First to dispense of some distracting preliminaries.  By observing that
social science research is ideologically infused -- and I believe this
was clear from context -- I meant no respect to social scientists, nor
did I intend to introduce anything that might not be expected to be a
commonplace on the SHOE list.  I have in mind only the usual observations
in the history of science and in the history of economics.  In context,
I was saying that the fact we can detect indeological influences in the
writings of von Mises is not a reason to discard his *arguments*. To
invoke von Mises ideology as a reason to discard his arguments is, as
I said, simply argumentum ad hominem (by the usual definition).

John Médaille appears to misunderstand the function of words in
philosophy and social science.  He accuses Mises of Humpty Dumptyism.
But  Humpty Dumpty does not tell us how he is using a term unless
we ask, so this is almost the opposite of the truth.  Mises seizes existing
words for new uses, but tells us up front how he intends to use them.  This is
standard practice in philosophy and social science; the days in which
people believe that somehow a word had an essential meaning beyond its
use are long gone, and we no longer spend time asking whether, as John puts
it, a definition is "true".  A definition is just a definition, and it
proves its usefulness in use.  As I mentioned, economists have commandeered
terms like 'utility' and 'rationality' in the same way, so that they use
these words in ways that naturally puzzle the unindoctrinated.

John proposes that "when we move from the world of pure forms to the worlds
of matter and human intentionality, there are no axioms", which sounds
puzzlingly axiomatic.  And it is also wrong.  Hard science and social science
both lean heavily on mathematics, which is heavily axiomatized.  The question
is not whether we will invoke axioms -- say the axioms of sentential logic
-- when doing social science, the question is whether axiomatic approach of
praxeology can help us do better social science.  I am not taking a position
on this, but in order to even discuss it, we need to have some understanding
of what praxeologists were saying, and we cannot have that if we insist that
they are not permitted to use words *as they defined them* in laying out their
arguments.

John proposes what we examine human behavior "without preconceived notions
or arbitrary 'axioms'".  Approaching any subject without preconceived notions
is I think generally granted to be impossible, so I suppose he means that we
should keep an open mind.  Yes, I would urge that.  I can agree that avoiding
arbitrary axioms is generally a good idea, although I suspect the history of
mathematics will offer some conflicting cases.  However, to offer this as
a retort in the current conversation is to presume that the axioms of praxeology
are arbitrary, and that remains a case to be made.

Alan Isaac






John Médaille <[log in to unmask]> wrote:
> Dr. Issac says, "Methodologically, I find it hard to criticize someone for saying how they will use a term." I agree. I affirm the right of L. Mises
> or H. Dumpty to use a word in any way they choose; to have it mean whatever they choose it to mean. But what is less clear is why they would think
> that imposed an obligation on anyone else to accept that definition as normative, or as true. You can impose a definition on yourself, but not on
> others. The real question, however, is whether the definition is true, whether contented people are really incapable of action. The proper way to
> answer that question is to consult the sciences that deal with human actions. I am more than willing to change my mind on the question. If you will
> merely show me the studies from psychologists which demonstrate that contented people are immobile, I will repent of obstinate opinion. But I will not
> accept a thing as so merely because you have defined as such. That is not the method of science, but the method of ideology.
>
> Dr. Issac continues, "Spontaneous jumping for joy does not fall into the category of purposeful behavior," Really? Why not? But okay. Let's leave it
> there. But suppose I sang for joy? Or danced for joy? Or kissed my wife for joy? I know that all of these are possible because I have done them all;
> would you exclude them all from "purposeful behavior"? On what grounds? They certainly seemed purposeful. If your theory of action is correct, if only
> discontent can move us to action, then every time I kissed my wife, she would have to ask, "What's wrong?"
>
> Dr. Issac: "I trust it is obvious that such a view encounters problems dealing with logic and mathematics," But I specifically mentioned those two as
> axiomatic because they deal with pure forms, and the relationships between those forms; they have no material or intentional content. But when we move
> from the world of pure forms to the worlds of matter and human intentionality, there are no axioms; we have to discover, scientifically, the rules for
> action, and can only do so by examining human behavior without preconceived notions or arbitrary "axioms." And we certainly can't determine that a
> thing is true by merely defining it as such.
>
> Dr. Issac agrees with me when he says, "You might separately argue that ideology infuses Mises's writings, and I'd agree." But then he goes on to say,
> "the same is true of most social scientists." Really? That's a pretty heavy charge. On what grounds do you make such a serious accusation? Or have you
> merely defined it as so?
>
> Finally, Dr. Issac avers, "to urge dismissal of his work on this basis is argument ad hominem," Really? Not by any definition of ad hominem that I am
> aware of. But then again, when some people use a word, it means exactly what they choose it to mean.
>
> Back to grading papers!
>
> John
>
>
> On Fri, Dec 12, 2014 at 11:24 AM, Alan G Isaac <[log in to unmask] <mailto:[log in to unmask]>> wrote:
>
>     In my view your comment is descriptively incorrect and methodologically misguided.
>     Descriptively, as I quoted before, he defines contentment as "that *state* of a
>     human being which does not and cannot result in any action".  As he makes clear,
>     there can be other sources of non-action.  Methodologically, I find it hard to
>     criticize someone for saying how they will use a term.  Now you may argue that
>     this usage is misleading because it commandeers a common word with other
>     connotations, but this is common in economics as well as in other fields.
>     (Consider "utility" or "rational expectations".)
>
>     Now what about your "jumping for joy" example?  Remember for Mises, action is *purposeful*
>     behavior. (I.e., not all behavior is action.)  Spontaneous jumping for joy does not fall into
>     the category of purposeful behavior, for Mises.  (I'll leave it for Miseans to correct me.)
>     However, a politician might feign jumping for joy in order to achieve a political goal,
>     and this would of course constitute action.  Similarly, if I *choose* to jump for joy rather
>     than say hugging the bearer of good tidings, because it better serves my goal of expressing
>     my inner state of gratitude, that is also action. For Mises, action is a broad category,
>     but it does not encompass all behavior.
>
>     As for your equation of axiomatic thinking to ideological thinking, I trust it is
>     obvious that such a view encounters problems dealing with logic and mathematics,
>     both of which have additionally demonstrated their pragmatic utility.  Naturally, pointing
>     out this shortcoming of your claim does not constitute a defense of praxeology.
>     You might separately argue that ideology infuses Mises's writings, and I'd agree.
>     Of course the same is true of most social scientists.  And to urge dismissal of his work on
>     this basis is argument ad hominem, rather than a grappling with his work.
>
>     Alan Isaac
>
>
>
>     John Médaille <[log in to unmask] <mailto:[log in to unmask]>> wrote:
>
>         He handles the problem definitionally; he defines contentment as "non-action." ​But surely, such a methodology is disallowed in science.
>
>
>
> --
> John C. Médaille
>
> /A dead thing can go with the stream...
> Only a living thing can go against it.
>                           -/G. K. Chesterton
>
> Toward a Truly Free Market: A Distributist Perspective
> <http://www.amazon.com/Toward-Truly-Free-Market-Distributist/dp/1935191810/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1280082231&sr=1-2>
> The Vocation of Business: Social Justice in the Marketplace
> <http://www.amazon.com/Vocation-Business-Social-Justice-Marketplace/dp/0826428096/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1280082193&sr=8-1>
> The Distributist Review <http://distributistreview.com/mag/>
> The Remnant Newspaper <http://www.remnantnewspaper.com/index.htm>
>