It seems to me Mason Gaffney correctly writes

 <<Economists could contribute more, I suggest, by recognizing that
solutions to our macro problems lie outside the box of ossified
counter-positions on fiscal and monetary policy.>>

Which failing was exemplified by Steve Kates (quoting Tim Davies)

<<As for the nature of the recessions that overcame Britain from 1813 to
1823, ……. the economy was beset by a series of shocks, mostly external, to
which it adjusted quickly…… Nothing in the historical record suggests that
Britain suffered from too rapid an investment program; also, the logic
against 'oversaving' is compelling.>>

A while ago I studied the boom and bust in the Scottish sea weed ash
industry for this period, a little.

I recall that adjustments in the finacial bust were brought in - much of the
population was loaded onto boats and shipped to Canada.  The adjustment was
accelerated, as I recall, by hunting down some ex-workers with dogs, and
carrying them, bound hand and foot, onto the boats 

Logically, it is certainly correct that, in the local context, neither
investment nor overspending played much part in the unfolding events.  Nor
did supply, nor did demand.  Even at the height of the boom, no money at all
seems to have been invested in ash production. Even at the height of the
boom, workers were apparently paid nothing at all.  The houses they were
evicted from they had built with their own bare hands.

As to Steve Kates talk of 

<<economic theory(‘s) ……primitive state ….. in 1820><

Well, a primitive and exploitative phase of economic thinking that had grown
up around John Locke had run its course by 1820.  The monetary system had
returned to something like it had been in the early 17th century. 
Parliamentary constituencies were soon to be reformed, employment
legislation – The Truck Act – soon brought in.  These are the important
event goings on around 1820, it seems to me.  

Macro Follies is a fun film, but in the context of 1820, Macro Follies is
also autological.

Rob Tye, York, UK