SHOE Archives

Societies for the History of Economics

SHOE@YORKU.CA

Options: Use Forum View

Use Monospaced Font
Show Text Part by Default
Show All Mail Headers

Message: [<< First] [< Prev] [Next >] [Last >>]
Topic: [<< First] [< Prev] [Next >] [Last >>]
Author: [<< First] [< Prev] [Next >] [Last >>]

Print Reply
Subject:
From:
[log in to unmask] (Peter J. Boettke)
Date:
Fri Mar 31 17:19:17 2006
Content-Type:
text/plain
Parts/Attachments:
text/plain (94 lines)
================= HES POSTING ================= 
 
I would have to say that Roy Weintraub's argument is of course 
correct.  Those working on the history of economic thought ought to write 
in a manner that aspires to the best work in intellectual history 
and history of science. 
 
That much said, history of thought serves several purposes in the 
curriculum of economists which are not limited to the scholarly 
enterprise of intellectual history.  On this point, I would simply 
point to Mitchell's "On the study of the economic classics," in 
_Types of Economic Theory_ or Viner's "A modest plea for some stress 
on scholarship in graduate training" in _Essays on the Intellectual 
History of Economics_.  Recognizing the multiple purposes for which 
the history of economic thought can serve does not undermine 
Weintraub's basic point -- which is that a legitimate contribution to 
the history of economic thought must be the type of work which is 
historically persausive to _historians_. 
 
There is also the problem of the Whigism of modern economics -- which 
has undermined the recognition of both the scholarly merits and 
educational value of the history of economic thought.  What are we to 
do about that?  Well, in the early pages of HOPE Kenneth Boulding 
wrote a wonderful essay "After Samuelson, Who Needs Smith?" -- the 
basic thesis is that we all do.  Why?  Because Adam Smith is part of 
the "extended present".  If that is so, then history of thought can 
be a legitimate tool in contemporary theory construction.  This is 
not a contribution to history, but to conceptual clarification, 
perspective, judgement, etc.  Wasn't this what Viner produced in his 
_Studies in Theory of International Trade_?  Viner wrote essays that 
lived in both worlds -- serious intelletual history that met the 
standards of historians, and yet, was able to glean from this work a 
perspective and judgement for theory development.  What is wrong with 
this type of work? 
 
Some of the most exciting work in contemporary history of thought has 
been produced by Robert Leonard who is making a contribution not just 
to economics, but to our broad understanding of the cultural 
underpinnings.  He has tuned us in to the broader movements within 
which subsets of economic theory emerged.  It is great stuff.  But so 
is the work of people like M. Rutherford's book on _Institutions in 
Economics_ -- which is not history, but instead highlights through 
the aid of history of thought lingering problems with which any attempt to 
incorporate institutions within a research program in economics must 
cope. [I apologize to Rob and Malcolm for using their work as examples, it is 
just that I find it easier to think about these issues in concrete 
rather than abstract conversation about standards]. I'd like to write 
some papers along the lines that Rob is developing, but I am also 
working on a book at the moment on the theory of comparative 
political economy which tries to use history of thought as an aid in 
constructing an alternative theoretical framework and research 
program -- redirecting attention in some cases and rediscoverying 
older themes in others.  The theoretical debates of the past -- some 
very distant -- are important because they are part of the extended 
present as Boulding taught.  Maybe the ancients knew more than the 
moderns on some issues, if so then we need to incorporate that.  Of 
course that is not a contribution _to_ history of thought, rather it 
is consuming history of thought for a research purpose rather than 
hobby. 
 
The either/or type reasoning or tone that I read in Roy's statement 
(maybe I am wrong) would only have historians of economics pursuing 
history of science type work, and forget the use of history of 
thought (discovering dead ends, redirecting the path of development, 
etc.) for theory construction.  While certainly conceding his point 
about standards, why isn't it legitimate to see the 
need for both exercises and to admit that different standards apply? 
 
Peter J. Boettke 
Assistant Professor of Economics 
Department of Economics 
New York University 
269 Mercer Street 
New York, NY 10003 
phone: (212) 998-8900 
fax: (212) 995-4186 
email: [log in to unmask] 
alternative email: [log in to unmask] 
web: http://www.econ.nyu.edu/user/boettke 
 
============ FOOTER TO HES POSTING ============ 
For information, send the message "info HES" to [log in to unmask] 
 
 
______________________________________________________ 
 Department of Economics         426 Decio Hall 
 University of Notre Dame        (219)631-6979 (O) 
 Notre Dame, IN 46556            (219)631-8809 (F) 
 
 http://www.nd.edu:80/~esent     mailto:[log in to unmask] 
______________________________________________________ 
 
 

ATOM RSS1 RSS2