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From:
Humberto Barreto <[log in to unmask]>
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Societies for the History of Economics <[log in to unmask]>
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Mon, 21 Oct 2019 17:55:23 +0100
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nep-hpe  New Economics Papers on History and Philosophy of Economics
─────────────────────────────┐
Issue of 2019‒10‒21
fifteen papers chosen by
Erik Thomson (University of Manitoba)
 http://ep.repec.org/pth72

[Selections by Humberto Barreto for SHOE list.]

 1. Applied history, applied economics, and economic history
   Colvin, Christopher L.; Winfree, Paul
 2. Justice without romance. The history of the economic analyses of
     judges behavior -1960-1993
   Alain Marciano; Alessandro Melcarne; Giovanni Ramello
 3. Ronald H. Coase (1910–2013)
   Alain Marciano
 4. The three fundamental frameworks for the unification of the macro
     social sciences
   George McMillan III
  6. How Can Experiments Play a Greater Role in Public Policy? 12 Proposals
     from an Economic Model of Scaling
   Omar Al-Ubaydli; John List; Claire Mackevicius; Min Sok Lee; Dana Suskind
  8. An Introduction to Juergen Backhaus’s “Lawyers’ economics vs. economic
     analysis of law”
   Alain Marciano
 9. Mathematical Economics - Marginal analysis in the consumer behavior
     theory
   Marques, Jorge; Pascoal, Rui
10. Calabresi: Heterodox Economic Analysis of Law
   Alain Marciano; Giovanni Battista Ramello
13. Governance im Politikfeld Wirtschaftspolitik
   Mause, Karsten
14. Posner, Richard
   Alain Marciano
15. Is Corruption a Greater Evil than Sin?
   Cigdem Borke TUNALI; Laurent WEILL

────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────

 1. Applied history, applied economics, and economic history
   Colvin, Christopher L.; Winfree, Paul
  As a new field of academic enquiry, applied history has a unique opportunity
  to learn lessons from other applied fields. In this essay, we set out how we
  think applied historians can learn from the mistakes of applied economists
  and economic policymakers in their use, and abuse, of economic theory and
  economic history. What we call the New Applied History has the potential to
  improve the way policymaking is conducted. But only if its practitioners
  understand the power, and limitations, of theory. We apply our ideas to the
  case of budgetary policymaking in the United States.
   JEL: B15 B22 E12 E63 N12 N41
   Keywords: applied history,budgetary policy
   Date: 2019
 URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:zbw:qucehw:201907&r=hpe

 2. Justice without romance. The history of the economic analyses of
     judges behavior -1960-1993
   Alain Marciano (MRE - Montpellier Recherche en Economie - UM - Université
    de Montpellier); Alessandro Melcarne (EconomiX - UPN - Université Paris
    Nanterre - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique); Giovanni
    Ramello (Dipartimento di scienze giuridiche ed economiche, Universita
    degli studi del piemonte orientale - Universita degli studi del piemonte
    orienta)
  Richard Posner's "What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?" (1993a) is not, as
  usually believed, the first analysis of judges' behaviors made by using the
  assumption that judges are rational and maximize a utility function. It
  arrived at the end of a rather long process. This paper recounts the history
  of this process, from the "birth" of law and economics in the 1960s to 1993.
  We show that economic analyses of judge behavior were introduced in the
  early 1970s under the pen of Posner. At that time, rationality was not
  modeled in terms of utility maximization. Utility maximization came later.
  We also show that rationality and incentives were introduced to explain the
  efficiency of Common Law. Around this theme, a controversy took place that
  led Posner, and other economists, to postpone their analysis of judicial
  behavior until the 1990s. By then, the situation had changed. New and
  conclusive evidence of judges' utility maximizing behavior demanded for a
  general theory to be expressed. In addition, the context was favorable to
  Chicago economists. It was time for Posner to publish his article.
   Keywords: Self-interest,Utility Maximization,Judges,Judicial decision
    making,Rationality
   Date: 2019–08
 URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02306821&r=hpe

