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[log in to unmask] (Patrick Gunning)
Date:
Fri Mar 31 17:19:08 2006
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===================== HES POSTING ==================== 
 
 
Much of the recent discussion about what economic historians 
should do assumes that the readers of this forum know the meaning 
of Whig history, internal history, and external history. But my 
impression is that these terms have been used in different ways 
by different writers, sometimes rather sloppily. As a result, 
writers have talked past each other. I commend Ross Emmett for 
setting out his definitions for all to read and to try to 
understand. At the same time, I find the recommendations he makes 
regarding what historians should do unconvincing and his 
conclusion inconsistent with his definitions. 
 
     Ross defines "internal history" as "rational reconstructions 
of the logic of argumentation used by historical figures." He 
does not like internal history when it becomes equivalent to Whig 
history. A Whig history is based on a decision by the historian 
about which of several competing viewpoints of those ideas is 
"victorious." (I think Ross means to say "better.") In his view, 
the historian should be free to choose which standards or modes 
of argumentative logic he/she will use. Whig history, in his 
view, takes away that freedom. The Whig historian claims that 
there is one correct standard or mode of argumentation that must 
be used in making reconstructions. Ross does not call the Whig 
historian "arrogant" but to do so would be consistent with his 
line of argument. In any case, Ross rejects Whig history because 
of its absolutism and, in so doing, is led to RELATIVISM. 
     Although he is led to relativism, he decides not to deal 
with it. That is, he decides not to confront relativism with its 
antithesis: absolutism. Instead, he ends his remarks with the 
statement that "there is little or nothing INTERESTING that can 
be said about Truth, but lots of INTERESTING things to say about 
how and why specific economists made the arguments and claims 
they did."(italics added) 
     Thus, in addition to defining the various histories, Ross's 
letter is a plea for relativism. I think that his plea is 
unconvincing. Ross seems to be well aware that if one wavers on 
relativism, one would have to admit the possibility that a 
particular Whig historian or a particular "internal historian" 
might be CORRECT in his judgment that a particular idea, logical 
argumentation, or rational reconstruction is BETTER and that it 
therefore DESERVES TO WIN.  And if one admits this possibility, 
one would have to grant provisional credence to the historian who 
claims that he/she studies these things because they are closer 
to the truth than competing ideas. More concretely, one would 
have to provisionally admit that some professional historians 
might be wasting their time, since they are doing reconstructions 
of ideas that are incorrect; while other historians are using 
their time productively since they are doing reconstructions of 
ideas that are correct. Finally, one would have to subscribe to 
the operational principle that to do a conscientious history of 
economics, one would have to try personally to judge the 
correctness of ideas. Since Ross does not admit these 
possibilities, he subscribes to relativism. 
     As I see it, the fundamental division between Ross's and my 
notion of what an economic historian ought to do is this. In his 
view, the historian should study ideas because they are 
interesting. I believe that the historian should study ideas 
because they are a window to the truth. Ross (implicitly) rejects 
the view that the different human minds possesses the same 
capacity for discriminating between truth and untruth in ideas, 
in logical argumentation, and in judging rational 
reconstructions. I accept this view. I believe that the logic 
that I use is the same as the logic that every other normal human 
being uses. And, because of this, I believe that I cannot only be 
persuasive but LOGICALLY convincing. Beyond this -- and 
anticipating the response that my position comes from arrogance -- I 
claim that it is the RELATIVIST who is arrogant, since he/she 
rejects what every normal human being accepts in his/her everyday 
interaction with others -- namely, that through reason combined 
with experience, he/she can arrive at a more true understanding of 
other human beings. 
     If I agreed with Ross, I might as well go dancing. For 
dancing is more interesting to me than the fads and fancies of 
certified professional historians. 
 
     There also seems to be an inconsistency in Ross's argument, 
although the matter may turn on a definition which he does not 
give. Ross does not define "rational reconstruction." But I would 
venture that to the typical reader, "rational" here implies 
"logical." And further that logical implies standards for 
discriminating between logical and illogical reconstructions. It 
would seem to follow that even Ross's non-Whiggish internal 
historian applies standards to judge whether a particular 
reconstruction is rational. Are such standards universal? Or are 
they relative? If Ross believes they are relative, he ought to 
bracket the term "rational." In that case, he would seemingly be 
left with the task of further clarifying his definition of Whig 
history and internal history. Or perhaps he should omit the term 
"rational" altogether. However, if he rejects bracketing the 
term or omits it, his plea for relativism would seem unfounded at 
least insofar as logic is concerned. 
     Of course, Ross may not want to construct logically 
convincing arguments at all, either in his history or in his 
letters to HES. The consummate relativist would reject the notion 
that "logical" or "rational" has a specific meaning. "There are 
all kinds of logic and all kinds of rationality," he/she would 
argue, "and, unlike the arrogant absolutists, I am a humble 
gatherer of facts and teller of stories." How does he/she choose 
among which facts to study and which stories to tell? I guess it 
depends on his/her interest -- i.e., it depends on what he/she 
finds interesting. The consummate relativist would be unperturbed 
by a comment that his/her writing is logically unconvincing. 
 
-- 
Pat Gunning 
http://stsvr.showtower.com.tw/~gunning/welcome 
http://web.nchulc.edu.tw/~gunning/pat/welcome 
 
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