mason gaffney wrote:
>
> In all this discussion of Say’s Law, something missing is the role of 
> anticipations. I write not to argue any point, but to ask of the group 
> if anyone else has?
>
> Thus, the demand for replacement depends on the structure of 
> inventories in being. As they mature to salability the owner of a 
> going concern will normally plan to replace them. To do so he, and the 
> whole chain of producers who supply and service him, will hire people 
> and borrow money and rent space to produce and store the new goods. 
> Doing so, they generate the incomes the producers will use to buy the 
> new goods. In this way, circulating capital circulates itself IN ADVANCE.
>
> Fixed capital needs replacing much slower. An extreme case is the 
> pyramids.
>
> This idea seems implicit in the original Austrians’ emphasis on the 
> structure of capital and the period of production. Most modern 
> Austrians have wandered off into other ideas and dogmas, and no longer 
> focus much on these early concerns. Can anyone direct me to definitive 
> works along the lines limned above?
>
> Thank you,
>
> Mason Gaffney
>
Some historians of economic thought, I have come to learn, want to see 
the exact words used in the classical literature to accept that the same 
ideas were being explained as we moderns now do. But I think we can 
recognize the role of anticipations in David Ricardo's discussion of 
Say's law in chapter 21, pages 290-92, of his /Principles/, including:

"M. Say has ... most satisfactorily shewn that there is no amount of 
capital [funds or savings] which may not be employed in a country, 
because demand is only limited by production. No man produces, but with 
a view [anticipation?] to consume or sell, and he never sells, but with 
an intention [anticipation?] to purchase some other commodity, which may 
be immediately useful to him, or which may contribute to future 
production. By producing, then, he necessarily becomes either the 
consumer of his own goods, or the purchaser and consumer of the goods of 
some other person. It is not to be supposed that he should, for any 
length of time, be ill-informed of the commodities which he can most 
advantageously produce, to attain the object which he has in view 
[anticipation?], namely, the possession of other goods; and therefore, 
it is not probable that he will continually produce a commodity for 
which there is no demand.... Too much of a particular commodity may be 
produced, of which there may be such a glut in the market, as not to 
repay the capital [funds] expended on it; but this cannot be the case 
with respect of all commodities."

Alfred Marshall (/Principles/, Porcupine Press, 1990, pp. 591-92) treats 
very well the problem posed to the adjustment process by the fixity of 
capital goods while elaborating J.S. Mill's explanation of Say's law: 
"The demand for commodities, of which the ultimate goal is consumption, 
comes from production."

While at this, I might remind those who find my earlier statement that 
income is used to acquire money (cash) to be a problem to read up on the 
demand for money function, perhaps, William Baumol's (/QJE/, 1952) 
formulation. Otherwise, simple introspection as to how they came by the 
cash in their pockets, if not by exchanging their income for it, would 
do just fine.

James Ahiakpor
>
> *From:*Societies for the History of Economics [mailto:[log in to unmask]] 
> *On Behalf Of *Rosser, John Barkley - rosserjb
> *Sent:* Sunday, February 02, 2014 1:27 PM
> *To:* [log in to unmask]
> *Subject:* Re: [SHOE] L'offre crée même la deman de
>
> Oh, I said I would say no more about this, but that was in response to 
> James Akhiapor. I do think that Steve Kates's latest deserves some 
> reply. Four points.
>
> 1) It is sort of funny that while it was James Mill who first strongly 
> argued that there could not be a general glut because demand was 
> constituted out of previous supply, carefully reading how he phrased 
> it makes it clear that at most former supply provides for potential 
> demand. It does not guarantee that the succeeding demand will actually 
> equal that previous supply. It is merely asserted as a dogma of faith.
>
> 2) The obvious reason why it might not, which was recognized by 
> Ricardo and Say and many others, was the possibility of hoarding. So, 
> to argue for the law, one had to essentially argue that hoarding never 
> amounted to anything or could amount to anything. As it is, both 
> Ricardo and Say admitted at least that it could amount to something in 
> the short run, although they tended to deny it for the long run. This 
> means that those simply asserting that the law must hold in the short 
> run or doing so either as a statement of pure faith, or are engaging 
> in some sort of twisting of the meaning of words, such as the 
> nonsensical contortions involved in declaring hoarding to actually be 
> "spending of income" in order to obtain the cash to be hoarded.
