In my view your comment is descriptively incorrect and methodologically misguided.
Descriptively, as I quoted before, he defines contentment as "that *state* of a
human being which does not and cannot result in any action". As he makes clear,
there can be other sources of non-action. Methodologically, I find it hard to
criticize someone for saying how they will use a term. Now you may argue that
this usage is misleading because it commandeers a common word with other
connotations, but this is common in economics as well as in other fields.
(Consider "utility" or "rational expectations".)
Now what about your "jumping for joy" example? Remember for Mises, action is *purposeful*
behavior. (I.e., not all behavior is action.) Spontaneous jumping for joy does not fall into
the category of purposeful behavior, for Mises. (I'll leave it for Miseans to correct me.)
However, a politician might feign jumping for joy in order to achieve a political goal,
and this would of course constitute action. Similarly, if I *choose* to jump for joy rather
than say hugging the bearer of good tidings, because it better serves my goal of expressing
my inner state of gratitude, that is also action. For Mises, action is a broad category,
but it does not encompass all behavior.
As for your equation of axiomatic thinking to ideological thinking, I trust it is
obvious that such a view encounters problems dealing with logic and mathematics,
both of which have additionally demonstrated their pragmatic utility. Naturally, pointing
out this shortcoming of your claim does not constitute a defense of praxeology.
You might separately argue that ideology infuses Mises's writings, and I'd agree.
Of course the same is true of most social scientists. And to urge dismissal of his work on
this basis is argument ad hominem, rather than a grappling with his work.
Alan Isaac
John Médaille <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> He handles the problem definitionally; he defines contentment as "non-action." But surely, such a methodology is disallowed in science.
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