With apologies for the length, I too have something to further add to this thread ...it concerns the pursuit of 'truth' or the lack thereof in economics...

Economics should be a practical science. Certainly there is a rich tradition for this to be so in many theoretical traditions within the discipline. But practicality means that ways of thinking especially as regards the most fundamental principles of the science should change if demonstrably shown to be problematic and even outright wrong by properly formulated and tested reasonably objective criteria. But within economics this unfortunately does not happen nor is it encouraged; in fact the opposite! It is not a real big secret that our discipline is rather loathe to accept results of evidence that seriously undermines certain of the most sanctimonious principles of the mainstream of thinking. Two examples of this come to mind.
 
First concerns the minimum wage. Study after recent study has shown that increasing the minimum wage has positive effects in terms of wage increases across the board (even for those adjacent communities not governed by the minimum wage) and a positive impact on aggregate income via simple effective demand multiplier mechanisms associated a high consumption propensity of wage earners at the lower tier; and the increased minimum wage has effectively zero negative employment effects! In fact the opposite as, via effective demand, increased income often translates into increased output demand and hence increased demand for employment. The point here is this is what loads of evidence since the 1990s shows! At some point this should not be a matter of debate but rather the point of departure of theorizing; but it is not.  Instead the above scenario implies the dangerous notion that a downward sloping demand curve for labor may be bogus, and this crosses ideological terrain that certain powerful elements in our discipline just cannot accept. It’s unfortunate really, because here economics risks ceasing to be a science and becomes riddled with guns-for-hire as regards corporate and monied interests and influence (especially in the academy and with research opportunities; this speaks to the topic of the thread...).
 
Second is the the intellectual poverty of the Cobb-Douglas and generally well-behaved aggregate production functions which accord to standard neoclassical postulates when they are used to ostensibly corroborate and/or justify aggregate marginal productivity of 'capital'.  But nothing of the sort actually exists, not even by violent abstraction or approximation. And mindful mainstream economists such as Frank Hahn, Paul Samuelson, Robert Solow, Herbert Simon, Mark Blaug, and C.E. Ferguson among others of that generation were at times honest enough intellectually to recognize this.  But not the current generation; witness Professor Mankiw who takes heart in the high R squared from empirical tests of malleable capital aggregate production functions as 'proof' that marginal products of 'capital' exist and are 'well-behaved', without himself seeming to know or care to learn that the purported 'good fit' comes from the fact that what is being tracked is NOT the so-called 'marginal product of aggregate capital' but rather simply an Euler-type income identity!  
 
What is so frustrating is that this is nothing new; as far back as 1938 and 1939 Horst Mendershausen identified these types of problems with the then spanking-new Cobb-Douglas.  Phelps-Brown revisits this in 1957, Franklin Fisher in the 1960s, Anwar Shaikh's HUMBUG production function in the 1970s and 1980s, and in the 1990s into the 21st century the extensive work by Jesus Felipe, John McCombie, and others.   
 
But all that is erased, and the new generation of economists remain ignorant of these issues, as if they never existed, or have been unequivocally answered when in fact they have not; rather these tough questions have been avoided and those that ask them dismissed and denied tenure, and quite ostrich-like heads are firmly planted into the ground and the mantra of "free markets", the purported sovereignty of the consumer, and the so-called ‘marginal method’ of constrained optimization is recited ad nauseam.  As Joan Robinson lamented late in her life, we are again thrust with essentially the economic theory that existed before Keynes.  To my mind that is the truly reactionary element in all of this...the retrenchment and further entrenchment of bad theories that lead to bad policies all of which are known and have been shown to be failed. And in this economic ceases to be a practical science and risks becoming for all intents and purposes alchemy.  

Scott Carter
The University of Tulsa
________________________________________
From: Societies for the History of Economics <[log in to unmask]> on behalf of Mason Gaffney <[log in to unmask]>
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2017 5:56 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: [SHOE] LSE series of reprints of scarce works on political economy

Patrick Spread reveals much truth about the worst in academic and other
intellectual discourse, but in the process he goes, I believe, too far.
Many thinkers and writers are moved by honest curiosity and quest for truth.
They may be a small minority, but their findings and idealism vindicate the
whole intellectual enterprise.

The confirmed cynic twists idealism itself into a form of egotism. With that
kind of wordplay we can quibble forever, but I think most people can see
through it without my dwelling on the obvious.

-----Original Message-----
From: Societies for the History of Economics [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On
Behalf Of Patrick Spread
Sent: Wednesday, June 21, 2017 1:21 AM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: [SHOE] LSE series of reprints of scarce works on political
economy

Dear All,

I follow with great interest the discussions regarding the origins of the
LSE and its academic/political orientation. Rob Tye reveals below yet
further complicated concerns over finance, academic achievement and
ideological commitment.

