Funny thing is Ric, I agree with most of what you wrote, and so would Hayek+Lachmann. Yes, it is unrealistic to think in terms of one representative agent, especially Homo-Economicus. Hayekian econ typically has several types of imperfect "agents" in play. Yes, networks are important, Austrians have seen this for a long time. Yes, citizenship in a democracy entails rights and responsibilities, and perhaps some difficulties if we overuse democratic mechanisms- that could take us down the wrong path, towards serfdom. Hayek does also mention irreducible aggregates, favorably (see the counter revolution of science), and this has played well with some Austrians (i.e. Don Lavoie).
So my flirtation with Post-Keynesian-Old Institutional econ began for the reasons you list, specifically because I found Neoclassical econ absurd, and for the exact reasons you discuss. My flirtation with PK-OIE ended because I did not think that these paradigms delivered what they promised to, and Austrian Economics (and to some extent Virginia Econ) did.
A few things we seem to all have in common are an interest in complexity theory and uncertainty, quasi-rationality/heterogeneous agents, and a willingness to address broader social issues. As Gary suggested, I think there is a Keynes-Hayek paradigm, a common framework within which Keynes and Hayek discussed issues. This framework gave way to Samuelson and Friedman. Why? Why were Shackle and Lachmann unable to carry the Keynes-Hayek paradigm forward? Can we blame it on the trend towards positivism, as Bruce Caldwell seems to? Quite possibly so.
D.W. MacKenzie, Ph.D.
Carroll College, Helena MT
--------------------------------------------
On Fri, 11/15/13, Ric Holt <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
Subject: Re: [SHOE] Where are the ex-Austrians?
To: [log in to unmask]
Date: Friday, November 15, 2013, 4:56 PM
Needless to say I find
myself in Barkley's "camp" and if people have
read our writings you know our arguments. If there has been
a shift in my thinking, it is more to looking at specific
problems and policy solutions and to put them in the context
of the development of economic thought, which I believe is
always changing. For example, the problem of going from
individual to aggregate behavior. Since my graduate student
days, I have been dumbfounded that one can believe that the
aggregate acts exactly the same way as a
"representative agent." No other discipline I
know, in the natural or social sciences, believes this that
I am aware of. But yet, that is what our textbooks still
tell us. If one lives in a bubble, the mainstream model
might make sense, but when people actually start interacting
together a lot of stuff happens -- some unpredictable. It
was this question, along with others, that got me interested
in looking at different "schools" of thought. I
have benefitted from them all and what heterodox economics
has given me is an opportunity to look at theoretical
problems AND public policy from different perspectives and
provide more tools to use. It is hard for me to imagine how
one can come up with humane and efficient policy choice with
the assumption that people only interact within a private
price system without looking at the networks and clusters
they find themselves in, as another example. With those
moving toward a libertarian position, I find myself moving
more and more away for two reasons: 1) networks are more
common then we think in understanding economic behavior -
and they are complex. 2) On a philosophical level, what do
we mean by citizenship, particularly in a working democracy?
People live a variety of communities and at least in a
democracy citizenship requires active involvement and
responsibilities -- citizens have rights, but they also have
responsibilities. I know what the libertarian response is to
having rights, but what about responsibilities?
Citizenship in a democracy confront tensions
between private rights and active citizenship, which, by the
way, Mill was aware of and never was able to resolve. In my
reading of him he kept jumping back and forth from what in
the literature is known as negative and positive concepts of
freedom. In my writing I'm pursuing some intermediary
position.
Ric Holt
On Fri, Nov 15, 2013
at 12:33 PM, Doug Mackenzie <[log in to unmask]>
wrote:
It
might also be worth noting that Hayek started out as a
Fabian Socialist and Tom Sowell started out as a Marxist. It
might further be worth noting that Hayek did not say that
Keynes' theory was wrong, he wrote that it was a
'special case'. Mises was, as I understand it, a
Historicist prior to reading Menger's Principles.
The general historical question here might be "how does
becoming an economists change one's views of
economics?". Friedman was a new dealer before learning
college economics. James Buchanan once told us that his
entire class were New Dealers' at the start of
Friedman's class, but by the end half the class were
Chicago Friedmanite's. Lerner and Lange were Marxists,
or at least Marx infleunced early on, b ut moderated their
views after learning Neoclassical econ (Lange appeared to
revert towards Marxism after WW2, but he had a gun to his
head, with Stalin in charge). In fact, a Lerner student once
told me that Lerner repudiated even his Neoclassical
writings on Market Socialism. Larry Summers claims that
Friedman was a 'devil figure' in his youth, but came
to respect Friedman. How exactly do these changes take
place? Is it the influence of data or theory, or both?
My own experience is the pretty much reverse of Gary and
Barkley, initially interested in Post Keynesian-Veblenian
ideas 22 years ago, turned towards Hayek and Nozick. In my
case data and theory were both important, but data probably
mattered more. I still cover The General Theory in
Intermediate Macro (students are required to read most of
this book), but overall I see the evidence as contradicting
Keynes.
