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From:
Doug Mackenzie <[log in to unmask]>
Reply To:
Societies for the History of Economics <[log in to unmask]>
Date:
Sat, 16 Nov 2013 05:56:37 -0800
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Funny thing is Ric, I agree with most of what you wrote, and so would Hayek+Lachmann. Yes, it is unrealistic to think in terms of one representative agent, especially Homo-Economicus. Hayekian econ typically has several types of imperfect "agents" in play. Yes, networks are important, Austrians have seen this for a long time. Yes, citizenship in a democracy entails rights and responsibilities, and perhaps some difficulties if we overuse democratic mechanisms- that could take us down the wrong path, towards serfdom. Hayek does also mention irreducible aggregates, favorably (see the counter revolution of science), and this has played well with some Austrians (i.e. Don Lavoie).

So my flirtation with Post-Keynesian-Old Institutional econ began for the reasons you list, specifically because I found Neoclassical econ absurd, and for the exact reasons you discuss. My flirtation with PK-OIE ended because I did not think that these paradigms delivered what they promised to, and Austrian Economics (and to some extent Virginia Econ) did. 
 
A few things we seem to all have in common are an interest in complexity theory and uncertainty, quasi-rationality/heterogeneous agents, and a willingness to address broader social issues. As Gary suggested, I think there is a Keynes-Hayek paradigm, a common framework within which Keynes and Hayek discussed issues. This framework gave way to Samuelson and Friedman.  Why? Why were Shackle and Lachmann unable to carry the Keynes-Hayek paradigm forward? Can we blame it on the trend towards positivism, as Bruce Caldwell seems to? Quite possibly so. 


D.W. MacKenzie, Ph.D.
Carroll College, Helena MT

--------------------------------------------
On Fri, 11/15/13, Ric Holt <[log in to unmask]> wrote:

 Subject: Re: [SHOE] Where are the ex-Austrians?
 To: [log in to unmask]
 Date: Friday, November 15, 2013, 4:56 PM
 
 Needless to say I find
 myself in Barkley's "camp" and if people have
 read our writings you know our arguments. If there has been
 a shift in my thinking, it is more to looking at specific
 problems and policy solutions and to put them in the context
 of the development of economic thought, which I believe is
 always changing. For example, the problem of going from
 individual to aggregate behavior. Since my graduate student
 days, I have been dumbfounded that one can believe that the
 aggregate acts exactly the same way as a
 "representative agent." No other discipline I
 know, in the natural or social sciences, believes this that
 I am aware of. But yet, that is what our textbooks still
 tell us. If one lives in a bubble, the mainstream model
 might make sense, but when people actually start interacting
 together a lot of stuff happens -- some unpredictable. It
 was this question, along with others, that got me interested
 in looking at different "schools" of thought. I
 have benefitted from them all and what heterodox economics
 has given me is an opportunity to look at theoretical
 problems AND public policy from different perspectives and
 provide more tools to use. It is hard for me to imagine how
 one can come up with humane and efficient policy choice with
 the assumption that people only interact within a private
 price system without looking at the networks and clusters
 they find themselves in, as another example. With those
 moving toward a libertarian position, I find myself moving
 more and more away for two reasons: 1) networks are more
  common then we think in understanding economic behavior -
 and they are complex. 2) On a philosophical level, what do
 we mean by citizenship, particularly in a working democracy?
 People live a variety of communities and at least in a
 democracy citizenship requires active involvement and
 responsibilities -- citizens have rights, but they also have
 responsibilities. I know what the libertarian response is to
 having rights, but what about responsibilities? 
 
 Citizenship in a democracy confront tensions
 between private rights and active citizenship, which, by the
 way, Mill was aware of and never was able to resolve. In my
 reading of him he kept jumping back and forth from what in
 the literature is known as negative and positive concepts of
 freedom. In my writing I'm pursuing some intermediary
 position. 
 
