> facts where they lead, and despite all that Rockefeller funding, for
>> me they lead most importantly not to LSE, but rather to the
>> convergence of Paris and New York during WWII.
>>
>> I will outline my own narrative, in the hope of getting criticism, or
>> assisting others with particular references.
>>
>> Back in the 1980's I saw two huge but completely separate problems in
>> monetary history. At Cambridge, Finley was undermining a correct
>> understanding of Ancient European Monetary history. He was diverting
>> attention away from political-economic motives by exaggerating the
>> extent of economic ignorance in ancient times. In Paris, Brauadel was
>> undermining a correct understanding of Medieval European Monetary
>> history by exaggerating the influence of the fluctuating fecundity of
>> mining operations. Over the next three decades I came to the
>> conclusion that these two very influential errors were in fact
>> intimately associated via agencies outside academia.
>> The facts that guided me are these, in roughly the order in which I
>> unearthed them
>>
>> 1) Andrew Murray Watson at Toronto launched an acute criticism of the
>> Braudelian bullionist position (EHR 1967). I wrote to Watson in the
>> 1990's to ask why he never followed up on that work on monetary
>> history He explained that immediately upon publication, and apparently
>> unexpectedly, he was given a Ford Foundation award to work on the
>> history of agriculture instead. It was that which, rightly or
>> wrongly, set me thinking
>>
>> 2) From there I found: Francis X. Sutton, "The Ford Foundation's
>> Trans-Atlantic Roles and Purposes" written by a one time Ford
>> Foundation employee, a man charged with negotiating very significant
>> funds towards Braudel, and clearly stating his understanding that
>> these were primarily associated with the political influence of
>> Braudel's work, rather than its academic content. Part of that grant
>> award (one million dollars in the 1970's as I recall) required
>> collaboration concerning the associated syllabus with Paul Lazarsfeld
>>
>> 3) Meanwhile I researched Finley, and discovered that, as Erik
>> Thomson suggests - he was an enormously erudite fellow, having already
>> gained degrees in three different subjects at the age of 21. Such was
>> his natural ability, that it seemed to me that as a young man he chose
>> to try to 'change history rather than study it', taking a position as
>> a propagandist for political views concerning academic matters,
>> alongside Boas. (That work seems to have created the basis of the
>> model for the later and very well
>> know Ford Foundation CCF project). He also became closely involved with
>> Paul Lazarsfeld at Columbia, a mentor who provided his job references,
>> including one working for Karl Polanyi, funded by the Ford foundation.
>> Much
>> of this information comes from the Tompkins biographies, but I found
>> in correspondence that Tompkins was resistant to the adoption of
>> additional sources I had to offer which to me suggests a popularist
>> mask concealed Finley's rather cynical and manipulative personality
>>
>> 4) The paper about Lazarsfeld "Clientelism and the University: was
>> Columbia Sociology a machine?" by Terry Nichols Clark is not as useful
>> as it initially sounds concerning substantive matters, but it gives a
>> vivid first hand account of "PFL's flagrant Machiavellianism" which
>> reinforced my conclusions concerning his close associate Finley. I
>> judge the extraordinary contemporary piece "The Basic Laws of Human
>> Stupidity" by eminent monetary historian Cipolla gives an addition
>> window into the levels of cynicism operating within exactly such
>> branches of academia back in those days
>>
>> So things I saw as disconnected and errors as a young man, in
>> maturity, appear to me connected, and intentional misrepresentations.
>> We have no window into men's hearts of course, but I could not
>> comfortably inhabit my own skin if I professed otherwise.
>>
>> Rob Tye
>>
>
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