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It seems wise to begin my comment on Professor Henderson's editorial by 
identifying the class of ideas with which I assume the history of economics 
is concerned. The fundamental idea is that of how normal human beings 
interact under the conditions of the market economy. This includes the 
following ideas, among others: (a) ideas about the effects of an unexpected 
increase in the quantity of money, (b) ideas about the effects of 
government barriers on imports into a market economy, (c) ideas about the 
difference between interaction under conditions of competition and 
monopoly, (d) ideas about who receives the benefits of the market economy 
and (e) ideas about the effects of deficit government spending. 
 
        To highlight what seems at first to be the difference between my 
view of the history of economic thought and that of Professor Henderson, 
let me put myself in the shoes of a first-time, invisible visitor from 
outer space, who has an interest in the history of ideas like these. I 
might form two initial hypotheses. First, I might hypothesize that I would 
discover that the history represents the replacement of ideas that are less 
adequate with those that are more adequate. Second, I might hypothesize 
that the appearance and disappearance of ideas would represent no notion of 
adequacy but that it might inform me about the nature of the people who 
expressed the ideas. 
 
        (I will not in this short note express my criterion for judging 
adequacy. The interested reader can find an example at 
http://stsvr.showtower.com.tw/~gunning/subjecti/workpape/role_ent  My aim 
here is only to draw the attention to the difference between the two 
hypotheses.) 
 
        Professor Henderson seems to believe that the study of economic 
ideas will inform him about the people who had the ideas and that the 
primary focus ought to be on the people. I have no particular interest in 
the people unless they are in some way related to what I identify as 
contributions to the growth of ideas. Thus, I have no special interest in 
"sociologising" or "contextualising" ideas, although there may be some 
benefit in trying to distinguish social conditions under which growth 
occurred from those in which there was stagnation or regression. In 
addition, it may be necessary to sociologize and contextualize in order to 
avoid mistakes in the interpretation of statements. We don't want to make 
the error of attributing an idea to someone who did not have it, or vice 
versa. 
 
        Thus my aim of identifying cases of the "growth of ideas" differs 
significantly from Professor Henderson's apparent aim of studying people 
who have ideas. HESers can proceed with either aim. I would suggest, 
however, that the latter aim comes very close to RELATIVISM. In its most 
extreme form, relativists aim to convince us that all ideas are relative 
and that others who claim that ideas are absolute are misinformed and 
likely to be pompous and elitist. However, confidence that the human mind 
can make progress is hardly pompous and elitist. The extreme relativist is 
left to explain what ordinary people would never deny -- the progress of 
human civilization via the development of the human mind. If ordinary 
people would never deny the progress of human civilization, HESers should 
be careful not to deny the progress of ideas in economics. 
 
        I don't believe that Professor Henderson is an extreme relativist. 
In describing the approaches of "sociologizing" and "contextualizing" and 
after rejecting "whig history," he says that both approaches "emphasize the 
view that economics is a knowledge-producing enterprise." It seems obvious 
that when we presume that knowledge is produced we are making an implicit 
judgment about the adequacy of the "thing" that is produced. So I believe 
that his real message is simply that HESers ought to pay more attention to 
historical context. Read the masters first, he says, then head off to the 
archives, read the correspondence, the discussions at professional 
meetings, the book reviews, contemporary magazines, etc. My recommendation 
is: Don't get lost in the archives, as fascinating as you may find them. 
Don't forget that you came there to study knowledge-production -- the 
replacement of a less adequate idea with one that is more adequate. 
 
        One final comment. I would recommend being careful when discussing 
the control over a scientist's choices. Economists seem to differ radically 
regarding the "proportion" of their moves that are "free" and "forced," to 
use the words referred to by Professor Henderson. It seems quite reasonable 
to presume that everyone is partly a product of his environment (nature and 
nurture) and partly a free spirit (a distinctly human being). But it seems 
equally reasonable to presume that the "mix" varies from person to person. 
Were Einstein's moves forced or free, compared with his contemporaries? It 
seems quite possible that those who produced more adequate economic ideas 
are the same as those who rank highest on the freedom scale. 
        Of course, to make a free move does not insure the production of 
knowledge. Don Quixote also made free moves. Nevertheless, to produce 
knowledge may require that one make a free move. 
 
-- 
 
Pat Gunning 
http://stsvr.showtower.com.tw/~gunning/welcome 
 
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