>
> 3) The matter of Mill's analysis of financial breakdown becomes a very 
> complicated and not straightforward story. How he reconciled this with 
> the law was to emphasize that supply did not arise due to the 
> financial breakdown and failure to supply credit. However, the modern 
> view is more to look at this one stage ahead and say that the supply 
> does not arise because the financial breakdown and the absence of 
> credit led to a fall in aggregate demand as the businesses that would 
> have carried out real capital investments, fail to purchase the inputs 
> they need to carry out the production of the real capital investment, 
> with this failure to purchase those inputs due to their inability to 
> obtain credit constituting a failure of aggregate demand. Needless to 
> say, how one views this sort of issue is totally relevant to analyzing 
> what has gone on recent years in our modern economy. Did the collapse 
> of the financial system due to the collapse of the housing bubble lead 
> to an insufficiency of aggregate demand by businesses who could no 
> longer borrow money to purchase the capital goods, or was it their 
> subsequent failure to produce after their failure to carry out their 
> potential demand that is the key to the subsequent failure of demand? 
> Most now would say it is the former, and that what Mill described was 
> a way in which there could be a short term failure of aggregate 
> demand, even as he emphasized that these were temporary and would 
> right themselves if left alone.
>
> 4) On the matter of Keynes and his treatment of all this in the GT, I 
> think that there is widespread agreement and acceptance even by many 
> of his stronger fans that he failed to accurately describe the history 
> of macro thought, including particularly regarding this matter, and 
> that he failed to give credit to many classical economists who had 
> developed many of the ideas appearing in the GT prior to his writing 
> it. However, Kates's argument that almost nobody in the English 
> language tradition were dissenters to Say's Law, with the list 
> dominated by apparent wackos like Major Douglas, emphasizes that 
> indeed there was a place for Keynes to formulate a strong critique of 
> the law in the GT, this being one situation where he was not 
> downplaying the role of predecessors as much as he did regarding other 
> ideas. It does not matter that the law was labeled "Say's Law" only in 
> the early 20th century, Keynes provided a strong critique of it that 
> would hold just as well if he had called it the "law of markets."
>
> ------------------------------------------------------------------------
>
> *From:*Societies for the History of Economics [[log in to unmask]] on 
> behalf of Steve Kates [[log in to unmask]]
> *Sent:* Sunday, February 02, 2014 8:50 AM
> *To:* [log in to unmask]
> *Subject:* Re: [SHOE] L'offre crée même la deman de
>
> I appreciate Daniel Besomi’s comments, which I hope will help us 
> clarify these issues. I might also mention that most of what I 
> summarise here, as in the previous post, was discussed in my /Say’s 
> Law and the Keynesian Revolution: How Macroeconomic Theory Lost its 
> Way/ (Elgar 1998).
>
> The first point I am trying to make begins here. There are two 
> fundamental economic questions:
>
>         1)what is the basis for demand?
>
>         2)what causes recessions, or perhaps more accurately in this
>         case, what does not cause recessions?
>
> What Say, and Robinet, were explaining was the origins of demand, 
> which they argue is based on previous sales. Demand is constituted by 
> supply. What they wrote is an answer to the first question, but it is 
> not an answer to the second.
>
> The second question may be rephrased in this way: can there be such a 
> thing as a general glut? This is a completely different question from 
> the first, and the answer, as a consequence of the general glut 
> debate, was that no, there is no such thing as a general glut, demand 
> deficiency does not cause recessions. James Mill’s answer to this 
> question was, in part, premised on Say’s answer to the first but were 
> not an answer to the first. They are separate but related issues. Mill 
> used Say's discussion on the basis for demand to explain why a general 
> glut was impossible.
>
> It is because James Mill was the first, so far as I know, to answer 
> the second question that I see him to have been the first to frame the 
> classical statement on what is now called Say’s Law. /The General 
> Theory/ is about whether demand deficiency, a general glut, is 
> possible. And when one finally accepts the classical answer to 
> question 2, as FH may have done, then, but only then, the economic 
> issues revolve around 1, which is what kind of supply will actually 
> create demand.
>
> And then, in answering that question, we can ask ourselves whether the 
> Keynesian notion that spending on anything at all will do the trick is 
> a correct answer. To a classical economist, it need hardly be said, 
> the idea that anyone would think non-value-adding production could 
> create growth and employment is too ridiculous even to contemplate. 