 3. Ronald H. Coase (1910–2013)
   Alain Marciano (MRE - Montpellier Recherche en Economie - UM - Université
    de Montpellier)
  The purpose of this chapter is to link Ronald Coase's methodological
  approach to what he 'learned' when he was at the London School of Economics
  (LSE) from Edwin Cannan and Arnold Plant. The main lesson Coase taught us
  and insisted upon was that economics should not be too 'abstract' and should
  not rely on a priori categories. He pleaded for more realism in economics,
  for a form of 'political economy': economists should use theory to
  generalise what facts tell us rather than trying to interpret facts by using
  a priori and abstract categories. This conception of economics is closer to
  the LSE of Cannan and Plant than to the Chicago of Stigler, Friedman,
  Becker, or Posner.
   Keywords: political economy,Cannan,Plant,realism,methodology,Coase,common
    sense,Chicago,LSE
   Date: 2019–07–11
 URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02306814&r=hpe

 4. The three fundamental frameworks for the unification of the macro
     social sciences
   George McMillan III (Impact Analytics)
  ? This opening slide set advances McMillan 2015 (IISES Amsterdam) and
  McMillan 2017 (IISES Vienna) and focuses on the lateral integration of the
  three primary macro conceptual areas of political, economic/demographic and
  geopolitical frameworks to generate a "unified theory of the philosophical
  and social sciences."? Specifically, the three essential frameworks are. (1)
  Aristotle's Six Forms of Government, (2) the per capita GNP ratio signifying
  economic growth/population growth proportions, and (3) the Four Category
  Geopolitical Form Model framework of First, Second, Third and Fourth World
  country gradations. ? These three frameworks: (a) explain the full range of
  behavior pertaining to their respective area, (b) can incorporate all the
  subfield theories in their respective areas, (c) vary directly with one
  another in terms of a tight vs catastrophically loose wage labor price
  continuum, which (d) integrates the primary macro disciplines into a
  singular causal model. ? The independent variable of interval level
  Government Form interval level model of Aristotle. links the economic
  growth/population rates of change proportions because liberal democracies
  and First World countries only seem to exist in relatively tight wage labor
  market conditions, i.e. high economic growth and low population growth
  proportions. The Government Form Categories and the per capita GNP ratio
  link directly to the two primary trends of technology and population growth
  throughout history, that give rise to the two secondary trends of migration
  of First World manufacturing facilities to the South, and the mass migration
  of people to the North to explain current geopolitical outcomes. ? This
  system of frameworks links to the persistent primary and secondary trends to
  explain the permanently declining global wage labor equilibrium process as
  it directly the changing of geopolitical Forms over the next few decades.
  This system measures relative equality-inequality and relative
  stability-instability continuums that covary with the tight vs
  catastrophically lose wage labor continuum. This integrated model affirms
  Harsanyi?s (1969) assertion that the isolated subfield theories do not
  adequately anticipate first, second and third order effects. ? This system
  achieves the three longstanding objectives of the behavioral economics
  movement of: (a) Harsanyi?s ?integrated explanatory theory? and ?core model?
  of the social sciences discussed in his 1960, 1966 and 1969 papers, (b) it
  extends the Integrated Causal Model (ICM) of Tooby and Cosmides 1992
  throughout the philosophical and social sciences, and (c) achieves Gintis?
  2006 and 2009 ?unification of the behavioral sciences.?
   JEL: A12 F01 F22
   Keywords: Unified Theory of the Philosophical and Social Sciences;
    Unification of the Behavioral Sciences; Integrated Explanatory Theory of
    the Social Sciences; Core Model of the Social Sciences; Unified Behavioral
    Economic Theory; Integrated Theory of the Macro Social Sciences; Core
    Model of the Social Sciences
   Date: 2019–10
 URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:sek:iacpro:9812207&r=hpe


 6. How Can Experiments Play a Greater Role in Public Policy? 12 Proposals
     from an Economic Model of Scaling
   Omar Al-Ubaydli; John List; Claire Mackevicius; Min Sok Lee; Dana Suskind
  Policymakers are increasingly turning to insights gained from the
  experimental method as a means to inform large scale public policies.
  Critics view this increased usage as premature, pointing to the fact that
  many experimentally-tested programs fail to deliver their promise at scale.
  Under this view, the experimental approach drives too much public policy.
  Yet, if policymakers could be more confident that the original research
  findings would be delivered at scale, even the staunchest critics would
  carve out a larger role for experiments to inform policy. Leveraging the
  economic framework of Al-Ubaydli et al. (2019), we put forward 12 simple
  proposals, spanning researchers, policymakers, funders, and stakeholders,
  which together tackle the most vexing scalability threats. The framework
  highlights that only after we deepen our understanding of the scale up
  problem will we be on solid ground to argue that scientific experiments
  should hold a more prominent place in the policymaker's quiver.
   Date: 2019
 URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:feb:artefa:00679&r=hpe

