I suppose we've now entered the 'naked' phase of anti-Austrianism? ;-)

Defining (demarcating) economics as the study of the effects/results/outcomes of action is 'ducking' psychological issues in the same sense that studying biology is 'ducking' physics. We're talking about specialized sciences, so I don't see the issue with letting those specializations have boundaries. 

Also, I noted earlier that Austrian economics makes a different claim than modern neoclassical economics; the former starts with action and attempts to explain what happens, while the latter (at least recently) tends to dig into the drivers or triggers of action. Those are very different aims (or, more loosely, aims), yet the critique seems to come back to the attempt to force Austrian theory into the neoclassical framework - and thereby show that it doesn't hold water. I don't see the relevance of this. How is that anything but a dishonest attempt to knock down Austrian economics? (I'm opposed only to the 'dishonest' part; any theory should be able to defend itself to legitimate, honest criticism.)

Let's see where we're at in this subthread's discussion on the definition of action:
1) John Medaille claim Mises 'redefined a horse as a cow' as he doesn't use the words as in ordinary language
2) I shared Mises's definition as stated in his magnum opus Human Action
3) Rob Tye counters that Mises definitionally is only 'retreating into ordinary language'. 

Any suggestions for how one can properly respond to this?


Per


Dr. Per L. Bylund | Entrepreneurship | Hankamer School of Business
Research Professor | Baugh Center for Entrepreneurship & Free Enterprise 
Baylor University | One Bear Place #98011 | Waco, TX 76798-8011
p  573.268.3235| w  www.PerBylund.com | e  [log in to unmask]

-----Original Message-----
From: Societies for the History of Economics [mailto:[log in to unmask]] On Behalf Of Rob Tye
Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2014 2:30 AM
To: [log in to unmask]
Subject: Re: [SHOE] happiness vs. GDP

Contra Per Bylund, surely the  psychological and social dynamics associated
with brain activity lie way beyond contemporary science, and the Mises
definition ducks these problems by retreating into ordinary language,
creating a definition which appears absurdly simplistic -  to me, and I
guess anyone with a scientific outlook.  Thus the request for some
alternative quick fix definition from John Medaille - which would inevitably
be just as simplistic - is unfair.

Bylund and Isaac however might reasonably defend Mises with the argument -
if a job is worth doing it is worth doing badly.  

And the reply to that argument is to ask - how badly? John Medaille seems to
suggest Mises does the job very badly indeed - introducing a socially
damaging ideology.  Sounds initially plausible, but I would welcome a few
more words on that matter from John.

Rob Tye