Doug Mackenzie wrote:
> > John C. Medaille wrote-
>
> > We (you, me, Mises) all seem to agree that
> > meaning derives only from a social context; the
> > question is whether MI can account for that
> > context, and indeed whether it simply begins at
> > the wrong end. But we might even use a better
> > description of meaning. The statement "all
> > meanings are individual meanings" is at best
> > partial and at worst simply wrong. Would it not
> > be more accurate, at a merely descriptive level,
> > to say that "all meanings are individual
> > expressions of socially derived meanings."
>
>
>Socially derived though the interaction of
>individuals? Who else? Of course people learn from
>each other and each individual is part of a social
>context, along with other individuals. I see nothing
>wrong with MI at this point. YOu have not made any
>problem clear, not anything that Mises (1922) and
>Hayek (1937) did not deal with.
But he doesn't deal with it; he merely asserts
that his method can, but he doesn't attempt to
account for the fact that individual attitudes
are already socially formed before anyone acts.
The social plays no part in his axioms of
action. What you have in the relationship between
the individual and society is a chicken-and-egg
problem, and such problems are never solved by
asserting either chicken OR egg; they can only be
resolved by finding a way to assert BOTH chicken
AND egg. By asserting the chicken (the
individual), Mises assumes that the egg (a social
product) will take care of itself. It won't.
Mises pays lip service to the social, but his
solution is in no way different from those who don't, from pure individualists.
What is most baffling in all this is how
unproblematic Misians consider their theory to
be. In this discussion (and in HA) I have had
pushed at me the notion that praxeology belongs
to neither the speculative nor the practical
reason (and I agree), an epistemology divorced
from philosophy, actions divorced from
psychology, a social theory rooted in pure
individualism, an idealism which handles
prudential issues under imaginary constructs,
among other problematics. Now, all of these
things may be true, but then are not
unproblematic. But Misians never seem to
recognize the problematic nature of their
formulations and questions seem to irritate them;
indeed, Mises claims that Praxeology has the same
epistemological status as do logic and
mathematics, stating that it is "unconditionally
valid for all beings endowed with the logical
structure of the human mind. (57)" Now, the best
thing you can say for someone who thinks he has
"discovered" something as intuitively obvious as
logic or mathematics, but which no one ever
noticed, is that he is in the grip of an
enthusiasm; the worst you can say is that he has fallen prey to arrogance.
I think we all
>agree that the standard textbook NC approach fails,
>and you seem to admit that Mises tried to do things
>differently.
I don't admit this; that is my point. The
differences are trivial, though hotly debated.
See Mason Gaffney's post. Are there real policy
prescriptions that are different in a fundamental way?
>Please explain exactly how exactly
>Misesean economics fails.
Isn't the prior question, "show a case in which
Misesean economics has succeeded"?
John C. Medaille
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