Jim asks why anyone should accept a proposed "conceptual framework...as   
the single point of view from which to judge all knowledge and error."   
He goes on to argue that one cannot judge a "theoretical-conceptual   
framework" without looking at the past. Thus, the past is relevant to   
the goal of choosing among conceptual frameworks. It follows, he   
believes, that the argument of the Harvard chaps must be wrong. It seems   
to me, however, that this does not address the main argument.  
  
One need not look at the DISTANT past in order to choose among   
conceptual frameworks. It is possible that, in disregarding the distant   
past, one would overlook a superior framework. But there is no necessary   
reason to believe this. Can he or anyone give an example of a case where   
an overlooked conceptual framework of the distant became relevant?   
(Note: if one could do this, he would at the same time be providing an   
example of error in that those who had adopted alternative frameworks   
must have overlooked a superior one from the distant past.  
  
Nor does the argument that "mainstream economics," whatever one means by   
this, is increasingly pluralistic imply that the study of pluralism is   
worthwhile except as a pastime. There has been a proliferation of games   
and sports. Unless one can confidently assert that economics is   
something more than a game or sport, one would not expect the study of   
its pluralist history to yield anything more useful than a travel report   
from...well, Cambridge.  
  
Which takes me to the principal issue. The statement about the "Harvard   
economists" contains an implicit judgment about the goal of economics.   
What goal are they assuming? John Womack did not specify it. Yet without   
it, one cannot evaluate their statement.  
  
In natural science, it is possible to determine whether a particular   
method or conceptual framework helps one achieve a goal. One does not   
need omniscience to determine whether a rocket has reached Mars, as its   
designers, using some conceptual framework, intended. The presumption of   
the "Harvard economists" seems to be that a comparable goal exists in   
economics. It seems to me that this is why HESers are so disturbed by   
John's hearsay statement. They look with disdain upon those who believe   
that such a goal exists. HESers write vaguely about how those Harvard   
chaps must be wrong and they gain empathy from their professional   
colleagues. But they miss the point of the argument that the study of   
the history of economics is useless.  
  
By the way, I do not subscribe to the view that the study of HOT is   
useless. I am merely trying to get at the logic of a number of responses   
made by Jim and others.  
  
Pat Gunning