===================== HES POSTING ====================
Ross Emmett's definition and discussion of Whig history clarifies the
issue very usefully. Thank you Ross. I am still not convinced that
it is the last word. Some comments.
Definition. Emmett - "Whig" history justifies the "victory" of a
particular group over their adversaries by recounting why the victory
was "inevitable" in terms established by the victorious group
themselves. Butterfield - the tendency in many historians to write on
the side of the Protestants and Whigs, to praise revolutions provided
they have been successful, to emphasise certain principles of progress
in the past and to produce a story which is the ratification if not the
glorification of the present.
Ross seems to me to have added "inevitability", which is a difficult
concept (to a determinist, whatever happened was inevitable). I prefer
Butterfield's original stress on justification. One of his main points
was that historians should explain and describe, not pass judgement.
Also added are "groups". We are surely concerned with the history of
ideas and structures rather than groups. Hence, Ross's "losers" and
"winners" aren't relevant. To the extent that there is a current
concensus, we are all (apparent) "winners".
The best fit I can think of to either definition of Whig history is
Marxist history as done in communist countries (when there were such
things). Western Marxism (and Marx's) seems to be a variant -
justifying future, confidently anticipated, victory as inevitable.
Internal and external history seem to me to be orthogonal to the
Whig/non-Whig distinction. That isn't the impression given by James
Henderson or Roy Weintraub. I agree with Ross's "thick" history, but
the internal/external balance may vary with the question posed.
Whig history of ideas and truth - I used "truth" and "error" in full
knowledge of how loaded and difficult the terms are. Can we tell the
story of the history of science in terms of the growth of knowledge
(however uncertain and provisional that knowledge is)? Can we do so for
economics (harder to justify)? To dismiss the question on the grounds
that we set the terms in which "truth" is defined is to evade the issue.
A naive scientist would argue that Newton's account of the solar system
defeated earlier accounts because it was (more nearly) true. It led to
better predictions, etc. Of course one can say that this rests on the
definition of truth as "consistent with empirical evidence" rather than,
say, consistent with the bible, or Aristotle. (I am aware that this
argument can be made much more complex - I don't think that affects the
main issues.) My naive scientist would not be greatly fazed by this
objection, I think, and would be right not to be. We arrived at a better
criterion for judging theories. I am happy to be naive on this one.
There is then an empirical question (not one of principle). Is the
history of ideas more affected by changes in the notion of truth or
whatever (each theory "true" by the standards of the time) or is it
more a question of improving theories relative to a comparatively
unchanging standard of "truth" (or "adequacy" or whatever word you want
to use)? For the physical sciences over the last few centuries, I
think, clearly the latter. For economics I am not so sure, but the
question is worth asking.
Has the history of economics been dominated by Whigs? For the study of
classical and preclassical economics, perhaps Marxist-Whigs have
dominated, but I don't think that is what people in this debate have
been saying. Neoclassical-Whigs seem to me to be few and far between.
Sam Hollander, perhaps, but despite his remarkable productivity he
didn't dominate single handed.
----------------------
Tony Brewer ([log in to unmask])
University of Bristol, Department of Economics
8 Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1TN, England
Phone (+44/0)117 928 8428
Fax (+44/0)117 928 8577
============ FOOTER TO HES POSTING ============
For information, send the message "info HES" to [log in to unmask]
|
