HES has been quiet for some time, and I was busy when there was a  
flurry of discussion about why economists need the history of  
economic thought, so I decided to re-ignite the discussion with a  
short defense of the following statement: there is a fundamental  
difference between the history of economics and the history of  
economic thought.  Furthermore, while the history of economic  
thought is intimately related to economics, the history of  
economics is not (in fact, it is more closely related to the  
history of science).  Those who read Margaret Schabas' article in  
HOPE on Breaking Away (1992) will recognize my debt to her  
argument. 
 
Before defending this claim, let me say that identifying the  
difference between these two disciplines has helped me to  
understand a common uneasiness I experience when reading  
articles and participating in conferences.  The uneasiness I  
experience emerges when the assumption is made (either explicitly  
or implicitly) that what we are doing is important because it  
will enrich the conversation of the economics community.  To give  
a concrete example, at the Rotterdam conference my paper on  
Knight's capital theory was set in a session in which there were  
two other papers: a paper on the role of the entrepreneur in the  
history of economic thought; and a paper re-examining Knight's  
understanding of risk and uncertainty in order to see whether it  
could inform a re-orientation of probabilistic thinking in  
economics.  Both of the other papers were good; my uneasiness had  
nothing to do with the quality of the work.  Rather, I felt that  
my paper served a fundamentally different purpose than the other  
two.  Some might chalk my uneasiness up to an implicit  
"presentism" in the other two papers, but even at the time I  
didn't think that.  At least one of the papers explicitly  
acknowledged the limitations of what the analysis could do given  
its starting point.  And presentism is present in all our work,  
in the sense that we all have contemporary concerns that direct  
the questions we ask and the issues we choose to treat.  I know  
that I have specific issues which drive my research on Knight, and  
they are issues which would not have been Knight's. 
 
Now to a defense of my claim that there is a fundamental  
difference between the history of economics and the history of  
economic thought.  The argument could be formulated in several  
ways, but the way I am comfortable with is based on a Kuhnian- 
type notion of science combined with the notion of separate  
discourses.  We can begin by identifying what economics is. 
 
Economics is a community of scholars who engage in a disciplined  
conversation.  The disciplines which direct the conversation are  
threefold: a common purpose, common methods, and common agreement  
on what constitutes the facts.  In order to keep this message as  
short as possible, please bear in mind that the conversation is  
obviously not as unified as my description suggests.  The  
community is fraught with disagreement and conflict over its  
purpose, its methods, and the facts; but the conflict has not  
reached the point where the community splits and separate  
conversations operating according to different disciplines emerge  
(although that has happened in the past -- the split between  
economists and sociologists at the end of the 19th century is one  
example).  The important point for my thesis is that economics is  
a disciplined conversation. 
 
One thing that is important to every discursive community is the  
tradition of conversation.  Whether it realizes it or not, every  
community is constantly engaging its tradition when it engages in  
conversation.  In some communities, that engagement with  
tradition is obvious -- I would suggest that occurs because there  
is less agreement and greater conflict over the conversation's  
purpose, method, and facts.  In other communities, the  
commonality of purpose, method and facts renders the  
conversation's engagement with its tradition almost transparent.   
For examples, consider the differences between physics and  
biology; or between archaeology (I'm guessing here) and political  
science. 
 
Most of the other social sciences call their conversation's  
engagement with its tradition "theory."  In economics, we call it  
the history of economic thought, reserving the term theory for  
the contemporary conversation.  But because there is no  
conversation without engagement with the tradition, theory and the  
history of economic thought are two sides of the same coin.   
Underlying both are the purposes, methods, and facts of the  
economics community. 
 
So what do I think the history of economics is?  Essentially, I  
think that the history of economics is a different disciplined  
conversation than economics, operating in accordance with a  
different purpose, method, and set of facts.  The history of  
economics is a disciplined conversation about the history of a  
different disciplined conversation -- the conversation of  
economics.  The purposes, methods, and facts that discipline the  
history of economics are the purposes, methods, and facts  
appropriate to the study of disciplined conversations.  [N.B.,  
one could mount a counter argument here that would merge  
economics and the history of economics by arguing that economic  
activity is disciplined conversation -- in a manner similar to  
Klamer and McCloskey.  That would open up the possibility that  
the history of economics can be explained by economics, or that  
economics can be explained by discursive theory.  Both are  
interesting possibilities.]   
 
Anyway, the historian of economics, qua historian, is not  
directed by the purposes, methods and facts of the community of  
economists.  In fact, the existence of the economists' purposes,  
methods, and facts may be the very things the historian of  
economics wants to explain, according to her methods and for her  
purposes.  The history of economics and economics are not,  
therefore, two sides of the same coin; they are, in fact,  
different coins (maybe even different currencies).   
Furthermore, historians of economics share more with historians  
of other disciplined conversations (we call them historians of  
science--understanding science in a broad sense that includes  
historians of the humanities, the social sciences, and  
communities of non-academic conversation--for example, among  
bankers or political figures) than with economists or even  
historians of economic thought. 
 
I close with an observation.  To say that the history of  
economics and the history of economic thought (as part of  
economics) are different disciplines does not mean that they  
cannot enrich each other.  No discursive community exists in  
isolation from other communities, and inter-community  
(interdisciplinary) dialogue can help each community re-evaluate  
its purposes, improve its methods, and establish better facts.    
Unfortunately, up to this point historians of economics have  
tended to converse more with historians of economic thought and  
economic theorists than with historians of science.  But that is  
changing. 
 
If you have read to this point, what do you think? 
 
Ross 
 
Ross B. Emmett, Augustana Univesity College, Camrose, Alberta 
CANADA   T4V 2R3   voice: (403) 679-1517   fax: (403) 679-1129 
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