> Only a modern economist might think so, but to anyone from the 
> classical tradition, the idea is still ridiculous.
>
> Daniel also points out that Fred Taylor had used the phrase “Say’s 
> Law” earlier than 1921. This is true, but 1921 nevertheless remains 
> the significant date, which is why I chose my words very carefully. 
> What I wrote was this:
>
> “The first thing that might be noted is that the term ‘Say’s Law’ is 
> not classical in origin but was consciously invented by Fred Manville 
> Taylor and introduced into general economic discourse with the 
> publication of his /Principles of Economics/ text in 1921.”
>
> If you go to my Say’s Law text (pp 148-149 and especially the 
> footnote), you will find that I discuss Taylor’s invention of the 
> term, including his first use in 1909 in an obscure article on how to 
> teach economics. He then brings Say’s Law into his introductory text, 
> but the first seven editions were student editions distributed only 
> within the University of Michigan. It is only following the 
> publication of the eighth edition as a general text with commercial 
> distribution that the term enters general economic discourse. It is 
> the publication of the book for sale outside the U of M campus that 
> brings the term to a wider public, and it is only after 1921 that it 
> enters into more general discourse.
>
> But it is really neither here nor there whether Taylor invented the 
> term in 1909 or 1921. What is important to understand is that the term 
> was invented in the twentieth century and it was invented by Taylor. 
> What is not in any way affected by the dating is the need recognise 
> that Keynes must, as an absolute certainty, have been reading other 
> things about the various issues that end up in /The General Theory/ 
> that he never mentioned to anyone else. The 
> locked-himself-in-a-room-and-came-up-with-these-ideas-one-by-one 
> version, as he tells the tale himself and is now repeated as gospel, 
> is obviously untrue since Keynes had to have picked up the phrase from 
> somewhere else. If not from Taylor than from someone who had read Taylor.
>
> Then, on the third point raised, if it can be said, as Daniel says, 
> that my stating that everyone accepted Say’s Law through until 1936 
> was only “approximately true in the English, French and Italian 
> literature”, that’s more than good enough for me. I perfectly well 
> understand that there were some very few and generally obscure 
> dissenters, particularly in English. I even discuss this very weak 
> opposition in my book, with the two (three, I guess) most important 
> dissenters in English having been John Hobson on the one hand and 
> Foster and Catchings on the other. Keynes can himself name only five 
> in his “Brave Army of Heretics” (/GT/ 371), and if you look at the 
> list and choose only his contemporaries, aside from Hobson who is 
> iffy, you are looking at a very dubious list of authorities, namely, 
> Silvio Geselle and Major Douglas. During the period up until 1936, 
> there may hardly have been a theory more universally accepted than 
> Say’s Law.
>
> On 1 February 2014 18:34, Daniele Besomi <[log in to unmask] 
> <mailto:[log in to unmask]>> wrote:
>
> If we want to set the facts concerning Say's law straight, let's do it 
> properly. Its history begins far earlier than Mill, since it is very 
> precisely stated in a dictionary in 1780:
>
> ‘Nobody can be a buyer unless he is also a seller; since buying 
> implies paying, nobody can buy unless he sells, because only by 
> selling can he procure the money to buy what he buys. From the fact 
> that every buyer must be a seller and that he can buy only if he 
> sells, a second axiom results, namely, that every seller must also be 
> a buyer, and he cannot sell unless he buys. Therefore every vendor 
> must, by way of the purchases he performs in turn, provide everybody 
> else with the money for buying the goods the vendor wants to sell 
> them.’ There may not be perfect matching between individual sales and 
> purchases, but if someone becomes richer by selling more than he buys, 
> someone else is ruined by buying more than he sells, so that ‘by the 
> opposition between these two sorts of disorder, equilibrium is 
> re-established in the general mass of sales and purchases (entry on 
> COMMERCE in Robinet’s Dictionnaire universel des sciences morale, 
> économique, politique et diplomatique, vol. 12, pp. 444–445).
>
> As to Taylor's invention of the term. First, let's be precise about 
> the dating: the 1921 edition was the 8th; the book was first published 
> in 1911, and the expression 'Say's law' was already there, in Ch. VII. 