 8. An Introduction to Juergen Backhaus’s “Lawyers’ economics vs. economic
     analysis of law”
   Alain Marciano (MRE - Montpellier Recherche en Economie - UM - Université
    de Montpellier)
   Date: 2018
 URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02306870&r=hpe

 9. Mathematical Economics - Marginal analysis in the consumer behavior
     theory
   Marques, Jorge; Pascoal, Rui
  In the neoclassical theory, the economic value of a good is determined by
  the benefit that an individual consumer attributes to the last ("marginal")
  unit consumed. Marginal analysis was introduced to the theory of value by
  William Jevons, Carl Menger and Léon Walras, the founders of marginalism.
  Since the so-called “marginalist revolution” of the 1870s, differential (or
  infinitesimal) calculus has been applied to the mathematical modelling of
  economic theories. Our goal is to present some consumer behavior models,
  their advantages and limitations, using the methodology of economic science.
  It should be emphasized that each (re)formulation is based on different
  economic principles: diminishing marginal utility, diminishing marginal rate
  of substitution and weak axiom of revealed preference.
   JEL: C02 D03
   Keywords: Marginal analysis, consumer behavior models, diminishing
    marginal rate of substitution, weak axiom of revealed preference
   Date: 2018
 URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:96442&r=hpe

10. Calabresi: Heterodox Economic Analysis of Law
   Alain Marciano (MRE - Montpellier Recherche en Economie - UM - Université
    de Montpellier); Giovanni Battista Ramello (Università degli Studi del
    Piemonte Orientale-Amedeo Avogadro (ITALY))
  Guido Calabresi is one of the founders of the law and economics movement.
  His approach, however, corresponds to a form of economic analysis of law
  that, we claim, is heterodox. We show why in this short notice.
   Date: 2018–08–13
 URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02306824&r=hpe


13. Governance im Politikfeld Wirtschaftspolitik
   Mause, Karsten
  This paper gives an overview of the topic "economic governance". This term
  is used in economics and neighboring social sciences as a generic term under
  which usually all activities are subsumed that are conducted by economic
  policymakers to 'steer' or 'control' the economic system, individual markets
  therein or certain economic actors (e.g., businesses, consumers). In
  addition to a more detailed clarification of the concept of "economic
  governance" and the presentation of actors and instruments of economic
  governance, the paper discusses why and in what situations economic
  governance is necessary. The latter issue is the subject of a continuing
  debate in politics, the public and the social sciences.
   JEL: D72 D78 E6 H1 L51 P16
   Keywords: Governance, Economic Policy, Political Economy, Governance
    Research, Public Policy Analysis, Market Failure, Government Activity.
   Date: 2019
 URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:pra:mprapa:96468&r=hpe

14. Posner, Richard
   Alain Marciano (MRE - Montpellier Recherche en Economie - UM - Université
    de Montpellier)
  Posner is one of the main contributors to what is known as "economic
  analysis of law". In this entry, we restrict our presentation to a few
  controversial claims he made (efficiency, wealth-maximization, Hicks-Kaldor,
  judicial decision making).
   Date: 2018
 URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02306799&r=hpe

15. Is Corruption a Greater Evil than Sin?
   Cigdem Borke TUNALI (Istanbul University); Laurent WEILL (LaRGE Research
    Center, Université de Strasbourg)
  The aim of this paper is to provide new evidence on the relation between
  religion and attitude toward corruption at the individual level. We use
  World Values Survey data covering 59 countries during the period 2010-2014
  to examine if religiosity and religious denominations are associated with
  attitude toward corruption. We find that religious people are more averse to
  corruption, supporting the view that religiosity favors honest behavior.
  Attitudes toward corruption differ across religious denominations.
  Protestantism and Hinduism are associated with greater aversion to
  corruption than Atheism, while other religious denominations do not have
  clear difference. This conclusion accords with the view that hierarchical
  religions favor greater tolerance to corruption than individualistic
  religions. Additional estimations on groups of countries with different
  dominant religions and on multi-religious countries show however that the
  relation between religious denomination and tolerance to corruption can vary
  with the religious environment of the country.
   JEL: H11 K42 Z12
   Keywords: religion, corruption.
   Date: 2019
 URL: http://d.repec.org/n?u=RePEc:lar:wpaper:2019-05&r=hpe

────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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