Yes, and so far as I learned, he pronounced it not "pierce," but "purse."

-----Original Message-----
From: Societies for the History of Economics [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of mason gaffney
Sent: Thursday, February 21, 2013 10:42 AM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: [SHOE] Retroduction / abduction in economics and elsewhere

If you are all writing about Charles Sanders Peirce, please note he put the "e" before the "i" in Peirce.
Mason Gaffney

-----Original Message-----
From: Societies for the History of Economics [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Ramzi Mabsout
Sent: Tuesday, February 19, 2013 1:40 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: [SHOE] Retroduction / abduction in economics and elsewhere

Dear Altug

Maybe you understood my question as looking for case studies of Quine's underdetermination in economics? But I was --and still am--interested in case studies where abduction / retroduction is used to explain economic data or economic phenomena. In other words, what I am looking are case studies that describe/explain the construction of an economic theory through abduction / retroduction .

I wish to use this opportunity to thank all those who kindly sent me their feedback and inputs.

All the best,

Ramzi

On Tue, Feb 19, 2013 at 4:31 PM,
<[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> Menno Rol wrote: "The heart of the epistemology of Pierce can be
formulated as the claim that sticking to old
> beliefs is a man's normal inclination and that this is in fact rational."
>
> I agree. However, Menno Rol also wrote: "In order to learn, we update 
> old
beliefs with a certain unwillingness
> in the face of counterevidence, facts that we stumble upon daily. The
updating process runs via hypothesis
> making: inference to the best explanation. What counts as the best
explanation depends not only on the newly
> encountered facts, but just as much - or even more - on our old beliefs.
Again, this is rational."
>
> I disagree with Menno Rol here because scholars, who run into
counter-evidence or refuting reasoning, do not
> always change their minds or update their beliefs. I think the reason 
> is
that "epistemic costs" in scholarly
> life are significantly high.
>
> Epistemic costs, to my understanding, refer to the costs involved in
operating the various scholarly
> arrangements such as collecting data, drafting papers, arguing with 
> other
scholars, and replicating the results
> of old models. Epistemic costs are sometimes so high that, for 
> example,
errors that scholars made in the past
> such as plagiarism and deterioration of data are not always remediable
today. As a consequence, scholars
> sometimes keep reproducing erroneous models. There are at least two
reasons for this: (1) there is almost no
> reward in the academy in going back to the models and explanations of
older generations and (2) it is sometimes
> impossible to replicate what older generations wrote. This suggests 
> that
the scholarly world is a world of
> positive epistemic costs in which negative externalities are not 
> always
and perfectly self-corrective. Perfect
> solutions do not come about so easily because scholarly mechanisms, 
> such
as refereeing and reviewing as well as
> the ethics of scholarly behaviour and certain codes of act, including 
> the
issue of liability, that help increase
> the productivity of scientific processes, cannot fully correct or cure 
> the
harmful consequences of individual
> scholarship. The problem of epistemic cost is that we do NOT "update 
> old
beliefs" in the face of
> counter-evidence and errors frequently remain uncorrected.
>
> Reminding the SHOE-List Ramzi Mabsout's original question: would 
> anybody
suggest any cases in which old habits
> of thought prevent scholars from changing their minds despite the fact
that there is sufficient evidence to
> abandon a refuted paradigm?
>
> Best wishes,
>
> Altug Yalcintas, Ankara University
>
> ---
>
>> Dear Menno Rol, It's been a long time since I read Pierce (or tried 
>> to
read him), but the way you describe "the
>> heart of the epistemology of Pierce" doesn't sound very different 
>> from
common sense, Bayes, or  the recognition
>> of the interplay of the algorithmic and the experiential in what we know.
(Algorithmic = what we know from
>> logical deduction from "self-evident" first principles; experiential 
>> =
what we know from intuition, authority,
>> pretty much what you call "old beliefs.") I remember being taught 
>> (and
believing) that Pierce was radically more
>> than, and radically different from, a procedure for updating our
knowledge in the light of new evidence.  Steve
>> Marglin
>>
>> From: Societies for the History of Economics [mailto:[log in to unmask]] 
>> On
Behalf Of M.E.G.M.Rol
>> Sent: Friday, February 15, 2013 12:07 PM
>> To: [log in to unmask]
>> Subject: Re: [SHOE] Retroduction / abduction in economics and 
>> elsewhere
>>
>> [sorry for a broken off mail sent a minute ago.]
>>
>> The heart of the epistemology of Pierce can be formulated as the 
>> claim
that sticking to old beliefs is a man's
>> normal inclination and that this is in fact rational. In order to 
>> learn,
we update old beliefs with a certain
>> unwillingness in the face of counterevidence, facts that we stumble 
>> upon
daily. The updating process runs via
>> hypothesis making: inference to the best explanation. What counts as 
>> the
best explanation depends not only on
>> the newly encountered facts, but just as much - or even more - on our 
>> old
beliefs. Again, this is rational.
>> Economics develops ever more into the direction of a science of
information exchange - think of Levitt &
>> Dubner's "Freakonmics", Constanze Binder's "Agency, Freedom and Choice"
and Frydman & Goldberg's "Imperfect
>> Knowledge Economics". If this is true, then it seems that Pierce's
approach becomes ever more relevant for
>> economists.
>>
>> For Mario Rizzo, as to the difficulty of his philosophy: for a good 
>> study
of the relevance of Pierce in science
>> in general, see:
>> Atocha Aliseda (1997) "Seeking explanations", Dissertation Stanford, 
>> ILLC
Dissertation Series, Amsterdam.
>> Aliseda uses the basic ideas now for her research on diagnostic 
>> reasoning
by medical staff.
>>
>> Menno Rol,
>> Groningen, The Netherlands
>>
>>
>> On 15-02-13,
[log in to unmask]<mailto:[log in to unmask]
A.EDU.TR> wrote:
>> Dear Ramzi Mabsout,
>>
>> You asked the SHOE-List about case studies on Peirce's abductive
reasoning. The following publications on
>> Peirce's philosophy in economics might be of interest to you, 
>> although I
am not quite sure to what extent they
>> can be considered case studies:
>>
>> James Wible. 1998. The Economics of Science: Methodology and 
>> Epistemology
as if Economics Really Mattered.
>> Routledge. (See: Chapter 4. Also: check Index.) A. W. Dyer. 1986. 
>> "Veblen on Scientific Creativity: The Influence of
Charles S. Peirce" Journal of Economic
>> Issues 20(1)
>> Altug Yalcintas. 2013. "The Problem of Epistemic Cost" American 
>> Journal
of Economics and Sociology 72 (5)
>>
>> Best wishes,
>>
>> Altug Yalcintas, Ankara University
>>
>>
>>> Dear colleagues,
>>>
>>> Would you be aware of any case studies (current or historical) or 
>>> concrete examples of Peirce's retroductive / abductive inferences in 
>>> economics (preferably) and the social sciences?
>>>
>>> I know Tony Lawson and Philip Mirowski discuss and offer some 
>>> examples but not much else.
>>>
>>> Thank you.
>>>
>>> All the best,
>>>
>>>
>>> Ramzi Mabsout
>>> Assistant professor
>>> Economics department
>>> American University of Beirut
>>>
>>
>>