> Second, the expression does not first appear in Taylor's book. Taylor 
> himself used the expression 2 years earlier in an article on 'Methods 
> of Teaching Elementary Economics at the University of Michigan'. But 
> there is at least a previous instance, in the English translation of 
> Rodbertus's Overproduction and crises', 1898, p. 40; the German 
> original text is 'Say's Gesetz' (that the original was in German is 
> not irrelevant: see below). And, third, at any rate the expression 
> doesn't surely come out of the blue. The French term, loi des 
> débouchés, was clearly associated to Say in the French literature 
> since at least Coquelin's dictionary in 1852, where there is an entry 
> on DEBOUCHES that is almost entirely constituted by quotations of 
> Say's writings. This leaked in the English language literature by 
> being taken up and translated in Lalor's Cyclopædia of political 
> science, vol. 3, 1884, as OUTLET; the entry is attributed to J. B. Say 
> himself.
>
> Finally, it is not true that Say's law was universally accepted by the 
> mainstream (unless, of course, one defines as 'mainstream' those 
> accepting Say's law). This may be approximately true in the English, 
> French and Italian literature (which doesn't mean that the law wasn't 
> questioned: it was, and not only by cranks), but is surely false for 
> the German language literature, where Say's law was explicitly debated 
> and often rejected by academic economists in connection with the 
> discussion of crises. Indeed it is precisely out of this literature 
> that the most serious theoretical approaches to crises and later (end 
> of the 19th C.) to business cycles emerged. In the English and French 
> literature, in fact, most theories of crises consisted in exercises of 
> dodging Say's law: since the law forbids overproduction (on this, 
> everybody agreed), the alternatives were simply either to reject the 
> law (as did many German economists, but also some French and some 
> English writers) or to blame monetary factors instead (the 
> credit-overtrading-speculation approach: thanks to credit one can 
> trade beyond his capital, this raises prices, induces speculation, 
> which in turn fosters more trade and credit. This, in one version or 
> another, was by far the most common explanation of crises during the 
> middle half of the 19th C, once the idea that crises are the 
> occasional and unsystematic consequences of a 'political disease' was 
> discarded following the fairly regular and periodic outbursts of 
> violent crises).
>
> The context in which Say's law was discussed was, at least since the 
> gluts debate, in connection with crises. If, after J.S. Mill's 
> trodding 'the thin line between acceptance and rejection of Say's 
> law', the law almost disappeared from explicit discussion in the 
> English literature it is precisely because it hindered theoretical 
> advances in the theories of crises: it was the elephant in the room 
> that everybody preferred not to mention.
>
> Daniele Besomi
>
>
> Il giorno 1-feb-2014, alle ore 00.42, Steve Kates ha scritto:
>
>
> >
> > There are a number of facts that are relevant in any discussion of 
> Say’s Law which I thought I might set out. What I find something of a 
> problem is the common assumption that Say’s Law refers to something 
> that was believed during the early parts of the nineteenth century and 
> was of little significance thereafter. No discussion ever seems to get 
> past Malthus, Say and Mill in looking at what was an embedded 
> principle right up until 1936.
> >
> >
> > The first thing that might be noted is that the term “Say’s Law” is 
> not classical in origin but was consciously invented by Fred Manville 
> Taylor and introduced into general economic discourse with the 
> publication of his Principles of Economics text in 1921. Before Taylor 
> no one called this association of demand with previous supply “Say’s 
> Law”. Taylor introduced the term because he thought economic theory 
> needed to identify one of its most important underlying principles. 
> The ironies of what followed next are too obvious for comment.
> >
> >
> > This continuous fixation on the early classical economists has had a 
> number of unfortunate consequences. The first is that economists are 
> always returning to Say as if he provided the definitive statement on 
> Say’s Law. He did not. If you want the point of origin, it is in James 
> Mill in his Commerce Defended published in 1807. Here is the passage 
> that matters, although the whole of his discussion is well worth the 
> effort:
> >
> >
> > “No proposition however in political economy seems to be more 
> certain than this which I am going to announce, how paradoxical soever 
> it may at first sight appear; and if it be true, none undoubtedly can 
> be deemed of more importance. The production of commodities creates, 
> and is the one and universal cause which creates a market for the 
> commodities produced.”
> >
> >
> > The final sentence should be familiar but is not the actual origins 
> of the specific words used by Keynes.
