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[Note from the moderator: This message was posted yesterday, but never
made it to the list. I'm reposting it and apologize for possible multiple
postings. --E-MS]
Roy,
First, as I said before, I agree with your standard for contributions
to the intellectual history of economics. But the field of history of
economic thought can also represent part of the "extended present" as
Boulding wrote about in HOPE way back when. In other words,
individuals can employ history of thought to explore dead ends. That
is how I read Horwitz's paper ... an attempt to link up two
literatures that have existed side by side, but never really met eye
to eye. The monetary disequilibrium school of the pre-Keynesian
monetarists (as now represented in the work of Yeager) with the
Austrian theory of the trade cycle. In this case, Horwitz is a
consumer of history of economic thought and using what he has
"purchased" in another endeavor -- which is exploring a path not
taken when the path taken led to a dead end.
What I don't understand is why you are so willing to dismiss out of
hand contributions of this type and to insist that only intellectual
history should be accepted within our field. Certainly you are
correct that work of an intellectual history type should be held up
as the exemplars in our field, but even in a field that respects
intellectual history -- such as political theory -- intellectual
history can be employed as a method of contemporary theory
construction. See, e.g., the work of Alsasdir MacIntyre. Cannot
economics follow a similar model?
Why has history of thought become the field for this type of work?
Because what unites us is a passion for understanding the continuity
and discontinuity within the conversation that represents the
discipline of economics. Since we share this passion and concern
with understanding, what has shaped that conversation and how has it
evolved? Why seek to exclude? Some scholars are going to do original
work _in_ the intellectual history of economics, others are going to
employ that work, and some are going to misuse it. Just like in any
field of scholarship. Of course, we want high standards. I
suggested before that those standards should be (for original work) the
standards that exist in the field of intellectual history in general,
just as the standards for methodology should be those established in
that literature, _and_ the standards for history of thought as
contemporary theory should be those reflected in the work of scholars
such as Jacob Viner (in his Studies in International Trade). But
note, we wouldn't want to exclude Jacob Viner from the club simply
because in that work he is not doing work like Q. Skinner, though we
recognize that Q. Skinner is the one really doing intellectual
history to the standard we hope to aspire. Viner is doing theory,
but in a manner that is different from that which modern methods and
prejudices allow, and in a manner which historians of thought can
learn from.
It seems to me we would be an impoverished field if we insisted on
only one or the other model for our society. The Cottrell/Horwitz
exchange I think is a poor example, for Cottrell's criticisms (whether
valid or not) were not on your point, but instead on the idea that
Horwitz was sneaking in a theoretical and ideological agenda that Cottrell
opposes and that he has criticized in published articles (which Horwitz did
not take into account in his paper). Horwitz can defend his paper
himself, but what he did was link two literatures that alone run
into problems, but together might avoid them. It was an exercise in
non-Whig rational reconstruction (if you allow me that terminology).
It is a work of synthesis, which might have contemporary relevance.
Why is this not a contribution to "Historical perspectives on modern
economics"? It is _not_ a contribution to understanding the
intellectual history of Clark Warburton's theory of cummulative rot,
but it doesn't pretend to be.
I am just not sold on the idea that (1) everyone confuses the
differences between an original contribution to the intellectual
history of economics, and the deployment of history of thought in
contemporary theory construction; and (2) that we should be excluding
scholars from the community who deploy h.o.t., rather than produce
it. Isn't our field wide and robust enough to sustain both types of
work -- and recognize that different standards apply?
Pete
Peter J. Boettke
Assistant Professor of Economics
Department of Economics
New York University
269 Mercer Street
New York, NY 10003
phone: (212) 998-8900
fax: (212) 995-4186
email: [log in to unmask]
alternative email: [log in to unmask]
web: http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/boettke
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