What is described can be understood as a process of 'intellectual
support-bargaining'. The common assumption behind academic enquiry is that
all are engaged in the pursuit of truth. But as your descriptions plainly
show, many are concerned to advance political interests, advance careers or
gain financial returns. So if the process is assessed in terms of 'the
pursuit of truth' there are bound to be disappointments. 'Intellectual
support-bargaining' provides a realistic account of theory-formation.
People seek support for their interests by proposing theories conducive to
advance of their interests. All theory is devoted to advance of interests of
one kind or another. Those who get the greatest support will dominate the
academic scene, will get the funding, will get the posts. 'Truth' ought to
triumph on the evidence, but evidence tends to be selected to accord with
interest. History shows that while we can do without 'truth', we cannot do
without support.

The idea of 'intellectual support-bargaining' is based not just on conscious
contrivance to advance interests, but on psychological impulses to look
after self. It is why the species has survived. It is also why humans have
formed such odd theories and held them with such passionate commitment.

Patrick Spread



Recent publication: www.routledge.com/9781138122918

Patrick Spread
Saikile, 29 Moorland Close,
Witney, OX28 6LN
United Kingdom
Tel: (+44) (0)1993 862 783
Mob: (+44) (0)787 1108 046

--------------------------------------------------
From: "Rob Tye" <[log in to unmask]>
Sent: Tuesday, June 20, 2017 9:48 AM
To: <[log in to unmask]>
Subject: Re: [SHOE] LSE series of reprints of scarce works on political
economy

> Dear Mason, and Erik
>
> With hindsight, I see the regrettable fundamental shift in general
> attitudes over the course of the 20th century as away from a whiggish,
> scientific and objective notion of truth championed by say Russell and
> Wells (somewhat via
> LSE)  in 1900, to a more relativistic, historicist and merely social
> notion of truth indicated by such as Foucault, Giddens or McCloskey in
> 2000.  I would argue that politically motivated funding of research
> played a troubling and significant role in that shift.  However, I
> certainly agree with Sheamur and Dimand that we need to follow the
> facts where they lead, and despite all that Rockefeller funding, for
> me they lead most importantly not to LSE, but rather to the
> convergence of Paris and New York during WWII.
>
> I will outline my own narrative, in the hope of getting criticism, or
> assisting others with particular references.
>
> Back in the 1980's I saw two huge but completely separate problems in
> monetary history.  At Cambridge, Finley was undermining a correct
> understanding of Ancient European Monetary history.  He was diverting
> attention away from political-economic motives by exaggerating the
> extent of economic ignorance in ancient times.  In Paris, Brauadel was
> undermining a correct understanding of Medieval European Monetary
> history by exaggerating the influence of the fluctuating fecundity of
> mining operations.  Over the next three decades I came to the
> conclusion that these two very influential errors were in fact
> intimately associated via agencies outside academia.
> The facts that guided me are these, in roughly the order in which I
> unearthed them
>
> 1)  Andrew Murray Watson at Toronto launched an acute criticism of the
> Braudelian bullionist position  (EHR 1967).   I wrote to Watson in the
> 1990's to ask why he never followed up on that work on monetary
> history He explained that immediately upon publication, and apparently
> unexpectedly, he was given a Ford Foundation award to work on the
> history of agriculture instead.  It was that which, rightly or
> wrongly, set me thinking
>
> 2) From there I found:  Francis X. Sutton, "The Ford Foundation's
> Trans-Atlantic Roles and Purposes" written by a one time Ford
> Foundation employee, a man charged with negotiating very significant
> funds towards Braudel, and clearly stating his understanding that
> these were primarily associated with the political influence of
> Braudel's work, rather than its academic content.  Part of that grant
> award (one million dollars in the 1970's as I recall) required
> collaboration concerning the associated syllabus with Paul Lazarsfeld
>
> 3)  Meanwhile I researched Finley, and discovered that, as Erik
> Thomson suggests - he was an enormously erudite fellow, having already
> gained degrees in three different subjects at the age of 21.  Such was
> his natural ability, that it seemed to me that as a young man he chose
> to try to 'change history rather than study it', taking a position as
> a propagandist for political views concerning academic matters,
> alongside Boas.  (That work seems to have created the basis of the
> model for the later and very well
> know Ford Foundation CCF project).   He also became closely involved with
> Paul Lazarsfeld at Columbia, a mentor who provided his job references,
> including one working for Karl Polanyi, funded by the Ford foundation.
> Much
> of this information comes from the Tompkins biographies, but I found
> in correspondence that Tompkins was resistant to the adoption of
> additional sources I had to offer which to me suggests a popularist
> mask concealed Finley's rather cynical and manipulative personality
>
> 4)  The paper about Lazarsfeld "Clientelism and the University: was
> Columbia Sociology a machine?" by Terry Nichols Clark is not as useful
> as it initially sounds concerning substantive matters, but it gives a
> vivid first hand account of "PFL's flagrant Machiavellianism" which
> reinforced my conclusions concerning his close associate Finley.  I
> judge the extraordinary contemporary piece "The Basic Laws of Human
> Stupidity" by eminent monetary historian Cipolla gives an addition
> window into the levels of cynicism operating within exactly such
> branches of academia back in those days
>
> So things I saw as disconnected and errors as a young man, in
> maturity, appear to me connected, and intentional misrepresentations.
> We have no window into men's hearts of course, but I could not
> comfortably inhabit my own skin if I professed otherwise.
>
> Rob Tye
>