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Scott Cullen asked: 
 
<what constitutes direct evidence?  If it must be physically measurable or 
touchable then I would also need to ask on what base the entire range of 
social sciences stand. 
 
 
My point about theoretical terms ('utility' being a possible instatiation 
of such a type) was not that non-theoretical terms are touchable, tangible 
or otherwise straightfowardly visible. The trouble with theoretical terms 
is that is is a non-dochotomous, viz a gradual, notion. Terms are always 
relatively theoretical, if they are at all. Terms referring to black holes 
are pretty theoretical, and there may be good reasons to beleve they make 
part of the ontic furniture of the world. Planets or moons are relatively 
less theoretical, because they are visible with the help of telescopes, but 
not by the bare eye. Telescopes, then, are constructs that were made 
possible by other theories, so one seems to need theories to see: auxiliary 
theories. The discussion started, I believe, with Galileo's telescope. 
 
If utility is relatively theoretical term, it is theoretical relative to 
something. The term may be theoretical with regard to the theory of 
utitlity itself, in the sense that this very theory is needed to measure 
it, 
or to see it, or whatever. it may be non-theoretical with regard to another 
theory. Philosophers of science sometimes speak of terms being 
'T-theoretical', the 'T' referring to the very theory in which the term 
figures. The circularity involved here is not necessarily vicious. 
(Something which should be noted in the other discussion: that something is 
circular need not always imply problems.) As long as there are other 
theories that help explain the T-theorical term: no problem. The model can 
be refined by distinguishing T-laden hypotheses and T-theoretical 
hypotheses, but that, I believe, leads us too far astray from the original 
discussion. This just aims to give the gist of how one could treat the 
problem of theoreticality and vsibility. 
 
 
Furthermore Bill Williams says: 
<The definition in physics of forces such as gravity seem to me to be 
similar to the definition of utility in economics.  But, the Newtonian 
system works rather well. While the principle of maximization in economics 
-- what ever it is that is being maximized -- generates some persistent 
anomalies-- such as the Giffen paradox 
 
It seems to me that there are great differences between gravity and 
utility. The former is easily measurable. Possibly, this is not just due to 
the fact that the Newtonian system works rather well and the economic not; 
it may be due to an ontological difference: maybe gravity exists and 
utility does not. One could be a theoretical realist for the physical 
sciences and a theoretical instrumentalist for the social sciences. 
 
 
Finally, as to the discussion about teleological explanations in biology, 
these do not come to be in fashion recently, but are as old as Darwin's 
publications. This is one reason to not classify biology too easily under 
the heading of the natural sciences.You can classify by domain of research, 
but also by research style, and often more than one style is in fashion at 
th same time. An example of this is precisely biology. Note, by the way, 
that many efforts have been done (some successful) to reconstruct 
teleological (or better: functional) explanations as causal. 
 
 
Menno Rol 
 
 
 
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