It might also be worth noting that Hayek started out as a Fabian Socialist and Tom Sowell started out as a Marxist. It might further be worth noting that Hayek did not say that Keynes' theory was wrong, he wrote that it was a 'special case'. Mises was, as I understand it, a Historicist prior to reading Menger's Principles.
The general historical question here might be "how does becoming an economists change one's views of economics?". Friedman was a new dealer before learning college economics. James Buchanan once told us that his entire class were New Dealers' at the start of Friedman's class, but by the end half the class were Chicago Friedmanite's. Lerner and Lange were Marxists, or at least Marx infleunced early on, b ut moderated their views after learning Neoclassical econ (Lange appeared to revert towards Marxism after WW2, but he had a gun to his head, with Stalin in charge). In fact, a Lerner student once told me that Lerner repudiated even his Neoclassical writings on Market Socialism. Larry Summers claims that Friedman was a 'devil figure' in his youth, but came to respect Friedman. How exactly do these changes take place? Is it the influence of data or theory, or both?
My own experience is the pretty much reverse of Gary and Barkley, initially interested in Post Keynesian-Veblenian ideas 22 years ago, turned towards Hayek and Nozick. In my case data and theory were both important, but data probably mattered more. I still cover The General Theory in Intermediate Macro (students are required to read most of this book), but overall I see the evidence as contradicting Keynes.
D.W. MacKenzie, Ph.D.
Carroll College, Helena MT
--------------------------------------------
On Fri, 11/15/13, Garnett, Rob <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
Subject: Re: [SHOE] Where are the ex-Austrians?
To: [log in to unmask]
Date: Friday, November 15, 2013, 2:48 PM
Barkley,
Thank you for this excellent post.
I will share it with my 'contending perspectives in
economics' students on Monday, as a testament -- as cogent
as I've heard in recent memory (here I feel the loss of
Warren Samuels) -- to the virtues of critical pluralism in
economics.
Rob
________________________________________
From: Societies for the History of Economics [[log in to unmask]] On
Behalf Of Rosser, John Barkley - rosserjb [[log in to unmask]]
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2013 1:16 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: [SHOE] Where are the ex-Austrians?
Oh, I was going to stay out of this thread, most of which I
have found kind of annoying and misdirected, but Gary
Mongiovi's self-outing as a quasi-ex-Austrian has perked my
attention. As the only person on the planet who is
simultaneously a member of the Society for the Development
of Austrian Economics, the editorial board of the Journal of
Post Keynesian Economics, and the Econometric Society, I may
be uniquely qualified to comment on this matter.
So, I read Hayek's Constitution of Libety in a seminar
taught by the late anarchist philosopher, Robert Nozick,
before I read either Marx or Keynes, although I do not think
I was fully aware at the time of what it meant to be an
"Austrian economist" (this was nearly a half century ago,
and I was a libertarian at the time). So, maybe I am a
bit like Gary in that I might be sort of an "ex-Austrian
economist," but I am not sure I ever was one, and I may be
more of one now, having read much more of Hayek and other
Austrians more seriously, along with having also read a lot
of both Keynes and Marx seriously. I have been called
and labeled many things over the decades, but prefer not to
be put into any particular box, at least not too vigorously
(I have had the experience in more than one setting of
having someone in that box roundly denouncing me or not
being a good member of that box, when I never said I was in
the darned box in the first place). One can accuse me
of being namby-pamby or wimpy or emptily eclectic or
whatever, but I like to look for the good and interesting
and relevant ideas in whomever I read and trying to take
those ideas seriously and relate them to other serious ideas
from other thinkers, while recognizing where particular
thinkers also are not at their best and making remarks or
comments or pushing ideas that do not seem to stand up too
well to careful scrutiny. I can say that as far as I
am concerned all three of those, Hayek, Marx, and Keynes,
have written brilliant and insightful and useful things,
while also having their off days and off books and so
on. I would also remind folks that it was not only
Keynes, but also Marx who at one point declared that "I am
not a Marxist," and while I do not think Hayek ever made an
equivalent remarks, it is clearly understood by nearly all
(I know of some who argue against this) that his views
changed over time on quite a few substantive matters.
I understand that there is strong tendency for groups to
self-identify and for people belonging to them to spend lots
of time and effort labeling others as either being in their
group or not, and that among historians of thought there may
be a larger percentage who identify with this or that
school, particularly the various heterodox schools,
especially those with long historical roots and traditions,
such as Austrians, Marxists, and Keynesians. But I
would suggest that it might be worthwhile spending more time
on examining the ideas in each school that are defensible
and admirable rather than having people denouncing each
other because they are in or not in this or that
school. Some of this gets really childish, frankly,
even if you do strongly identify as belonging to School X.
Barkley Rosser
________________________________________
From: Societies for the History of Economics [[log in to unmask]] on
behalf of Bylund, Per L. [[log in to unmask]]
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2013 1:40 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: [SHOE] Where are the ex-Austrians?
On Friday, November 15, 2013 9:28 AM, Alan G Isaac wrote:
> And of course such assertions boil down to:
> "it follows from my preferred AXIOMS that the
> world much match my beliefs about it".
>
> Again, this is just another way of immunizing
> against the empirical evidence.
>
> The term "obvious" is generally a pretty strong
> signal that thinking has stopped.
>
> Cheers,
> Alan Isaac
Considering the tone, it wouldn't surprise me if this debate
will very soon corroborate Godwin's Law. I want no part of
that, but I find the above a quite fantastic statement. I'd
like to think that it was sloppily written, but as it stands
the methodological implications are astounding. It seems to
suggest that logic is irrelevant (and hence that axioms
cannot be true or that it doesn't matter what is derived
logically from a true statement) or, alternatively, that the
fact that something is observed (empirically so, such as
seen, heard, measured and whatnot) makes it as well as its
use free from interpretation, subjectivity, or value
assessments.
I might point out that the "obviousness" that "the Sun
circles the Earth" is in fact an empirical observation,
though tainted by the observer's (false) assumption that the
ground s/he stands on does not move.
Per Bylund
_____________________
Per L. Bylund, Ph.D.
Baylor University
[log in to unmask]
(573) 268-3235
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