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H-NET BOOK REVIEW Published by [log in to unmask] (January, 1999)
David M. Hart. _Forged Consensus: Science, Technology, and Economic
Policy in the United States, 1921-1953_. Princeton Studies in American
Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998. xiv + 267
pp. Notes, bibliography, and index. $39.95 (cloth), ISBN 0-691-02667-X.
Reviewed for H-Pol by Mark Aldrich <[log in to unmask]>, Smith College
This slim volume, the result of the author's Ph.D. thesis, reveals
impressive research in archives and other primary materials as well as
wide reading in the secondary literature on science and technology
policy. In the Preface, the author states that his goal is "to undermine
the field's creation myth" (p. ix), which says "postwar science and
technology policy sprang full blown from the mind of Vannevar Bush." The
consensus on policy was, he claims, a forgery. Hart stresses that policy
explanations resting on transactions cost economics or the "liberal
society tradition" are inadequate, and he argues instead that policy
evolved from the interplay of five alternative visions of the liberal
state that he labels conservatism, associationalism, reform liberalism,
Keynesianism, and the national security state.
Hart's analysis of these events tends to be externalist. That is,
economics and broader policy visions, rather than scientific or
technological discoveries, are the primary forces shaping policy. He
begins with the "New Era." From 1921-1932, the conservative vision was
paramount, of course. But Hart also traces the influence of Hoover's
associationalist ideas, discussing a range of policy initiatives such as
the efforts of the Bureau of Standards to encourage research and
rationalization in textiles, housing, and lumber.
Concerning the early 1930s, Hart tells a complex story, interweaving the
technocracy movement, associationalist schemes of Gerard Swope and
others, and the efforts of reform liberals such as Rexford Tugwell and
David Lilienthal. Such a disparate group of actors led to both profusion
and confusion as policy initiatives ranged from share-the-work efforts
and NRA codes, to the abortive Committee on National Railway Research,
to TVA. In the late 1930s, Hart turns the spotlight to the efforts of
reform liberals such as Thurman Arnold, and the TNEC to prevent patent
holders from suppressing new technology. He also traces a brief alliance
between the liberals and Keynesians to reform housing.
After 1940, Hart describes the rise of military R&D and the role of
Vannevar Bush in the National Research Defense Committee and Office of
Scientific Research. He also chronicles the abortive efforts of Maury
Maverick and Henry Wallace to develop an expansive program of government
funded civilian R&D service.
The end of the war brought a "convergence"--a term Hart prefers to
consensus (p. 147)--in science and technology policy. Reformers and
associationalists allied to push through the National Science Foundation
in 1950 and to campaign for federal support of venture capital--which
led to the Small Business Investment Act of 1958. The massive postwar
commitment of resources to military R&D Hart traces to a complex of
causes. The memory of wartime strategic bombing as effectively
articulated by General Curtis LeMay and others, along with conservative
fears of regimentation and giant spending programs, led to the gradual
triumph of massive retaliation and the militarization of the AEC. Oddly,
however, he devotes relatively little time to the Manhattan Project or
to groups such as the Federation of American Scientists who would
ultimately prove important in mobilizing the anti-nuclear movement.[1]
Then, in 1950, Korea relaxed the budget constraints and the national
security state was born, propped up by military spending and fed by the
technological spillover from military R&D.
This thumbnail sketch omits much detail, for Hart's analysis is far
richer than one can summarize in a few paragraphs. The analysis of
events is usually persuasive; no one writing on American science policy
can afford to ignore it. For me, the most valuable insight was his
stress on the continuing role of associationalism long after its heyday
in the 1920s. Of course, there are weaknesses, and I have several
quibbles and comments on ways I think the analysis could have been
strengthened.
First, the quibbles. No one I have read, including Bruce Smith, ever
claimed that post war policy was entirely the creation of Vannevar
Bush.[2] Hyperbole aside, it would also have helped if Hart had stated
the elements of the "consensus." As Bruce Smith summarized it, there
were four tenants: 1) basic research was a federal responsibility, 2)
applied research would also be an important government responsibility,
3) commercialization would be virtually automatic, and 4) some minimal
regulation would be necessary.[3]
There are, however, several more serious weaknesses. Despite Hart's
claim that he has cast a broader empirical net than earlier authors,
there are curious omissions. There is no discussion at all of science in
the Department of Agriculture or of the Public Health Service (PHS) or
of the founding of the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Moreover,
the long campaign that culminated in the NIH, as recently described by
Victoria Harden, both confirms and qualifies Hart's analytic scheme. She
too depicts the interplay of associationalists, reformers, and others in
the origin of NIH, but she casts an even broader net to include agency
scientists, bureaucrats, scientific associations, women's groups,
individual companies, and others.[4] Nor does Hart discuss the impact of
the regulation (except for anti-trust). Yet work on the ICC, FDA and
other agencies suggests that regulation significantly shaped
technological change.[5]
I am also skeptical that Hart's category "Keynesian" is very useful. As
he acknowledges at one point, "Science and technology played an
ambiguous part in Keynesian thought" (p. 22). He then goes on to note
that "WW II...detached Keynesianism from reform liberalism" (p. 23), and
in the post war years it came to rationalize military spending. I would
go a good deal farther: there is nothing in Keynesian analysis to lead
one to any particular view of science and technology policy or any other
sort of spending. Some who called themselves Keynesians no doubt urged a
more ambitious role for Federal R&D spending. But no doubt so did some
who called themselves Presbyterians. As Hart notes, tax cuts and
military spending are just as compatible with Keynesian analysis. In
fact, macro economists in general ignored technology until Robert
Solow's famous 1957 paper--done in the neoclassical mode and cited by
Hart--pointed to its importance.
Finally, although Hart briefly notes the technocracy movement of the
1930s, there is little in his analysis to foreshadow the rise of
environmental concerns and the anti-technology counterculture of the
1970s. This results, I think, from his omission of the work of the
Public Health Service and Food and Drug Administration (FDA) as well as
the origins of anti nuclear activism in the FAS. Yet as Christopher
Sellers has argued, there are direct links between PHS-FDA scientific
investigations of workplace toxics in the 1930s and environmental
movement in the postwar years.[6]
Notes
[1]. For the early efforts of the Federation of the American Scientists
to prevent military domination of atomic power see Daniel Kevles, _The
Physicists_ (Vintage, 1979), Chapter 22.
[2]. Bruce Smith, _American Science Policy Since World War II_
(Brookings, 1990). What Smith actually said (p. 36) was "The Bush
report...perhaps comes closest to summarizing many elements of the
consensus, but even it is incomplete."
[3]. Smith, _American Science Policy_, pp. 36-37.
[4]. Victoria Harden, _Inventing the NIH_ (Johns Hopkins, 1986).
[5]. On the role of the Bureau of Mines see Joseph Pratt, "Letting the
Grandchildren Do It: Environmental Planning During the Ascent of Oil as
a Major Energy Source," _Public Historian_ 2 (Summer 1980: 28-61). For
the effects of regulation in shaping more recent technological change,
see William Capron, _Technological Change in Regulated Industries_
(Brookings, 1970) and Paul MacAvoy, _The Regulation of Transport
Innovation: The ICC and Unit Coal Trains to the East Coast_ (Random
House, 1967).
[6]. Christopher Sellers, _Hazards of the Job: From Industrial Disease
to Environmental Health Science_ (University of North Carolina, 1997).
This review was commissioned for H-Pol by Lex Renda <[log in to unmask]>
Copyright (c) 1999 by H-Net, all rights reserved. This work may be
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