Subject: | |
From: | J. (J.) |
Date: | Fri Mar 31 17:18:26 2006 |
Content-Type: | text/plain |
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----------------- HES POSTING -----------------
Patrick,
I would disagree that it is by mathematics that
Samuelson carries out his "pigeonholing." He does
the pigeonholing first and then derives the mathematical
implications for Pareto Optimality. One can dispute
the validity of the latter procedures (use of calculus
to study optimization), but that is a distinct problem from
what is at issue here.
The real issue is the nature of "collective consumption
goods." Now, you are correct that Samuelson provided
very little analysis of the property rights issues or possible
alternative arrangements or specific aspects of non-
excudability, etc. in his original papers, beyond simply
asserting the likelihood of a non-optimal outcome from a
vaguely specified laissez-faire outcome.
However, subsequent discussions have made it clear
that in the real world we see a spectrum between "pure
private"and "pure public" goods. For this intermediate
spectrum, a variety of alternative arrangements along
Coasian lines may be manageable.
But, Samuelson was dealing with pure cases, food
as a private good and national defense as a collective
consumption good. The hard fact is that when one is
dealing with a pure collective consumption good, it is
very hard if not impossible to assign any kind of individual
property rights in any meaningful way. That is what Samuelson
showed, even if he did not draw out the argument fully.
I think a reasonable response to this is to argue that there
are in fact very few such pure collective consumption goods,
rather than to dismiss Samuelson's analysis for having failed
to deal with all the possible intermediate cases.
Barkley Rosser
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