John Médaille <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> all of this is to dance around the main issue: “Is discontent really the only motive for action? Does contentment exclude action?” For this, I have
> proposed a simple test: “Can a man not dance for joy, sing for joy, or kiss his wife for joy?” To this test, I have not received an answer, and I
> suspect that is because any answer would undo a lot of ideology.


Actually I offered an answer to this when you first raised it.
But to avoid just playing with words, you need to tell
us, when you wish to discuss Mises, will you accept his
definitions while we discuss his arguments?  If you will,
then there are fairly simple answers to the questions you raise,
even if you do not like the way they "sound".

You appear to conflate accepting Mises's definitions with accepting
his axioms, but these are quite different things.  Until we have
his definitions, we cannot even discuss his axioms, as we will
understand what has been said.  You do not have to adopt his
definitions for ordinary discourse, any more than you would adopt
economists' usage of 'utility' or 'rationality' for ordinary discourse.
In fact, it would be a mistake, as you would not be understood.  But
if you want to discuss how Mises speaks, that you must work with his
definitions or you cannot pretend to approach his meaning.

The answer I offered to your question distinguished between
spontaneous behavior and behavior directed toward an end.
Remember, Mises is interested in *action*, which *by definition*
is behavior directed toward an end. (1.IV.1)  If your behavior
is simply a spontaneous expression of emotion, it is not
"action" in this sense.  So your first confusion is to fail
to discriminate between behavior and action.  Mises says what he means:
"Acting man chooses between various opportunities offered for choice.
He prefers one alternative to others." (1.IV.11)  This defines the
realm of *action*, and Mises of course is interested in analyzing
action to determine its economic consequences.

Now as I said before, if you dance or your kiss is actually goal
directed, and you are choosing among alternative means of
achieving this goal, then it becomes action in Mises's sense.
I don't think Mises would be particularly interested in this kind
of action, because his focus is really economic action, but it
would meet his definition.  In this case, the "discontent" is merely
that the state in which you don't dance is less satisfactory to you
than the state in which you do dance.  Therefore you choose to dance.
Mises is really saying no more than that we make choices, and what we choose
is the action that seems best to us (at the time, given what we know,
give our emotional state, etc.)  I really cannot understand your fear
that this observation has some hidden ideological agenda, and I cannot
understand how we would do economics in the absence of this understanding
of the world.  If you believe the idea that we should understand economic
behavior (action) in terms of choices among alternatives is ideologically
tainted, perhaps you could offer a sample of economic analysis that proceeds
without this "ideological" cargo.

Just to be clear, I personally do not find Mises terminology of 'content',
'discontent', and 'unease' to be particularly apt for a general discussion of action
(though I find it unobjectionable for a discussion of economic action).  But
it certainly bothers me less than economists' talk of say "utility functions"
or "rational expectations".  But apt or not, as long as the definitions are
careful we can use them in a shared discourse, and we must use shared definitions
before we can proceed to a discussion of the arguments.

Alan Isaac