 Ric Holt
 
 
 
 
 
 
 On Fri, Nov 15, 2013
 at 12:33 PM, Doug Mackenzie <[log in to unmask]>
 wrote:
 
 It
 might also be worth noting that Hayek started out as a
 Fabian Socialist and Tom Sowell started out as a Marxist. It
 might further be worth noting that Hayek did not say that
 Keynes' theory was wrong, he wrote that it was a
 'special case'. Mises was, as I understand it, a
 Historicist prior to reading Menger's Principles.
 
 
 
 
 The general historical question here might be "how does
 becoming an economists change one's views of
 economics?". Friedman was a new dealer before learning
 college economics. James Buchanan once told us that his
 entire class were New Dealers' at the start of
 Friedman's class, but by the end half the class were
 Chicago Friedmanite's. Lerner and Lange were Marxists,
 or at least Marx infleunced early on, b ut moderated their
 views after learning Neoclassical econ (Lange appeared to
 revert towards Marxism after WW2, but he had a gun to his
 head, with Stalin in charge). In fact, a Lerner student once
 told me that Lerner repudiated even his Neoclassical
 writings on Market Socialism. Larry Summers claims that
 Friedman was a 'devil figure' in his youth, but came
 to respect Friedman. How exactly do these changes take
 place? Is it the influence of data or theory, or both?
 
 
 
 
 My own experience is the pretty much reverse of Gary and
 Barkley, initially interested in Post Keynesian-Veblenian
 ideas 22 years ago, turned towards Hayek and Nozick. In my
 case data and theory were both important, but data probably
 mattered more. I still cover The General Theory in
 Intermediate Macro (students are required to read most of
 this book), but overall I see the evidence as contradicting
 Keynes.
 
 
 
 
 D.W. MacKenzie, Ph.D.
 
 Carroll College, Helena MT
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 --------------------------------------------
 
 On Fri, 11/15/13, Garnett, Rob
 <[log in to unmask]>
 wrote:
 
 
 
  Subject: Re: [SHOE] Where are the ex-Austrians?
 
  To: [log in to unmask]
 
  Date: Friday, November 15, 2013, 2:48 PM
 
 
 
  Barkley,
 
 
 
  Thank you for this excellent post. 
 
 
 
  I will share it with my 'contending perspectives in
 
  economics' students on Monday, as a testament -- as
 cogent
 
  as I've heard in recent memory (here I feel the loss
 of
 
  Warren Samuels) -- to the virtues of critical pluralism
 in
 
  economics.
 
 
 
  Rob
 
 
 
  ________________________________________
 
  From: Societies for the History of Economics [[log in to unmask]] On
 
  Behalf Of Rosser, John Barkley - rosserjb [[log in to unmask]]
 
  Sent: Friday, November 15, 2013 1:16 PM
 
  To: [log in to unmask]
 
  Subject: Re: [SHOE] Where are the ex-Austrians?
 
 
 
  Oh, I was going to stay out of this thread, most of which
 I
 
  have found kind of annoying and misdirected, but Gary
 
  Mongiovi's self-outing as a quasi-ex-Austrian has
 perked my
 
  attention.  As the only person on the planet who is
 
  simultaneously a member of the Society for the
 Development
 
  of Austrian Economics, the editorial board of the Journal
 of
 
  Post Keynesian Economics, and the Econometric Society, I
 may
 
  be uniquely qualified to comment on this matter.
 
 
 