> >
> >
> > It is also important to appreciate James Mill’s role since I see his 
> statement not only as exactly right, but he wrote his book in response 
> to an argument in which too much saving and too little demand were 
> seen as the causes of recession. This was the first instance in which 
> an argument that economies are driven by demand was rejected. Mill was 
> saying an economy could not be stimulated from the demand side. That 
> was the point of Say’s Law, and still is.
> >
> >
> > This nameless principle was universally accepted by the mainstream. 
> But if you would like to find Say’s Law as clearly stated as it is 
> possible to find it in the classical literature, this is David Ricardo 
> writing to Malthus just after the commencement of the General Glut 
> debate in 1820. Malthus said the post-Napoleonic recessions had been 
> caused by too much saving and too little demand. To this, Ricardo replied:
> >
> >
> > “Men err in their productions, there is no deficiency of demand.”
> >
> >
> > That’s it. Say’s Law. Recessions are caused by mis-directed 
> production, not deficient demand. This was the foundation for the 
> entire theory of the cycle that would develop over the following 
> century. It is the disappearance of the theory of the cycle that may 
> be the greatest loss economists have experienced because of the 
> General Theory.
> >
> >
> > There is then this. At the end of the General Glut debate in 1848, 
> John Stuart Mill published his Principles of Political Economy, which 
> included his fourth proposition on capital. This may be the most 
> enigmatic statement ever made by a great economist, but if you want to 
> see the principle behind Say’s Law, whether you agree with it or not, 
> this is what Mill wrote:
> >
> >
> > “Demand for commodities is not demand for labour.”
> >
> >
> > Or as we might put it today, an economic stimulus will not create 
> jobs. This is a statement whose reasoning is perfectly clear to me. I 
> teach it to my students and it is in my text and few ever have any 
> trouble with it. Described in 1876 as “the best test of a sound 
> economist”, in my view it still is. It was a conclusion that policy 
> makers accepted right through until the 1930s and perhaps even for a 
> while after. But it was an enduring concept.
> >
> >
> > So I take you back to Francois Hollande. What he said in French was 
> this:
> >
> >
> > “Le temps est venu de régler le principal problème de la France : sa 
> production. Oui, je dis bien sa production. Il nous faut produire 
> plus, il nous faut produire mieux. C’est donc sur l’offre qu’il faut 
> agir. Sur l’offre ! Ce n’est pas contradictoire avec la demande. 
> L’offre crée même la demande.”
> >
> >
> > This is the whole thing in my free translation:
> >
> >
> > “The time has come to work through the number one problem in France: 
> which is production. Yes, that’s what I said, production. We must 
> produce more, we must produce better. Hence, it is upon supply that we 
> must concentrate. On supply! This is not in opposition to demand. 
> Supply actually creates demand.”
> >
> >
> > It is true the point Hollande makes takes you back to J.-B. Say, 
> David Ricardo and James and John Stuart Mill, all of whom are, of 
> course, classical. But he also takes you back to Fred Taylor whose 
> book was published only a few years before the General Theory, where 
> he was trying to state what every economist of his own generation knew 
> and accepted. Today, so far as aggregate demand goes, we are all 
> Keynesians now, with some very few exceptions.
> >
> >
> > And while we’re at it, you might also ask yourself how Taylor’s very 
> much twentieth century phrase ended up in The General Theory. The 
> standard story of the trek from the Treatise to the General Theory has 
> a lot of gaps, even after the hundred million words that have been 
> devoted to explaining what the General Theory means and how it came to 
> be written.
> >
> >
> >
> > On 25 January 2014 15:08, Steve Kates <[log in to unmask] 
> <mailto:[log in to unmask]>> wrote:
> > This only came to my attention a few days ago but apparently 
> François Hollande, the President of France, quoted what he believed to 
> have been the actual words J.-B. Say used to describe the meaning of 
> what we today refer to as Say’s Law: L’offre crée même la demande. He 
> quoted it because he intends to use this maxim as a guide to policy in 
> directing the French economy. Here is the quotation, in French:
> >
> >
> > Le temps est venu de régler le principal problème de la France : sa 
> production. Oui, je dis bien sa production. Il nous faut produire 
> plus, il nous faut produire mieux. C’est donc sur l’offre qu’il faut 
> agir. Sur l’offre ! Ce n’est pas contradictoire avec la demande. 
> L’offre crée même la demande.
