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I have waited to enter the discussion about Stigler because I wanted the 
few extra minutes that a weekend affords to put my ideas together clearly. 
So I'm sorry if this comes a bit late. 
 
Brad has made it clear that his comments regarding Stigler were focused on 
Stigler's "bad history"; and Robert has identified how Stigler used his 
sociology of knowledge to good effect in the Chicago/Cambridge dispute. 
Both seem to have agreed that they were talking about two different things. 
I disagree. 
 
I want to argue that Stigler's sociology of knowledge was an integral part 
of his historiography, and is responsible for what Brad identifies as his 
"bad history." 
 
In the context of his discussion of J.S. Mill, Stigler remarks that the 
meaning of a dead economist's text is not determined by what the dead 
economist intended to say, but rather by the community of economists who 
read and use the dead economist's text. Those familiar with contemporary 
"reader-response" literary theory may be surprised that Stigler's remark 
was made in the 1960s, well before Fish and others popularized the notion 
that interpretative communities are the only carriers of meaning for a text. 
 
In Stigler's case, however, the openness to multiple readings of texts that 
contemporary reader-response theory celebrates is rejected in favour of the 
notion that a **particular interpretative community** has the right to 
exercise authoritative control over the meaning assigned a dead economist's 
text. The principle that the scientific community of economics exercises 
control over the interpretation of meaning of economist's text is best 
articulated in Stigler's essay "Textual Exegesis as a Scientific Problem" 
(Economica, Nov. 1965: 447-50) where he writes: 
 
        "The test of an interpretation is its consistency with the main 
analytical conclusions of the system of thought under consideration. If the 
main conclusions of the system of thought do not survive under one 
interpretation, and do under another, the latter interpretation must be 
preferred. (The analogy to maximum likelihood is evident.) 
        "This rule of interpretation is designed to maximize the value of a 
theory to the science. The man's [sic] central theoretical position is 
isolated and stated in a strong form capable of contradictions by the 
facts. The net scientific contribution, if any, of the man's work is thus 
identified, amended if necessary, and rendered capable of evaluation and 
possible acceptance. This rule of consistency with the main conclusions may 
be called the principle of scientific exegesis." (p. 448). 
 
Stigler's principle of scientific exegesis could be called the proper 
method for creating rational reconstructions (when we want to be 
perjorative, we call this "Whig History"). This is the point Brad was 
making when he attacked Stigler's application of this principle -- if 
Stigler's work in the history of economic thought is judged by the 
standards of history, it is "bad history." 
 
But how does Stigler's principle of scientific exegesis relate to his 
sociology of knowledge? How can we connect Brad's point to Robert's? 
 
Notice that Stigler's principle accepts as given the existence of a 
generally agreed-upon statement of "the main analytical conclusions of the 
system of thought under consideration". So we have knowledge of Ricardo's 
or Smith's "general position" which we use to judge competing rational 
reconstructions. The question is: who decides what Ricardo's general 
position is? The answer (for Stigler): the community of scientific 
economists. 
 
Here we see how the community of scientific economics functions as an 
"authoritative" interpretative community: there is a generally accepted 
reading of Ricardo, Smith, etc.  which functions as the screening mechanism 
for proposed interpretations of specific parts of these economists' work. 
"Goodness of fit" with the meaning ascribed by the interpretative community 
to the text is the historiographic basis for choosing among competing 
reconstructions of the work. 
 
And we come full circle: Stigler's sociology of knowledge informs his 
historiography, and the exercise of his exegetical principle supports his 
sociology of knowledge. 
 
Before I quit, let me suggest a parallel that will make sense to some 
members of HES: Stigler's principle of scientific exegesis is like the 
dominant Protestant principle of biblical interpretation -- the Analogia 
Scriptura (the analogy of Scripture). The Analogia Scriptura indicated that 
the interpretation of specific biblical passages was to be guided by the 
general message of the Scriptures: those interpretations which fit well 
with the general message were to be accepted, and those which did not were 
to be rejected. But who determined what the general meaning of the 
Scriptures was? Ah, but there's the rub . . . 
 
And today, when biblical scholars guided by interpretative principles 
accepted in another community (say, history for example!) create 
interpretations of biblical passages which do not accord with the Analogia 
Scriptura, what response do we expect from those within "the faith"? 
 
Would it not be the same as the response Stigler once gave to a proposed 
article about Smith: "I know Smith, and this is not the Smith I know"? 
 
Ross 
 
Ross B. Emmett                Editor, HES and CIRLA-L 
Augustana University College 
Camrose, Alberta CANADA   T4V 2R3 
voice: (403) 679-1517   fax: (403) 679-1129 
e-mail: [log in to unmask]  or  [log in to unmask] 
URL: http://www.augustana.ab.ca/~emmer 
 
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