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From:
Humberto Barreto <[log in to unmask]>
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Societies for the History of Economics <[log in to unmask]>
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Fri, 2 Dec 2011 08:33:06 -0500
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------ EH.NET BOOK REVIEW ------
Title: A Great Leap Forward: 1930s Depression and U.S. Economic Growth

Published by EH.NET (December 2011)

Alexander J. Field, /A Great Leap Forward: 1930s Depression and U.S. Economic
Growth/. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2011.  ix + 387 pp. $45
(hardcover), ISBN: 978-0-300-15109-1.

Reviewed for EH.Net by Paul Rhode, Department of Economics, University of
Michigan.

Sometimes if you look at a familiar object in a slightly different way, it
takes on an entirely new appearance.  Many examples of the phenomenon are
offered by Alexander Field’s path-breaking book, /A Great Leap Forward/,
which re-examines the history of productivity growth in the United States.
In his leading example, Field observes that if one uses 1941 as a breakpoint,
instead of the more conventional year 1937, then the rate of total factor
productivity (TFP) growth of the private non-farm economy (PNE) during the
Great Depression period is the fastest of any period on record.  The core
facts are simple -- hours of labor in the PNE were roughly the same in 1941
as in 1929 and the capital stock was slightly smaller, yet output was 33 to
40 percent higher.  Labor productivity and total factor productivity grew
rapidly despite high unemployment and weak income growth.  Indeed, the rates
of productivity growth exceeded those in the 1920s or in the so-called Golden
Age (1948-1973).

Field argues that growth of TFP in the 1930s was broadly based and not
narrowly concentrated in manufacturing, as in the 1920s.  It was not due to
changes in labor quality (pp. 36-40).  In annual data for the 1930s (as in
the surrounding periods), TFP growth was pro-cyclical, rising as the
unemployment rate fell (see chapter 7).  In addition, 1941 was chosen as a
benchmark because it is the closest thing to a pre-war economic peak for use
in comparison with 1929.  Field locates the sources of the 1930s
productivity advance in the maturation of the private R&D system and the
expansion of the surface road system.  Chapter 2 ends with a highly readable
narrative of how the improvement of America’s roads in the 1920s and 1930s
allowed commercial trucking to become a complement to the nation’s
long-haul railroads, raising the productivity of the transportation and
distribution sectors. He further shows that even if the public investments in
the transportation system are included in the capital stock in the
productivity calculations, the decade’s record TFP performance in the PNE
sector still holds (pp. 62-65).

Field’s discovery that the long 1930s (1929-1941) were “the most
technologically progressive decade” in U.S. history raises questions about
many other interpretations, including the roles of World War II advances and
“catching up” growth in the postwar period, the importance of General
Purpose Technologies (GPT), and the protean qualities some assign to
investment in capital equipment as opposed to structures. In the 1930s, none
of the technologies singled out in the recent literature on GPTs was
especially prominent.  And while the stock of capital equipment did increase
on net (unlike that of structures), its growth was slow.  Drawing on these
lessons from the 1930s, Field develops extended critiques in Chapters 8 and 9
respectively, of the validity of the De Long-Summers equipment hypothesis and
the value of the GPT concept.  It might have been possible to shine similar
light on the literature on intellectual property rights -- patenting activity
slumped in the 1930s in contrast to Field’s findings on TFP.

In his main analysis, Field focuses on the private non-farm economy, which
excludes the government sector, agriculture, and in many if not all cases,
the implicit rental services flowing from owner-occupied housing.  This
treatment of the agricultural sector is, from this reviewer’s perspective,
unfortunate.  The sector was large, representing about one-tenth of national
income and one-fifth of the labor force in 1929.  Statistics about its
performance are readily available.  The 1930s were known as the beginning of
the biological revolution in U.S. farming, as highlighted by the rapid
adoption of hybrid corn.  So at first blush, adding agriculture should
support his story.  But the decade’s low rate of reallocation of labor out
of the farm jobs into more productive employment elsewhere would tend to work
the other way.

At times, Field extends his analysis within and beyond the PNE sector.  The
impact of shifting benchmark dates is evaluated. These shifts require making
statistical adjustments and refinements to the existing series, which are
explained with great care.  Field’s clear writing style allows the
interested reader to follow the calculations in detail.  One consequence of
these efforts to place the 1930s experience into context is that Field
re-examines the nineteenth century record of productivity growth.  The
standard account, offered by Moses Abramovitz and Paul David, is that rapid
TFP growth was a twentieth-century phenomenon.  While Abramovitz and David
report TFP grew only 0.5 percent per annum over the 1855-1905 period, Field
uncovers a more impressive growth record over the 1871-1892 subperiod, one
fitting Alfred Chandler’s well-known account of the rise of modern business
enterprise and Vaclav Smil’s recent narrative of the diverse stream of
great innovations of the Second Industrial Revolution.  In Field’s
retelling of the U.S. economic history, periods of war -- including the Civil
War, World War I, and World War II -- exhibit the weakest performances.

The final section of /A Great Leap Forward/ draws on the lessons of the Great
Depression to consider the causes and consequences of the Great Slump of
today.  The chapters compare the sources of financial fragility in the
2007-2009 period with those of 1927-1933 and then trace the course of
investment by type of capital over the interwar period, and contrast the
uncontrolled land development of the 1920s and its overhang in the 1930s with
the real estate boom and bust of the 2000s.  The section finally turns to
timely question: do economic downturns have silver linings? Field shows
during the 1930s, economic adversity shocked the railroad sector into making
productivity-enhancing adjustments.  But such cases are hard to come by and
Field is not optimistic that bad times “pave the way to a better
tomorrow” (p. 311).

The “new growth narrative” offered in /A Great Leap Forward/ allows
readers to see the familiar in a different way.  It promises to become the
standard, stimulating the next wave of reassessments of the American
productivity record.

Paul Rhode is the author (with Alan L. Olmstead) of /Creating Abundance:
Biological Innovation and American Agricultural Development/ (Cambridge
University Press, 2008).

Copyright (c) 2011 by EH.Net. All rights reserved. This work may be copied
for non-profit educational uses if proper credit is given to the author and
the list. For other permission, please contact the EH.Net Administrator
([log in to unmask]). Published by EH.Net (December 2011). All EH.Net
reviews are archived at http://www.eh.net/BookReview.

Geographic Location: North America
Subject: Economic Development, Growth, and Aggregate Productivity
Time: 19th Century, 20th Century: Pre WWII, 20th Century: WWII and post-WWII

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