I would suggest that there are elements of good 
sense in both sides of this discussion, but also 
problematic bits. The history of economics has 
plenty to say about the present economic 
situation; in fact, I spent 90 minutes last night 
talking to a room full of scientists about 
exactly this. There are also several papers that 
will be presented at this year’s HES conference 
that bear on this subject. An understanding of 
the history of ideas is of no less import for 
dealing with the present than is understanding 
the history of events. That said, there are 
several problems with the position taken by 
Kates. (I use him as an example because of the pithy statements he offers.)

“HET is part of economics proper or it is part of 
the history and philosophy of science. I think it is the first.”

Why is this an either/or? I would think that it 
could very well be both. In fact, I DO think that it is both.

“If, however, trying to use HET to think about 
modern economic problems is not part and parcel 
of what specialists in HET would be expected to do, then we really ought
to just pack up shop right now.”

“Part and parcel”? That means, an essential or 
integral component of what an historian of 
economics/economic thought does. This would deny 
that it is legitimate to study the history of 
economic thought for its own sake, as a branch of 
intellectual history or the history of science. I 
simply cannot accept so narrow a definition of 
the legitimate province of the historian of economics.

There is also a certain amount of hubris in the 
statement, re. mainstream economists, that “This 
is where they need to be educated by us,” but the 
problems go beyond that. Too often history of 
economic thought takes the form of trying to use 
the past to show contemporary economists they are 
wrong. That is perfectly legitimate as a form of 
scholarship, but I question whether it is 
scholarship in the history of economic thought. 
It USES the history of economic thought, but it 
does not necessarily contribute to (and often 
does not contribute to) our understanding of the 
history of economic thought. And all of this is 
apart from the fact that the context in which 
these writers of the past wrote­the import of 
which is shown in HET as intellectual 
history/history of science­is often very far 
removed from present economic problems.

The distinction here is really between studying 
the history of ideas and disciplines vs. using 
that history toward a particular end­whether it 
be to prop up what passes as the mainstream at 
any given point in time, or to attack it (or the 
equivalent on the policy front). There are 
obviously plenty within our tribe who fall into 
each camp, and some who fall into both. A third 
way is to use the ideas of the past to help us 
understand the present­without passing judgment. 
The group working in that arena is much smaller. 
I have great sympathy for the first and third of 
these approaches, but not so much for the second. 
I will stop short of suggesting what, among these 
things, appropriately belongs in JHET, HOPE, 
EJHET, etc. That is for editors and referees to judge.

Steve Medema