> >
> >
> > François Hollande – January 14, 2014 [My bolding]
> >
> >
> > This only came to my attention because of an article reprinted from 
> The Financial Times dated 19 January and written by one of the FT’s 
> columnists, Wolfgang Münchau.
> >
> >
> > 
> http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/0a469808-7f6e-11e3-b6a700144feabdc0.html#axzz2r08HdayQ
> >
> >
> > This was the relevant para:
> >
> >
> > “Last week, we heard another Frenchman, President François Hollande, 
> proclaiming: ‘L’offre crée même la demande’, which translates as 
> ‘supply actually creates its own demand’. If you want to look for the 
> real political scandal in France today, it is not the sight of the 
> president in a motorcycle helmet about to sneak into a Parisian 
> apartment building. It is that official economic thinking in Paris has 
> not progressed in 211 years.”
> >
> >
> > This is significant to me for two reasons which I have discussed in 
> past threads on this site, not to mention in my Defending the History 
> of Economic Thought. First, economic ideas of the past are never 
> transcended in the sense that once something better has been devised, 
> older ways of looking at things never come back. As we can see here, 
> older ideas retain a life of their own and may, in the right 
> circumstances, turn out to be relevant in understanding contemporary 
> events. With the now generally recognised failure of the Keynesian 
> stimulus packages, the question has become, what should be done now?
> >
> >
> > There can be no doubt that the Socialist President of France, who 
> more than anything else would have liked to have spent the French 
> economy into recovery, but having personally experienced the 
> consequences of trying to use Keynesian economic policies, has 
> concluded that economies are not driven by a public sector stimulus. 
> Hollande is therefore looking in another direction and has embraced 
> Say’s Law as best he understands it.
> >
> >
> > You may be sure Hollande did not do this lightly. This awareness has 
> come as the result of the bitter fruits of experience. The stimulus 
> packages of 2009 are today’s debt and dying economies.
> >
> >
> > Which brings me to my second issue which is also something I have 
> discussed on this website. The classical economists may well have been 
> right that there will be no recovery until demand is again constituted 
> by actual value adding supply. And what is interesting is that 
> Hollande, far from leading the way in his approach to economic theory, 
> is following in the footsteps of others who are trying to achieve a 
> turnaround in their economies. This is again from the article in The 
> Financial Times:
> >
> >
> > “The third significance lies in the fact that the new consensus 
> spans the entire mainstream political spectrum. If you live on the 
> European continent and if you have a problem with Say’s Law, the only 
> political parties that cater to you are the extreme left or the 
> extreme right.”
> >
> >
> > Economic policy everywhere is, according to this article, guided by 
> Say’s Law. I don’t actually believe that is literally true, but the 
> problem remains that while policy makers are trying to walk away from 
> Keynes there are no longer any guideposts on what to do since almost 
> no economics text will explain the actual meaning of Say’s Law, the 
> classical theory of the cycle and what needs to be done to generate a 
> recovery when the economy is in recession.
> >
> >
> >
> > History of economic thought has its uses as economics. It is not the 
> history and philosophy of science, it is not the discarded ideas of 
> Dead White Males. It is part of the collective wisdom of economists 
> that we, as historians of economic thought, do our best to keep alive.
> >
> > --
> >
> > Dr Steven Kates
> > Associate Professor
> > School of Economics, Finance
> > and Marketing
> > RMIT University
> > Building 80
> > Level 11 / 445 Swanston Street
> > Melbourne Vic 3000
> >
> > Phone: (03) 9925 5878
> > Mobile: 042 7297 529
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> >
> > Dr Steven Kates
> > Associate Professor
> > School of Economics, Finance
> > and Marketing
> > RMIT University
> > Building 80
> > Level 11 / 445 Swanston Street
> > Melbourne Vic 3000
> >
> > Phone: (03) 9925 5878
> > Mobile: 042 7297 529
>
>
>
> -- 
>
>
> Dr Steven Kates
> Associate Professor
>
> School of Economics, Finance
> and Marketing
> RMIT University
> Building 80
>
> Level 11 / 445 Swanston Street
> Melbourne Vic 3000
>
> Phone: (03) 9925 5878
> Mobile: 042 7297 529
>


-- 
James C.W. Ahiakpor, Ph.D.
Professor
Department of Economics
California State University, East Bay
Hayward, CA 94542

(510) 885-3137 Work
(510) 885-7175 Fax (Not Private)