  So, I read Hayek's Constitution of Libety in a
 seminar
 
  taught by the late anarchist philosopher, Robert Nozick,
 
  before I read either Marx or Keynes, although I do not
 think
 
  I was fully aware at the time of what it meant to be an
 
  "Austrian economist" (this was nearly a half
 century ago,
 
  and I was a libertarian at the time).  So, maybe I am a
 
  bit like Gary in that I might be sort of an
 "ex-Austrian
 
  economist," but I am not sure I ever was one, and I
 may be
 
  more of one now, having read much more of Hayek and other
 
  Austrians more seriously, along with having also read a
 lot
 
  of both Keynes and Marx seriously.  I have been called
 
  and labeled many things over the decades, but prefer not
 to
 
  be put into any particular box, at least not too
 vigorously
 
  (I have had the experience in more than one setting of
 
  having someone in that box roundly denouncing me or not
 
  being a good member of that box, when I never said I was
 in
 
  the darned box in the first place).  One can accuse me
 
  of being namby-pamby or wimpy or emptily eclectic or
 
  whatever, but I like to look for the good and interesting
 
  and relevant ideas in whomever I read and trying to take
 
  those ideas seriously and relate them to other serious
 ideas
 
  from other thinkers, while recognizing where particular
 
  thinkers also are not at their best and making remarks or
 
  comments or pushing ideas that do not seem to stand up
 too
 
  well to careful scrutiny.  I can say that as far as I
 
  am concerned all three of those, Hayek, Marx, and Keynes,
 
  have written brilliant and insightful and useful things,
 
  while also having their off days and off books and so
 
  on.  I would also remind folks that it was not only
 
  Keynes, but also Marx who at one point declared that
 "I am
 
  not a Marxist," and while I do not think Hayek ever
 made an
 
  equivalent remarks, it is clearly understood by nearly
 all
 
  (I know of some who argue against this) that his views
 
  changed over time on quite a few substantive matters.
 
 
 
  I understand that there is strong tendency for groups to
 
  self-identify and for people belonging to them to spend
 lots
 
  of time and effort labeling others as either being in
 their
 
  group or not, and that among historians of thought there
 may
 
  be a larger percentage who identify with this or that
 
  school, particularly the various heterodox schools,
 
  especially those with long historical roots and
 traditions,
 
  such as Austrians, Marxists, and Keynesians.  But I
 
  would suggest that it might be worthwhile spending more
 time
 
  on examining the ideas in each school that are defensible
 
  and admirable rather than having people denouncing each
 
  other because they are in or not in this or that
 
  school.  Some of this gets really childish, frankly,
 
  even if you do strongly identify as belonging to School
 X.
 
 
 
  Barkley Rosser
 
 
 
  ________________________________________
 
  From: Societies for the History of Economics [[log in to unmask]] on
 
  behalf of Bylund, Per L. [[log in to unmask]]
 
  Sent: Friday, November 15, 2013 1:40 PM
 
  To: [log in to unmask]
 
  Subject: Re: [SHOE] Where are the ex-Austrians?
 
 
 
  On Friday, November 15, 2013 9:28 AM, Alan G Isaac wrote:
 
  > And of course such assertions boil down to:
 
  > "it follows from my preferred AXIOMS that the
 
  > world much match my beliefs about it".
 
  >
 
  > Again, this is just another way of immunizing
 
  > against the empirical evidence.
 
  >
 
  > The term "obvious" is generally a pretty
 strong
 
  > signal that thinking has stopped.
 
  >
 
  > Cheers,
 
  > Alan Isaac
 
 
 
  Considering the tone, it wouldn't surprise me if this
 debate
 
  will very soon corroborate Godwin's Law. I want no
 part of
 
  that, but I find the above a quite fantastic statement.
 I'd
 
  like to think that it was sloppily written, but as it
 stands
 
  the methodological implications are astounding. It seems
 to
 
  suggest that logic is irrelevant (and hence that axioms
 
  cannot be true or that it doesn't matter what is
 derived
 
  logically from a true statement) or, alternatively, that
 the
 
  fact that something is observed (empirically so, such as
 
  seen, heard, measured and whatnot) makes it as well as
 its
 
  use free from interpretation, subjectivity, or value
 
  assessments.
 
 
 
  I might point out that the "obviousness" that
 "the Sun
 
  circles the Earth" is in fact an empirical
 observation,
 
  though tainted by the observer's (false) assumption
 that the
 
  ground s/he stands on does not move.
 
 
 
 
 
  Per Bylund
 
 
 
  _____________________
 
  Per L. Bylund, Ph.D.
 
  Baylor University
 
 
 
  [log in to unmask]
 
  (573) 268-3235
 
 
 
 

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