Oh, I was going to stay out of this thread, most of which I have found kind of annoying and misdirected, but Gary Mongiovi's self-outing as a quasi-ex-Austrian has perked my attention.  As the only person on the planet who is simultaneously a member of the Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, the editorial board of the Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, and the Econometric Society, I may be uniquely qualified to comment on this matter.

So, I read Hayek's Constitution of Libety in a seminar taught by the late anarchist philosopher, Robert Nozick, before I read either Marx or Keynes, although I do not think I was fully aware at the time of what it meant to be an "Austrian economist" (this was nearly a half century ago, and I was a libertarian at the time).  So, maybe I am a bit like Gary in that I might be sort of an "ex-Austrian economist," but I am not sure I ever was one, and I may be more of one now, having read much more of Hayek and other Austrians more seriously, along with having also read a lot of both Keynes and Marx seriously.  I have been called and labeled many things over the decades, but prefer not to be put into any particular box, at least not too vigorously (I have had the experience in more than one setting of having someone in that box roundly denouncing me or not being a good member of that box, when I never said I was in the darned box in the first place).  One can accuse me of being namby-pamby or wimpy or emptily eclectic or whatever, but I like to look for the good and interesting and relevant ideas in whomever I read and trying to take those ideas seriously and relate them to other serious ideas from other thinkers, while recognizing where particular thinkers also are not at their best and making remarks or comments or pushing ideas that do not seem to stand up too well to careful scrutiny.  I can say that as far as I am concerned all three of those, Hayek, Marx, and Keynes, have written brilliant and insightful and useful things, while also having their off days and off books and so on.  I would also remind folks that it was not only Keynes, but also Marx who at one point declared that "I am not a Marxist," and while I do not think Hayek ever made an equivalent remarks, it is clearly understood by nearly all (I know of some who argue against this) that his views changed over time on quite a few substantive matters.

I understand that there is strong tendency for groups to self-identify and for people belonging to them to spend lots of time and effort labeling others as either being in their group or not, and that among historians of thought there may be a larger percentage who identify with this or that school, particularly the various heterodox schools, especially those with long historical roots and traditions, such as Austrians, Marxists, and Keynesians.  But I would suggest that it might be worthwhile spending more time on examining the ideas in each school that are defensible and admirable rather than having people denouncing each other because they are in or not in this or that school.  Some of this gets really childish, frankly, even if you do strongly identify as belonging to School X.

Barkley Rosser

________________________________________
From: Societies for the History of Economics [[log in to unmask]] on behalf of Bylund, Per L. [[log in to unmask]]
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2013 1:40 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: [SHOE] Where are the ex-Austrians?

On Friday, November 15, 2013 9:28 AM, Alan G Isaac wrote:
> And of course such assertions boil down to:
> "it follows from my preferred AXIOMS that the
> world much match my beliefs about it".
>
> Again, this is just another way of immunizing
> against the empirical evidence.
>
> The term "obvious" is generally a pretty strong
> signal that thinking has stopped.
>
> Cheers,
> Alan Isaac

Considering the tone, it wouldn't surprise me if this debate will very soon corroborate Godwin's Law. I want no part of that, but I find the above a quite fantastic statement. I'd like to think that it was sloppily written, but as it stands the methodological implications are astounding. It seems to suggest that logic is irrelevant (and hence that axioms cannot be true or that it doesn't matter what is derived logically from a true statement) or, alternatively, that the fact that something is observed (empirically so, such as seen, heard, measured and whatnot) makes it as well as its use free from interpretation, subjectivity, or value assessments.

I might point out that the "obviousness" that "the Sun circles the Earth" is in fact an empirical observation, though tainted by the observer's (false) assumption that the ground s/he stands on does not move.


Per Bylund

_____________________
Per L. Bylund, Ph.D.
Baylor University

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