I do see some connection between Moore and Keynes, although it is no doubt
both controversial and rather tenuous.  There is at least a whiff of
Platonism about Moore’s epistemology.  This contrasts with Russell’s more
pro-science stance.  Keynes seems closer to Moore on such matters, for
instance in his idea that probability relations are directly perceived or
intuited, and his rejection of more scientific frequentist definitions.

If we judge his fundamental view of money from the first few pages of his
Treatise on Money (1930), then there seems to be a similar Platonist bent
there too.  To put it crudely and critically, he seems to write about the
shaping of the human concept of money by focusing upon what he wanted to
see, rather than what factually, scientifically, happened.

Connected to that tendency, it seems Keynes had delved into the more
objective history of money around 1925, but more or less turned his back on
such matters by 1930, rather scorning it as “Babylonian Madness”

Robert Tye, York, UK