D.W. MacKenzie, Ph.D.
Carroll College, Helena MT
--------------------------------------------
On Fri, 11/15/13, Garnett, Rob
<[log in to unmask]>
wrote:
Subject: Re: [SHOE] Where are the ex-Austrians?
To: [log in to unmask]
Date: Friday, November 15, 2013, 2:48 PM
Barkley,
Thank you for this excellent post.
I will share it with my 'contending perspectives in
economics' students on Monday, as a testament -- as
cogent
as I've heard in recent memory (here I feel the loss
of
Warren Samuels) -- to the virtues of critical pluralism
in
economics.
Rob
________________________________________
From: Societies for the History of Economics [[log in to unmask]] On
Behalf Of Rosser, John Barkley - rosserjb [[log in to unmask]]
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2013 1:16 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: [SHOE] Where are the ex-Austrians?
Oh, I was going to stay out of this thread, most of which
I
have found kind of annoying and misdirected, but Gary
Mongiovi's self-outing as a quasi-ex-Austrian has
perked my
attention. As the only person on the planet who is
simultaneously a member of the Society for the
Development
of Austrian Economics, the editorial board of the Journal
of
Post Keynesian Economics, and the Econometric Society, I
may
be uniquely qualified to comment on this matter.
So, I read Hayek's Constitution of Libety in a
seminar
taught by the late anarchist philosopher, Robert Nozick,
before I read either Marx or Keynes, although I do not
think
I was fully aware at the time of what it meant to be an
"Austrian economist" (this was nearly a half
century ago,
and I was a libertarian at the time). So, maybe I am a
bit like Gary in that I might be sort of an
"ex-Austrian
economist," but I am not sure I ever was one, and I
may be
more of one now, having read much more of Hayek and other
Austrians more seriously, along with having also read a
lot
of both Keynes and Marx seriously. I have been called
and labeled many things over the decades, but prefer not
to
be put into any particular box, at least not too
vigorously
(I have had the experience in more than one setting of
having someone in that box roundly denouncing me or not
being a good member of that box, when I never said I was
in
the darned box in the first place). One can accuse me
of being namby-pamby or wimpy or emptily eclectic or
whatever, but I like to look for the good and interesting
and relevant ideas in whomever I read and trying to take
those ideas seriously and relate them to other serious
ideas
from other thinkers, while recognizing where particular
thinkers also are not at their best and making remarks or
comments or pushing ideas that do not seem to stand up
too
well to careful scrutiny. I can say that as far as I
am concerned all three of those, Hayek, Marx, and Keynes,
have written brilliant and insightful and useful things,
while also having their off days and off books and so
on. I would also remind folks that it was not only
Keynes, but also Marx who at one point declared that
"I am
not a Marxist," and while I do not think Hayek ever
made an
equivalent remarks, it is clearly understood by nearly
all
(I know of some who argue against this) that his views
changed over time on quite a few substantive matters.
I understand that there is strong tendency for groups to
self-identify and for people belonging to them to spend
lots
of time and effort labeling others as either being in
their
group or not, and that among historians of thought there
may
be a larger percentage who identify with this or that
school, particularly the various heterodox schools,
especially those with long historical roots and
traditions,
such as Austrians, Marxists, and Keynesians. But I
would suggest that it might be worthwhile spending more
time
on examining the ideas in each school that are defensible
and admirable rather than having people denouncing each
other because they are in or not in this or that
school. Some of this gets really childish, frankly,
even if you do strongly identify as belonging to School
X.
Barkley Rosser
________________________________________
From: Societies for the History of Economics [[log in to unmask]] on
behalf of Bylund, Per L. [[log in to unmask]]
Sent: Friday, November 15, 2013 1:40 PM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: [SHOE] Where are the ex-Austrians?
On Friday, November 15, 2013 9:28 AM, Alan G Isaac wrote:
> And of course such assertions boil down to:
> "it follows from my preferred AXIOMS that the
> world much match my beliefs about it".
>
> Again, this is just another way of immunizing
> against the empirical evidence.
>
> The term "obvious" is generally a pretty
strong
> signal that thinking has stopped.
>
> Cheers,
> Alan Isaac
Considering the tone, it wouldn't surprise me if this
debate
will very soon corroborate Godwin's Law. I want no
part of
that, but I find the above a quite fantastic statement.
I'd
like to think that it was sloppily written, but as it
stands
the methodological implications are astounding. It seems
to
suggest that logic is irrelevant (and hence that axioms
cannot be true or that it doesn't matter what is
derived
logically from a true statement) or, alternatively, that
the
fact that something is observed (empirically so, such as
seen, heard, measured and whatnot) makes it as well as
its
use free from interpretation, subjectivity, or value
assessments.
I might point out that the "obviousness" that
"the Sun
circles the Earth" is in fact an empirical
observation,
though tainted by the observer's (false) assumption
that the
ground s/he stands on does not move.
Per Bylund
_____________________
Per L. Bylund, Ph.D.
Baylor University
[log in to unmask]
(573) 268-3235
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