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Douglas Irwin, _Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade_.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. 274 pp. Bibliography
and index. $29.95 (cloth). ISBN 0691011389
Reviewed for EH.Net by Brad De Long, Department of Economics,
University of California- Berkeley <[log in to unmask]>
Douglas Irwin has written the history of "free trade"--as an idea and
as an economic policy--for our generation. His dominant organizing
principle is that the move toward freer trade in economic policy has
been "against the tide"- that there have been lots of reasons
over the ages why free trade should not have triumphed as economic
policy, and that its triumph to date is somewhat miraculous: akin to
a river running uphill.
Mercantilism and Free Trade
Free trade as an idea was born in the shadow of mercantilism in
early modern Britain. It is not the case that before Adam Smith's
_Wealth of Nations_ thinkers rejected the idea of trade: the
notion that countries, like individuals, stand to gain from
specialization (producing what they make best and most efficiently)
and exchange is powerful, fundamental, and obviously true. But before
Adam Smith thinkers overwhelmingly believed that imposing
delicately-calculated restrictions on international commerce could
boost an economy's resources and achieve important non-economic goals
as well. For example, even Adam Smith wrote that "defense is more
important than opulence."
It is hard from our current perspective to make much sense of the
mercantilist writers. They were aggressively pro-export--sharply
critical of restrictions that limited export. Irwin sees their
doctrines as having four components:
A moral argument that foreign-produced luxuries were not worth
consuming, and that the state should (for the good of those who
would buy French fripperies if unrestrained) restrict imports of
foreign-produced luxuries.
An unemployment-equilibrium argument that allowing imports to
increase would throw people out of work.
A belief that manufacturing should be promoted to enhance
economic development--perhaps with some recognition that this
argument required that the benefits to society from expanding
manufacturing be greater than the profits to the manufacturer.
Non-economic goals: "defense more important than opulence."
Against mercantilism, Adam Smith established a strong presumption in favor
of the economic benefits of free trade. David Ricardo nailed the case down
with his exposition of "comparative advantage." Ever since trying to
construct a coherent intellectual case for trade protection has been like
trying to roll Sisyphus's stone up the hill.
This is not to say that people have not tried. The case for free
trade is not absolute. It is limited by:
Worries about the distributional effects of trade--in which
case free trade can boost real national product but erode social
welfare if it shifts the distribution of income and wealth in an
unfavorable direction.
Worries about the effect of free trade on the
terms-of-trade--in which case finely-tuned protectionist measures
that erode the total surplus from trade can nevertheless garner a
larger surplus for the home country (under the assumption that
foreign governments do not retaliate).
Worries about the effect of free trade on high-externality
industries--in which case policies that restrict trade might boost
external benefits by more than enough to offset the lost gains
from trade.
But as Irwin eloquently argues, all these limitations of the case
for free trade are fragile. In many cases trade protection is a poor
second-best policy, to be avoided because there are other more direct
and less costly alternative policies that will produce higher
economic welfare. In other cases, close scrutiny reveals that the
reasons for rejecting free trade "have foundered under the weight of
the manifold qualifications that narrow the range of circumstances
under which the argument is valid.... [For example] the strategic use
of trade policy to shift rents between countries... hinges critically
upon numerous assumptions about competitive behavior and market
structure."
Irwin thus concludes--I believe correctly--that arguments for
protection are fragile and frail compared with the presumption that
free trade is a good thing. To do better than free trade requires an
enormous amount of knowledge and policy-making skill on the part of
the government, skill that can only make things a little bit better
if protectionist policies are properly applied--but could make things
a lot worse if misapplied.
The Rent-Seeking Society
However strong the _intellectual_ case for free trade, the
victory of free trade as an economic _policy_ is still quite
surprising. We can run through--Irwin runs through--the standard
rent-seeking society arguments:
Beneficiaries from protection know who they are.
Each beneficiary from protection gains a lot more than each
consumer loses.
Beneficiaries from protection can organize easily.
The logic of politics is not the logic of market exchange--but
the logic of power exercised, and identifiable favors done for
those who can someday return them.
For all these reasons, governments seeking to assemble coalitions
of politically powerful elites _should_ be powerfully
attracted by individual protectionist proposals. There is a principle
that the set of economists is dense in the space of possible
policies: for every small number epsilon, for every policy theta,
there is someone who can wear a tie, speak with authority on
television, and make semi-coherent arguments that some policy that is
within epsilon of theta is in fact optimal. When the stakes are large
the returns to being a tame politician or a tame intellectual for
protectionist interests are large too, and the labor market works
well enough that demand calls forth supply--and we have Pat Choate
claiming with an apparently straight face that five million American
manufacturing jobs are "at risk" if the United States lowers its
tariffs on Mexican imports from an average level of 3% to zero.
And it was here that I found myself wishing that Douglas Irwin had
written a slightly different book. For I do not believe that the
production and reproduction of intellectual arguments proceeds
independently of the rest of social life, and I think the links
between the strength of protectionist ideas and the potential
benefits to those with the wherewithal to fund the creation and
distribution of protectionist ideas are very strong and very
interesting. But Irwin remains at the level of the intellect. He does
not descend to the sociology of ideology at all--and I think that
what is a very good book is less than the Platonic Ideal of a history
of free trade because of its limited scope.
In addition, there is powerful feedback from the political economy
back to the case for free trade. The very strength of the
political-economic pressures toward protection generated in a
rent-seeking society serves to powerfully reinforce the case for free
trade. Douglas Irwin quotes Paul Krugman that the most powerful case
for free trade today "'is not the old argument that free trade is
optimal because markets are efficient' but rather 'it is a
sadder-but-wiser argument for free trade as a rule-of-thumb in a
world whose politics are as imperfect as its markets.... to abandon
the free-trade principle in pursuit of the gains from sophisticated
intervention could therefore open the door to adverse political
consequences that would outweigh the potential gains.'"
The Future
Irwin concludes his book with a resounding triumphalist sentence:
"Yet if the historical experiences described here continue, free
trade will remain one of the most durable and robust propositions
that economic analysis has to offer for the conduct of economic
policy."
I find myself much more pessimistic--not that I think that free
trade does not deserve to flourish, but that I doubt that it will
flourish. There are two reasons to be skeptical of the future of free
trade:
The first reason is that the East Asian economies that have grown
so impressively in the past two generations have not been committed
to free trade. There are arguments that they have been committed to
free trade in what matters most for production (if not for consumer
welfare): "a free-trade regime for exports and for imports for
exporting industries" is the phrase often used. There are arguments
that they have been lucky not to have been badly hurt by their
deviations from free trade. There are arguments that they have
managed to find a set of trade restrictions that actually does
promote high-externality activities and rapid growth.
Which is true is unclear.
What is clear is that for the next generation opponents of free
trade will say: "Japan, Korea, Taiwan, etc. did not adopt free
trade--and look how fast they grew." And at the level of economic
policymaking and public ideology, this statement has the potential to
erode a lot of support for free trade.
The second reason is that arguments for protection today hinge
much more on the duties that first world consumers owe third world
workers than on the links between protection and first world
prosperity. Does the restriction of imports that violate fair labor
standards give employers in developing countries the right incentives
to improve working conditions and boost social welfare? Or does it
just destroy jobs in developing countries--making the life chances of
the poor even worse? It is not clear. But consumers in the first
world do have moral obligations toward workers in developing
countries, and the economic theory of free trade sheds little light
on what policies are best in light of these moral obligations.
Brad De Long
Department of Economics
University of California- Berkeley
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